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Abstract
This thesis presents an economic analysis of the electricity industry in Iran. 
The first three chapters of this study deal with a detailed examination of the industry, 
the theory of efficient electricity pricing and the policy implications for Iran. The next 
three chapters are concerned with efficient electricity production. They consist of a 
survey of the methodology, previous studies, empirical applications and discussion of 
the policy implications. The completed thesis comprises seven substantive chapters.
This study not only provides efficiency scores for the Iranian electricity industry 
relative to the efficient frontier for electricity production, but also as a by-product, an 
efficiency comparison of the electricity industry in 26 developing countries. The 
average level of technical efficiencies in the electricity industry of these developing 
countries, the Iranian power plants and regional distribution organizations are 
estimated at 77%, 72.7% and 81% respectively. They are based on a two-year panel 
data of 26 developing countries, six-year unbalanced panel data of thirty Iranian 
power plants and one cross-section of thirty distribution organizations taken in 1995.
This thesis utilizes two popular techniques; Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SPA) and 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DBA). The use of both SPA and DBA extends the 
capabilities of addressing issues in ways that would otherwise not be available. 
Econometric models using panel data are employed to investigate technical 
inefficiencies. The Malmquist index approach is applied to investigate technological 
change, technical and scale efficiency changes in the electricity industry in the sample 
of developing countries as well as Iranian power plants. The DBA efficiency scores 
are used in Tobit models to determine which factors are the main causes of 
inefficiency. The information obtained using all these approaches will enable policy 
makers to find ways of raising efficiency levels. This study may prove to be a useful 
reference in efficiency measurement and electricity pricing in the Iranian economy. 
The results may have wider applicability because the Iranian electricity supply 
industry resembles many other developing countries.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Electricity plays a vital role in modem economies. It is considered a core 
activity in the economic development plans of most countries. In Iran, in common 
with many other countries, a considerable amount of attention has been given to the 
question of electricity generation in order to facilitate the reconstmction of the 
economy and development process. In short, one of the most important objectives of 
the electricity industry is to guarantee continuity of electricity supply which is of vital 
importance for sustained economic development in Iran.
The requirement of large investments in the power sector and the rising cost of 
electricity generation have intensified the need for increased efficiency. Economists 
usually distinguish between two main aspects of efficiency during performance 
analysis, namely technical and allocative efficiencies. Technical efficiency deals with 
performance within the firm whereas allocative efficiency is concerned with 
performance of the firm in the market.
As implied from the empirical work, the cost of electricity production is unnecessarily 
high in Iran, and the government provides a large amount of subsidies; therefore 
technical inefficiency is costly to society at large. The nominal price of electricity is 
also low relative to its shadow price in Iran, so that users do not pay enough attention 
to using it efficiently. In other words, allocative inefficiency is now a national 
problem (SANAT-E-BARQ,1996). As the World Bank (1994a) argued, the Iranian 
electricity industry needs advice on loss reduction (efficient electricity production) 
and tariff setting (efficient electricity pricing). These two aspects of efficiency (i.e. 
technical and allocative) are not, however, independent because the pricing of 
electricity will be influenced by the absolute and relative costs of electricity 
production.
In many countries public utilities are run inefficiently, so that inefficiency appears to 
be a widespread problem (World Bank, 1997). The growing move towards
privatisation of electricity industries across the world is partly on the grounds of 
efficiency improvements (Yunos and Hawdon,!997). The principle gains sought from 
privatisation are lower costs and prices that reflect costs.
This thesis presents a comprehensive overview of the Iranian electricity industry with 
emphasis on electricity pricing and technical efficiency of electricity provision, which 
are both critical economic issues. The concern is the severe under-pricing of 
electricity as well as the existence of low technical efficiency in electricity provision.
In this study, efficient electricity pricing is introduced as the most effective tool for 
demand side management. On the supply side, technical efficiency is taken into 
consideration. The hypothesis states that technical inefficiency is a significant factor 
in explaining the under performance of the Iranian electricity industry. However, there 
is no empirical evidence in the case of Iran, and this study is the first of its kind. In 
short, it attempts to present an efficient electricity pricing and sound management 
strategy including the likely potential for privatising the Iranian electricity industry.
This thesis uses the frontier analysis approach to measure technical efficiency. 
Standard firontier analyses have mostly used static fi'ameworks, where inputs and 
outputs do not involve time in any essential manner. The issue of dynamic efficiency 
is central to analyses of capital accumulation and economic growth. In models of 
economic growth for the whole economy the long run version of the dynamic 
production fi-ontier occupies a central role. The treatment of efficiency analysis in the 
dynamic environment can be found in Sengupta (1995, 1996b, 1997). Since my 
concern is with the efficiency of current production, I have chosen to use the static 
models. There is a vast number of applications of frontier methodology in other 
countries, so that efficiency measurement is now commonplace in a wide spectrum of 
empirical studies. In the DEA approach, the efficiency frontier is calculated under 
alternative assumptions of constant and variable returns to scale. The latter 
assumption allows scale and technical efficiency to be evaluated separately (Banker, 
Chames and Cooper, 1984). In the electricity industry, an input-based technical
efficiency approach is usually examined because the amount of electricity generated 
and distributed can be considered as given in an output regulated system. Thus, my 
concern is to compare the ability of different units to provide electricity by using as 
few resources as possible. From a policy point of view, one effective way to put 
pressure on inefficient firms is to publish measures of efficiency and productivity 
trends. When the performance of a firm is inferior relative to other firms in the 
industry, it is highlighted and the reference set and determinants of efficiency could 
then be used as a guidance.
The investigation is conducted using unique panel data fiom 1987 and 1988 for a 
sample of the electricity industries of 26 developing countries, including Iran (The 
term panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross-section of countries 
over several time periods). The power plants and regional distribution organisations of 
Iran are also examined in detail. This analysis is the first to apply stochastic frontier 
analysis to panel data for developing countries. The use of both SFA and DEA 
methodologies made it feasible to examine the electricity supply industry in a vast 
arena. In addition, confidence in the results is likely to be greater.
1.1 Hypotheses and objectives
The main hypothesis of this study is that there is room for increasing efficiency in the 
Iranian electricity industry, namely, efficient use of resources, with considerable scope 
for this industry to practice better management. With regard to efficient electricity 
pricing, the goal is the maximisation of social welfare. It would then be useful to 
specify a well-defined rule that motivates the Iranian electricity industry to charge 
economically efficient prices. Efficient electricity production can then serve as an 
effective offset against the likely pressures of electricity price adjustment. It is argued 
that the electricity industry should not only enlarge its role through active 
participation in conservation measures on the demand side (SANAT-E-BARQ,1997), 
but also most importantly, could take measures to induce yardstick competition in 
cost reduction among power plants as well as distribution organisations to improve
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supply side efficiency (Shleifer,1985). The chief objective is to investigate ways of 
making the Iranian power industry more efficient and responding to the needs of the 
21st century.
The crucial point of this study is to find out how technical efficiency can be improved 
and by how much. Is the form of ownership a determinant of the efficient operation of 
the electricity supply industry? This study is likely to be helpful for managers to know 
how well they are performing, and how much more they could achieve. Moreover, as 
Farrell (1957) originally argued, information concerning the relative efficiency of the 
individual firms has many policy implications.
The literature argues that, owing to recent developments in the technology of plant 
construction and demand growth, economies of scale in electricity generation are 
exhausted. This has significantly reduced the advantages of natural monopoly and 
public ownership in electricity generation. To see the results of such empirical studies 
reference should be made to studies of developed countries, particularly those of the 
US. There has been no equivalent empirical investigation of the Iranian electricity 
industry to examine this claim. One of the main objectives of this study is to provide 
such an empirical investigation.
Productivity is generally defined in terms of the efficiency with which inputs are 
transformed into useful output. In Iran, the earliest approach to productivity 
measurement was based on ratios of a measure or index of aggregate output divided 
by the observed quantity of a single input, typically labour (among them Asheghian, 
1982). Such productivity indices might render misleading results regarding the overall 
efficiency of the firms. In addition they are without theoretical foundations (Pitt and 
Lee, 1981). This thesis sets out to conduct a frontier analysis, to present efficiency 
measurement via the most advanced techniques grounded in economic theory. In 
embodying all inputs and outputs simultaneously, frontier analysis can be interpreted 
as a generalisation of traditional ratio analysis.
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1.2 Outline of the study
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 provides an economic analysis 
of the Iranian electricity supply industry and addresses some of the basic issues. This 
is followed by a presentation of the theory of efficient electricity pricing in chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodologies of efficiency measurement (DEA and SFA) and 
demonstrates how the technical efficiency based on Farrell’s technical efficiency 
concept is measured. This chapter also discusses the input-based Malmquist 
productivity index and its decomposition.
Chapter 5 reviews previous studies of electricity generation and distribution. It 
presents the arguments of previous studies, methodology, model specification, 
assumptions and the definition of variables. Chapter 6 is devoted to empirical work 
and estimation of technical inefficiency of the Iranian electricity industry relative to 
25 electricity utilities in other developing countries using panel data. It is followed by 
detailed investigations of the Iranian power plants and distribution organisations.
Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the study. It presents an overall conclusion and 
comments on policy implications. Some suggestions for future research are also 
offered. The appendices and references are to be found at the end.
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Chapter 2
An economic analysis of the Iranian electricity industry
2.1 Introduction and background
Twenty years after the invention of electric power by Edison, T (21 Oct. 1879) 
electricity was first introduced into Iran. However, the history of the electricity industry 
in Iran begins in 1904 when a 400 KW generator acquired by an Iranian merchant, 
Haaj Amin-ul-Zarb, was installed in Tehran. The major development of the electricity 
industry commenced in the 1960s. Until then, there was no central agency to direct, 
control or guide the electricity supply industry. The public municipalities and private 
companies had established their own power plants but electricity supply was 
unsatisfactory. Supply was unreliable, voltage conditions were very poor, lines and 
installations were far from safe, distribution facilities were inadequate and the tariff 
charged was high (UN, 1962). Under these conditions Iran recognised that urgent 
attention should be paid to the organisation, control and regulation of the industry, and 
in January 1963 an organisation called the Iran Electric Authority was established. In 
1964, after the creation of the Ministry of Water and Power, The Iran Electric 
Authority became a subsidiary of this Ministry. Planning statistics were first collected 
in 1964, but detailed statistical data has only been published since 1967. The Ministry of 
Water and Power was renamed the Ministry of Energy in 1974.
The Iranian electricity supply industry has been mainly under the control of the 
government since 1965 when the nationalisation law was ratified by the government 
(Ministry of Energy, 1981). The then government decided to invest directly in the 
electricity industry and encourage the private sector to invest in other industries (e.g. 
manufacturing). A common argument was that the electricity industry as a whole was 
a natural monopoly due to production economies of scale. The government argued the 
importance of providing ample supplies of electricity at reasonable rates was a basic 
necessity for economic development (UN, 1965,1967). It was hoped that a publicly
13
owned monopoly would be able to operate the electricity supply industry on a large 
scale and would be induce cost reduction of electricity production. However, the 
costs recorded were high, and electricity tariffs did not keep up with the growth in 
costs, which far exceeded revenue. Between 1967-1980 the average revenue of 1 kwh 
of electricity was equal to its average cost in one year 1976 alone, and only rose above 
average cost in 1982 and 1988 (Azani, 1993).
The first economic development plan after the Islamic Revolution (1979) was initiated 
in August 1988 after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The main objectives of the first five- 
year development plan (1989-1993) were to economise electricity production and 
eliminate subsidies by receiving full cost from consumers. However, the electricity 
industry has mostly been faced with losses. For instance, in 1996, the average cost of 
electricity production based on domestic ftiel prices was Rls.105 per kwh, while its 
average revenue was Rls.49.5, so that the subsidy paid by the Ministry of Energy per 
kwh was Rls. 55.5. i.e., the electricity has been sold at less than half (47%) its average 
cost. Ironically, it seems such a loss has not been of any serious concern, since deficits 
in the electricity industry budgets have been mostly met from the country’s oil 
revenue.
In June 1997, the electricity subsidies per kwh that were being paid by the Ministry of 
Energy to various electricity customers were as follows: Agriculture = Rls. 101.5, 
Residential = Rls.76.6, General & Public = Rls.60.7, Industry = Rls.32.9 and 
Commerce = Rls.5.4 (SANAT-E-BARQ,1997). On the other hand, as the Deputy 
Energy Minister in Power Affairs pointed out (Interview, 8th Jan. 1997), the Ministry 
of Energy is itself receiving subsidies from the government in the form of:
1. Low fuel prices for electricity generation
The Ministry of Energy purchases oil products and natural gas from the Ministry of 
Petroleum at heavily subsidised prices.
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2. Allocation of governmental exchange rates
It is worth noting that, in the era after Islamic Revolution, the huge subsidies on 
consumer goods, as well as those on industrial and agricultural inputs were partially in 
the form of preferential exchange rates (Farzin, 1995). Capital investments are also 
heavily subsidised through the preferential exchange rate (World Bank, 1994a).
3. Access to state-owned banking system facilities
4. Exemption from some customs and commercial rules
5. Allocation of the country’s income revenues (annual budget set)
6. Low tax commitment (payment)
In an effort to reduce the governmental subsidy provided to the electricity industry, 
the government intends to increase the degree of decentralised decision making in the 
power sector. The first BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) contract (1995) for building 
a thermal power plant (1000 MW) in the Kerman city was aimed at meeting this 
objective. Under the BOT model, private investors construct the power station, sell 
power to the electricity industry for an agreed price, then, once the debt is paid off, 
transfer the power station to the electricity industry at a nominal price (Sullivan, 
1990). The Ministry of Energy is encouraging foreign investment in the electricity 
industry on a BOT basis. The Minister has declared that the country will cooperate with 
efficient foreign companies that are ready to transfer technical know-how to Iran and 
enter into long-term cooperation with the Ministry of Energy. The Ministry will also 
hand over some of its affiliated companies to the private sector in the future (S ANAT- 
E-BARQ,1997).
Given the allocation of huge subsidies to the electricity industry, it can be argued that 
the electricity production and pricing policies in Iran are unlikely to be regarded as 
economically efficient. The annual subsidies may reflect managerial/scale inefficiency
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in electricity operations. Investigation into what went wrong, may avoid mistakes in 
the future. It seems that economic analysis, particularly applied to the costing and 
pricing of electricity, may be an incentive for improving the efficiency of electricity 
supply and also discourage wasteful consumption of electricity.
2.2. Structure of the electricity industry
In the 1890s the appearance of large steam turbines allowed the development of the 
thermal power plants around the world. However, it was not until 1959 that the first 
steam power plant (Shahid Firozi power station) was built in Tehran. The electricity 
supply industry has been based mostly upon thermal power plants in Iran (Table A1.2, 
Figure 2.1).
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During the last 28 years the hydro-power plants contributed, on average, 21% of the 
Iranian electricity requirements. This contribution was only 9.1% in 1994 (Table A1.3). 
Considering that the country (Tehran as an indicator) had a mean annual rainfall below 
250 mm during the last three decades (Table A 1.8b), it is expected that thermal not 
hydro power generation will play an important role in the future; there is no nuclear 
power.
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There are three categories of thermal power plants; steam turbine, gas turbine and diesel 
generator. During the period 1977-1994 the share of gas turbines in the country's 
electricity production was risen while the share of diesel generators has remained at a 
low level (Table A1.5). The population grew so fast (e.g. at 1.95 percent annum during 
the period 1986-1996) that the government could hardly satisfy electrical needs, and the 
country suffered a large breakdown in generating capacity. The daily life of residents in 
both urban and rural areas was often disrupted by frequent electricity blackouts. Given 
the urgency of meeting demand, gas turbines were seen as the quick way of adding new 
generating capacity. In general, gas turbines tend to be used for peaking purposes 
because they require much quality fuel and have relatively low technical efficiency. In 
Iran, some existing open cycle gas turbine plants are being converted to combined cycle 
operation through adjusting the steam cycle equipment. As can be seen later on, the use 
of gas turbines in combination with steam turbines in combined cycle plants is 
advisable.
In 1985, around 26% of the electricity produced by the Ministry of Energy came from 
gas turbines, about 15% came from hydro, 55% was from steam power plants and the 
remaining 3.8% was produced by diesel generators. Gas turbines accounted for 20% of 
the total electricity production in 1994 (Table A1.5). The dominant mode of electricity 
generation in Iran is steam-driven turbines where the steam is produced by fossil-fuel- 
fired boilers (Table A1.4, Figure 2.2).
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In the past, due to mostly political considerations, the nominal prices of domestic fuel 
were kept at fixed levels. Consequently, following the high inflation rates in the last 
two decades, fuel is supplied almost free of charge to the Ministry of Energy by the 
Ministry of Petroleum (World Bank, 1994a). It is expected that the economic 
efficiency of the electricity production is low, partly due to low fuel prices (allocative 
inefficiency) and partly because of the relatively high share of gas turbines (technical 
inefficiency) in the production process. The estimated average technical inefficiency 
is 27.3%, indicating that the Iranian power plants were only 72.7% technically 
efficient over the period 1990 to 1995. The econometric result indicates that, in order 
to increase the technical efficiency of the Iranian power stations, the gas turbine 
power plants should take decreasing share in electricity production.
2.3 Distribution organisations for electricity
During the era after the Islamic Revolution (1979) the Ministry of Energy was largely 
concerned with the expansion of electricity generation in order to satisfy electricity 
demand. Thermal power plants were badly damaged during the eight year Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-1988). The electricity industry had insufficient generating capacity to meet 
current needs, and was faced with increasing demand from a rapidly growing 
population. Therefore, the focus was on production aspects. This led to a neglect of 
distribution side of electricity which suffered from under-investment compared to
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production. The cost of distribution services was increased in the 1980-1988 period, 
while the quality of service fell (SANAT-E-BARQ,1996).
In 1981 there were eleven organisations responsible for the distribution and sale of 
electricity. During 1992, in an effort to improve the organisational structure of the 
electricity industry, these were reorganised into 24 distribution organisations. The 
public distribution organisations obtain electricity from the national system, and are 
obliged to supply electricity in their corresponding distribution area to all domestic, 
commercial and other customers. By 1995 the number of distribution organisations 
had been increased to 30. Supply of safe and high quality electricity to the consumers 
at the least possible cost are among the main objectives of the power distribution 
organisations. Each public distribution organisation is administered by a publicly 
authorised manager appointed by the Ministry of Energy.
The Ministry of Energy realized the necessity of evaluating the performance of the 
distribution organisations, and in October 1995 inspectors were sent to evaluate their 
activities. Their performances (based on some qualitative and quantitative criteria) 
were ranked as excellent, very good and good. The results were published as follows 
(Table 2.1).
2.1 Official performance evaluation of the distribution organisations in 1994
Distribution Organisations Ranking
Ghazveen, Mashad, Zanjan, Khorasan and Azarbaijan Gharbi Excellent
Pars, Markazi, Khozestan, Isfahan, Tehran, Gharb Tehran, Bushehr, 
Hormozgan, Semnan, Azarbaijan Sharghi, Mazandaran, Ardebil, Kerman, 
Qum, Hamadan, Lorestan, Sistan & Balochestan, Gilan, Kordestan, Yazd, 
Kermanshah, Kokeeloeh & Booyer Ahmad.
Very Good
Char Mahal Bakhtiari and Ham Good
Source: The Ministry o f Energy, PAIK- E-BARQ, Newsletter, No.25, 1995, Page 10.
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In the Ministry’s Newsletter (PAIK-E-BARQ,No.25,1995) copying the practice of the 
successful distribution organisation (Pars) was recommended to less successful 
organisations in order to tackle inefficiency. It is interesting to note that the empirical 
work (see chapter 6) also introduces the Pars distribution organisation, as a strong 
yardstick candidate (a dominant reference set). The General Manager of the Pars 
distribution organisation with his colleagues are admired by the Minister of Energy 
for functioning well in other aspects (PAIK-E-BARQ,No.28,1995).
In the absence of any frontier analysis regarding technical efficiency of the 
distribution organisations, the Ministry of Energy is inclined to rely on its own 
criteria. The existing method of performance evaluation has some drawbacks; Pirstly 
it does not present quantitative measures of efficiency for each organisation. Secondly 
the procedure for selection of reference sets for inefficient units is not straightforward. 
The Ministry of Energy could use the frontier analysis (DEA/SPA approaches) in 
order to monitor the performance of the electricity distribution organisations as well 
as the power plants.
2.4 Ownership and institutional structure
Historically, electricity supply industries were mostly operated by publicly-owned 
enterprises with a high degree of integration. In the world, the most significant step in 
integrating the electricity industry and passing control to the government took place 
shortly after the Second World War in 1946, when legislation was approved by the 
Prench parliament creating Electricité de Prance as a state-owned integrated utility. In 
Iran the nationalisation law was ratified by the government in August 1965. By 1969 
nearly all the electricity industry was nationalised and the regional distribution 
companies were set up by the government, which was a step towards improving the 
administration of the electricity supply industry. Private installations were purchased 
and work transferred to the responsibility of the Regional Companies. The institutional 
arrangement of the each regional company was similar to that of the Ministry, 
comprising engineering, commercial, financial and administrative departments. All
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regional companies were supervised by the Ministry of Water and Power (UN, 1969). At 
the same time, the Iranian power generation and transmission company (TAVANIR) 
was established for the purpose of generation and transmission of electricity for bulk 
sales to the regional companies and very large customers.
It seems that the traditional approach to electricity supply is being changed. In 1990s, 
the liberalisation (restructuring and privatisation) of electricity industries was well under 
way (World Bank, 1994b, 1997). The literature on electricity sector reform is extensive 
(among them Pollitt, 1997). In Iran, after the Iran-Iraq war, due to the emergence of new 
circumstances in the country, privatisation of the public manufacturing enterprises with 
the aim of increasing efficiency and structural adjustment was approved by the Board of 
Ministers in 1991. Decentralising policies were taken into consideration for the 
electricity industry. In practice, based on the legislation by the Board of Ministers some 
duties and responsibilities of the Power Affair Deputy of the Ministry of Energy were 
given to the Iranian power generation and transmission company (TAVANIR) and the 
name of this company was also changed into the Iranian power generation and 
transmission organisation (SANAT-E-BARQ, 1997).
The government is considering a role for the private sector in building power stations 
and generating electricity. The most important policy measure, adopted in 1994, was the 
law passed by the Iranian parliament which obliges the Ministry of Energy to purchase 
electricity at guaranteed price from the private sector. These policies are intended to 
encourage the private sector, which was entirely absent from the Iranian electricity 
supply industry since 1980, to invest in the electricity generation (Table 2.2).
During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and unfavourable macro-economic conditions, the 
private sectors mostly invested in activities which enabled them to get a quick return on 
capital; this did not include the electricity industry. In Iran, due to a long period of 
investment and prevailing low tariffs, the private investors require the necessary 
guarantees by the government for their investment and involvement in the electricity
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supply industry. Seven to eight years are needed to build a hydro power plant, and 
nearly five years are needed for the construction of a steam power plant in Iran.
‘MW”
2.2 Total installed capacity by ownership 
(1968-1992)
Year Publicly owned Self-Generating Industries Privately owned
1968 1008 761 75
1969 1313 704 69
1970 1396 723 69
1971 1997 770 40
1972 2094 770 40
1973 2794 1214 109
1974 3215 1263 102
1975 3449 1319 82
1976 3689 1363 78
1977 5571 1415 119
1978 7024 1438 127
1979 7931 1438 135
1980 9628 1600 0
1981 10232 1600 0
1982 10308 1600 0
1983 10922 2089 0
1984 11419 2230 0
1985 12369 2352 0
1986 13011 2526 0
1987 13311 2678 0
1988 13681 2865 0
1989 14442 2985 0
1990 14803 3149 0
1991 14848 3306 0
1992 16313 3471 0
Sources:
UN, Electric Power in Asia &Pacific, 1981 &1982, 1985 &1986, 1987&1988, 1991 & 1992 
Ministry of Energy, Development Trend of Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), Aug. 1995
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2.5 Economic performance and electricity demand
In this section, performance of the Iranian economy in the last three decades along with 
the electricity demand, particularly, in the residential sector are examined. Economic 
activities have a strong effect on the demand for electricity directly (residential sector) or 
indirectly (industrial sector). Such relationships can be quantified by the income 
elasticities of demand for electricity. Improvement an economic performance implies 
rising electricity demand, it is therefore necessary to look more closely at the Iranian 
economy.
2.5.1 Economic performance
During the last three decades, five different periods in economic performance of the 
Iranian economy can be distinguished (Table A1.8a, Figure 2.3).
1. From 1967 to 1977, GNP followed an upward trend due to increasing oil revenues 
and favourable international conditions.
2. During the period 1978-1981, the overall performance of the economy was poor. The 
Revolution-related problems along with the outbreak of the war resulted in a deep 
recession and decreasing GNP. In the meantime, the imbalance between aggregated 
demand and supply accelerated the inflationary pressures on the economy.
3. In 1982-1985, by contrast, more security for oil exports set the stage for a mild 
economic recovery for four consecutive years. The impressive victories of the Iranian 
armies facilitated a sharp increase in the volume of oil exports as well as enhanced 
public confidence.
4. During 1986-1988, the Iranian economy faced drastic stagnation due to the collapse 
of world oil prices and the effect of war damage. Economic activities were severely 
affected by the foreign exchange constraints and the intensification of Iraqi air raids on
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economic installations and residential areas. The outcome was a downward trend in 
GNP.
5. Since 1989, following the peace settlement, different policies from the emergency 
conditions during the Iran-Iraq war period (1980-1988) were followed. The government 
began a dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for 
an extensive economic reform program (Farzin, 1995). Some steps were taken towards 
the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy. The dominant government role in the 
economy was reduced and an increasingly important role for the private sector was 
emphasised. The structural adjustment program was started by relative liberalisation of 
foreign trade and the gradual elimination of various subsidies. From 1989 onwards an 
economic upturn, even though at a low level, can be seen (Table AI .8a, Figure 3).
3.Trend of GNP based on prices of 1990 
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2.5.2 Electricity demand
The level of electricity consumption in Iran was very low until 1967 compared with 
developed countries. For instance, in 1951 electricity consumption per capita was about 
12 kwh compared to above 1000 kwh in Europe and US. This latter figure can be 
compared with per capita electricity consumption of Iran in 1993 (Table AI.15). In Iran, 
domestic end-use energy consumption pattern is dominated by petroleum products 
which accounted for 66.6% of energy consumption in 1993, with natural gas second 
with 24.3%, whereas solid fiiel and the consumption of electricity accounted for 2% and 
7% respectively (Table A1.14). Iran, in common with many other developing countries.
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is experiencing a substantially high rate of increase in demand for electricity. Following 
the Islamic Revolution, the Ministry of Energy has paid particular attention to rural 
electrification. In other words, there was a remarkable shift from the use of fossil fuels 
to electricity consumption (Tables A1.13, A1.14). The rural population of Iran was 
38.7% of total population in 1996. It means that there is a potential for electricity 
consumption to increase in the future.
In recent years the growth of total electricity consumption has been around 10% (Table 
A1.15). Electricity demand has been growing fast and did not witness a fall during the 
1980s. Residential electricity consumption has increased continuously over the past 
28 years from 473 million kwh in 1967 to 22,473 million kwh in 1994. The total 
number of customers has also increased from 0.8 million to 11.7 million in 1967 and 
1994 respectively (Tables A1.6,A1.13). Hence residential electricity consumption has 
acquired a significant position in total electricity consumption. Since 1982 the 
consumption of electricity in the residential sector has increased faster than other 
sectors, so that more than one-third of the total Iranian electricity consumption is used 
for household purposes. The argument asserts that the residential sector has played an 
important role in the profile of the electricity consumption in Iran (Table A1.7, Fig2.4)
2.4 Trend of electricity consumption (1967-1994)
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Having considered such upward trends in electricity consumption, it is difficult to 
imagine an electricity balance between supply and demand using thermal power plants 
in the long-run. Moreover, in the light of environmental concern as well as diminishing 
Iranian oil reserves, important steps should be taken in order to have access to other
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sources of electricity generation such as nuclear power, and solar energy. Some years 
ago (1974), a plan to establish nuclear power plants, involving installation of 20 atomic 
energy plants with a total capacity of 23000 megawatts, was implemented by the 
Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. However, this plan has not become operational 
until now. It is worth noting that nuclear power can play an important role in the future 
if the economic and political conditions work in its favour.
Electricity is typically a normal good; both income growth and electricity consumption 
growth move in the same direction (Bohi, 1981). However, in Iran, there have been 
periods when income has decreased, while electricity consumption has increased (Table 
A1.8.a). How can this be explained? It is expected that electricity price has had a more 
significant effect than income on electricity consumption. Electricity demand modelling 
offers an understanding of the relationship between electricity consumption and its 
major determinants (price and income).
2.5.3 Modelling residential demand for electricity
Econometric modelling and the estimation of price and income elasticities of 
electricity demand are important for management and electricity pricing. While many 
studies of electricity demand are available for developed countries, relatively few 
have been undertaken for developing countries. There is, no published study on the 
estimation of price and income elasticities for Iran. Since the knowledge of such 
estimates is also crucial for efficient electricity pricing, this section attempts to 
provide them.
Residential demand for electricity is derived from consumer preferences on the basis 
of rational behaviour such as utility maximisation. It is usually assumed that 
consumers seek to allocate expenditures of income among available commodities in 
order to obtain the greatest degree of satisfaction from total expenditure. There is 
unanimous agreement that the price of electricity is important and that price has an 
inverse relationship with electricity consumption (Bohi, 1981). Gross National
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Product (GNP) has also been identified as one of the most important determinants of 
electricity demand and has been incorporated in the electricity demand functions. The 
GNP accounts for the effects of varying economic activity, growth in population and 
so on.
Changes in temperatures are incorporated in some studies examining the demand for 
electricity in order to account for seasonal variation in demand, mainly for the heating 
of the residential sector (among them Donatos and Mergos, 1991). However, the 
variations in temperatures have less explanatory power in studies using annual data. 
Obviously, there is a larger temperature variation between seasons than between 
years. The prices of competing fuels are often incorporated in demand functions to 
account for the consumers who observe prices and substitute one fuel for another 
(among them Chem and Bouis, 1988). Having reviewed the relevant literature, Bohi 
(1981) concluded that the results of the cross-price effects are inconsistent, and there 
is no basis to properly judge the nature of the true cross-price elasticity of electricity.
The Model
After examining different variables in model specification of electricity demand 
(Tables A1.8a, A 1.8b), the preferred model is introduced by a standard demand 
function. This form has been very common in studies of the residential demand for 
electricity (among them Bltony, 1995). The model is as follows:
E = aY“ pP
To simplify the estimation, a log-linear model is considered.
LE = y + aLY + p LP 
Where
E is residential electricity consumption per capita 
Y is real Gross National Product per capita 
P is average real price of electricity for residential sector 
LE = Log (E), LY = Log (Y) and LP = Log (P)
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Data and empirical results
The data used in this section consists of a sample of annual observations covering the 
period 1967-1994 for the explanatory factors of residential electricity demand. All of 
the data were extracted from the official publications of the Ministry of Energy, the 
Central Bank and the Statistics Centre of Iran. The unique price of electricity for 
residential sector was provided by the Head of CPI Department at the Central Bank of 
Iran (Tables A1.8a, A1.8b).
Methodology and time series properties of the variables
The observations are based on times series data. As Maddala (1992) argues, time 
series data may be non-stationary in the sense that means and variances depend on 
time. If the variables are found to be non-stationary, then it is important to investigate 
whether there is cointegration between these variables. The concept of cointegration 
provides an important link between the interrelationships of integrated processes and 
the concept of steady-state equilibrium. The theory of cointegration is developed in 
Granger (1981,1986) and elaborated in Engle and Granger (1987). They have shown 
that if y and x are both integrated of order d, 1(d), then there exists an Error Correction 
Model (ECM). To take an example, if y and x are both 1(1) series and are 
cointegrated, with cointegrating parameter k, then there necessarily exists an ECM 
which will be of the form (Nankervis, 1995):
AY, = p, + pzAX, + Pg (Y,., - KX,J + G,
The model is expressed in terms of variables that are all 1(0). In other words, the 
model is said to be balanced. Cointegration techniques and Error Correction Model 
(ECM) are useful as means of explicitly distinguishing long- and short-run effects of 
economic variables on energy consumption (Silk and Joutz, 1997).
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Test for Unit Roots and Cointegration
In the unit root test, the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root, i.e., the time series 
are difference stationary. The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests are popular methods of testing for unit roots. To test LE, LY and LP for 
non-stationary, the following equation for each variable, must be estimated (e.g., LE)
ALE, = Y + ôt + (P -l)LE,_i + s 
ALE = LE-LE(-1)
To test Hq : p = 1 LE, is 1(1), a random walk with drift
against H, : p < 1 LE, is trend stationary
For LE, LP and LY, the DF and ADF tests are shown that the null hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected. The absolute values of the DF and ADF statistics are not large 
enough to justify rejecting the hypothesis of non-stationary. However, it suggests that 
the first difference of variables is stationary (Table 2.3).
2.3 DF and ADF tests for the Unit Roots
Series DF ADF
LE - 0.045412 (-3.5867) 0.57731 (-3.5943)
LY - 1.5744 (-3.5867) -1.9678 (-3.5943)
LP - 2.2880 (-3.5867) -3.5276 (-3.5943)
95% critical values in brackets
The variables are found to be non-stationary, and so the second step is to investigate 
the possibility of cointegration between these variables (LE , LY and LP). The null 
hypothesis tested is that there is no cointegration, i.e., there is no long-run 
relationship. A test for cointegration can be thought of as a pre-test to avoid a spurious 
regression problem (Granger, 1986). When variables are cointegrated, it is expected 
that the residuals in this equation will behave like an 1(0) process. By the DF and ADF
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statistics, the null of no co-integration could not be rejected. That is, the residuals 
from the regression are not stationary. It seems that the structural changes due to the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran should be relevant. Therefore, the dummy variable (D) was 
included in the model to allow for different intercepts, when variables found to be co­
integrated. By rejecting the null of a random walk for residuals, the regression of LE 
on LY, LP, and D by OLS estimator to be a good estimator of coefficients.
LE = 4.59 + 0.55 LY - 0.91 LP + 0.28 D
The cointegrating regression gives the estimated long-run income elasticity of demand 
for electricity as 0.55. For every 10 percent increase in income, it is estimated that 
electricity consumption increases by 5.5 percent, ceteris paribus, an income inelastic 
response. The estimated long-run price elasticity of demand for electricity is - 0.91. 
These findings are of a magnitude consistent with other studies of residential demand 
for electricity (among them, Pouris, 1987 and Nielsen, 1993). The coefficient of D 
indicates that following the Islamic Revolution, independent electricity consumption 
has increased by 6%. It might be due to the government policy in supplying electricity 
firee of charge (first block of electricity consumption) to residential consumers (Tables 
2.4, A1.19).
Engle-Granger’s Error Correction Model
For estimation of the short-run elasticities of price and income for residential 
electricity demand, the Engle-Granger’s two-step is one solution. As Engle and 
Granger (1987) proposed, in the first step the parameters of the co-integrating vector 
were estimated and in the second step these are used in the Error Correction Model 
(ECM) to estimate the short-run income and price elasticities. The justification behind 
this procedure is that since the cointegrating regression provides a good estimator of 
the long run elasticities, those estimates should be used in the ECM. Therefore, step 
one of the Engle-Granger procedure was to estimate the cointegrating regression to 
obtain the residuals (RES). Step two presents the preferred model as follows:
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ALE =0.10 +0.24 ALY - 0.10 ALP -0.31 RES (-1)
(t statistics) (2.593) (- 0.756) (-2.274)
R '= 0.310, RSS = 0.097241, DW =1.63, Z1 = 0.32, Z2 = 2.84, (1968-1994)
Z1 and Z2 are the Langrange Multiplier test statistics (LM) for first-order 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity respectively. Both have % ^  distribution with 1 
d.f. under the null hypothesis. There are no problems with the autocorrelation 
statistics in the equation and the hypothesis of heterscedasticity can be rejected. 
Although R^  is relatively low, this is natural, because the variations in differences are 
explained (ALE). The estimated short-run income and price elasticities for electricity 
are 0.24 and-0.10 respectively.
Hendry’s General-to-Specific modelling approach
In contrast with the previous approach, in this procedure the short run and long run 
elasticities of price and income are estimated at the same time. The General to 
Specific Methodology (Hendry, 1986) is applied to estimate ECM for the residential 
electricity demand. This methodology is mainly applicable to dynamic time-series 
models. One starts with a generally acceptable hypothesis and then the general 
appropriate dynamic model (which is based on levels) is transformed to ECM (which 
is based on differences) and then narrows it down by looking for simplifications that 
are acceptable. Having done the procedure, the preferred model obtained is as 
follows:
A
ALE =1.46 - 0.54 ALE (-1) - 0.32LE(-2) + 0.17ALY + 0.15ALY (-1) + 0.25 LY(-2)
(-2.75) (-2.86) (2.2) (1.87) (3.79)
- 0.13ALP - 0.27LP(-2) + 0.03D(-2)
(-1.14) (-2.47) (0.72)
R" =0.703, RSS = 0.034011, Z1 = 1.583, Z2 = 0.146 (1969-1994)
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The diagnostic statistics suggest that there is no evidence of either first-order 
autocorrelation or of heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the equation. From this 
approach, the estimated short-run and long-run price elasticities of demand for 
electricity are -0.13 and -0.84 respectively. Short-run price elasticity will be lower 
than the long-run because during the short-run, reactions are usually behavioural 
changes, whereas in the long-run conservation effects can appear in connection with 
new appliances. The estimated short-run and long-run income elasticities of electricity 
demand are 0.15 and 0.78 respectively.
Conclusion
Two different methods were applied for the estimation of long-run and short-run 
elasticities of price and income. As Granger (1986) argued, asymptotically both 
methods should yield a valid ECM and hence arrive at the same estimated model. 
Both approaches (Engle-Granger 2 step and Hendry’s methods) have given almost the 
same price elasticity of residential electricity demand -0.10 in the short run, and -0.90 
in the long run, ceteris paribus. These findings indicate that residential demand for 
electricity is price inelastic in both the short-and long-run in Iran. Bohi (1981) also 
argued that in the case of residential demand for electricity the evidence is fairly 
strong that demand is price inelastic. It can be seen that the estimated long run price 
elasticity is higher than that of income in absolute terms. This finding implies that 
price is a more significant determinant of electricity demand than income. This 
finding clarifies the seeming contradiction of an increase in electricity consumption 
during the era of sluggish economic conditions. In fact, one of the main reasons why 
this sector has a high demand for electricity is due to the inability of the pricing 
structure to indicate to consumers the cost of electricity production. Therefore, 
efficient electricity pricing could be a very important tool for demand management, 
especially in the long-run.
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2.6. Electricity supply and operating performance
In this section, the supply side of the Iranian electricity industry is investigated. During 
1967-1994 period, electricity generation increased from 1842 Million Kwh to 77,086 
million kwh (Table A1.2). Though electricity production has been increasing to satisfy 
the demand, it is argued that the operation of power system could not be satisfactory. 
Some standard criteria are used to examine the operating performance of the industry 
(Table A1.17).
2.6.1 Energy utilisation
The electricity industry is an energy waster, consuming large amounts of energy 
unnecessarily. The critical dependence of the Iranian economy on energy exports, 
underlies the need for energy conservation. The issue becomes crucial, when it is noted 
that the energy used for generating electricity was 25.6 percent of the total used in 1993 
(Tables Al.lO, A l.ll). In fact, a significant proportion of the demand for energy 
originates in the electricity generating sector. If domestic energy consumption decreases, 
this amount can be allocated for export. It is particularly meaningful for members of 
OPEC, that are subject to oil production quotas. Energy conservation is also desirable 
due to global warming and environmental problems. Comparable data highlights the 
extent of wasteful energy consumption pattern which needs to be rationalised (Table 
A1.16, Figure 2.5).
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During the 1967-1994 period, energy conservation of the Iranian electricity supply 
industry ranged between 25.6 and 32 percent (Table A1.17). For the energy 
conservation calculations, the quantities of different types of fuel used in the power 
stations were combined by converting them into British thermal unit (Btu) equivalents 
(Tables A1.1 ,A1.29). The formula is as follows:
Energy conservation
electricity generated (Btu) 
fuel inputs (Btu) X 100
In electricity generation the primary mechanism to improve fuel consumption can be 
inter-fuel substitution. Construction of appropriate time-series data, provided an 
opportunity to examine the substitution possibilities among energy forms (fuel oil, gas 
oil and natural gas). In the era after the Islamic revolution, some significant 
modifications were made in the type of fuel consumed by the country’s power plants 
(Tables A1.9, A1.12, Figure 2.6).
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The increasing share of natural gas in thermal power plants reflects the growing 
awareness of natural gas availability and its advantages for generating electricity. Iran 
has 20.7 trillion cubic metres of natural gas which is the second largest endowment in 
the world. Substituting natural gas in power generation, in addition to environmental 
considerations, has dual benefits. The benefits come from both import substitution for 
gas oil deficits and releasing fuel oil for other uses. The decrease of gas oil consumption 
in the country’s power plants is also advisable, because gas oil causes erosion of paddles 
within power plants (field visit, 1997).
2.6.2. Overall electricity loss
The operational performance of the power sector can also be improved by diminishing 
the high system losses. The difference between electricity generated and electricity 
billed has been high in the Iranian electricity industry. The overall electricity loss ratio is 
calculated as follows:
Overall electricity loss ratio =
electricity loss (kwh) 
electricity generated (kwh)
X 100
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the system loss ratio has been increased from 16.1% in 1985 to 18.5% in 1993 (Table 
A 1.17). In comparison, one study indicates that the system loss of Japan was only 6% in 
1991 (Ingco, 1996). Studies carried out by the World Bank suggest that the economic 
level losses on most system is in order of 10-15% (Pearson, 1991). With present 
technology, these losses should generally range between 7% and 10% (Schramm, 1993). 
It can be argued that there is major scope for loss reduction in the Iranian electricity 
industry. Part of these losses are due to non-technical factors such as inaccurate 
metering and billing, un-metered supplies, non-payments (some government 
departments are among the non-payees) and illegal connections. Another factor 
affecting high losses is the poor conditions of the Transmission and Distribution 
network (T&D). Efforts should be made to reduce these losses. Policy implications 
include some strategies to combat non-technical factors as well as improvements in 
Transmission and Distribution facilities.
2.6.3. Capital utilisation
In addition to the need for energy conservation in electricity production, the optimum 
use of capital in electricity generation is also vital for efficient electricity production. It 
is argued that savings can be achieved in the better utilisation of the existing installed 
generating capacity.
Load Factor (LF) is a measure of optimum use of capital (capacity). LF is the ratio of 
the actual output produced to the maximum output of electricity that a plant could 
produce if it were to be operated continually at maximum capacity. It is calculated as 
follows:
electricity generated (Kwh) 
Load factor = x 8760 '
A 100% load factor means that capacity or peak demand is used continuously for 24 
hours a day. A 50% load factor means that capacity is only used for an average of 12
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hours a day. In the case of the Iranian electricity supply industry the average annual load 
factor has ranged from 40% in 1967 to 65.7% in 1990 (Table A1.17). The highest load 
factor in the world which was registered is 92.9% for the state-owned electricity 
company in Thailand (Pollitt,1995). Substantial gains may come from the optimum use 
of existing capacity. Namely, with improvement in load factor, costs can be significantly 
reduced. In the meantime, a high load factor may indicate a near optimal amount of 
plants. It is worth noting that a high load factor, in most countries, may be the outcome 
of the peak load pricing, which can be used in policy making. Peak load pricing refers to 
the pricing of economically non-storable commodities whose demand varies 
periodically. Peak load pricing has been the subject of considerable researches (Crew, et 
al, 1995). In Iran, due to prevailing hot weather during summer and extensive use of air 
conditioning and cooling systems, maximum demand for electricity usually occurs in 
summer, the months of June, July, August and September (Figure 2.7). It is worth 
pointing out that the cooling system of buildings is mostly electric evaporating coolers 
and window type air conditioning. Although evaporating coolers in the dry climate of 
Iran is effective, the design of the present system goes back to the 1960s and does not 
incorporate the latest technological advances (World Bank, 1994a).
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As noted the peak load demand for electricity is highly correlated with hot weather in 
the summer. On the other hand, in the summer due to hot weather the generation of 
thermal electricity is also faced with some limitations (due to increasing oil temperature 
in power stations, field visit, 1997). In addition, in the summer due to shortage of 
rainfall the level of water reserves in the dams are reduced, so that the share of the 
production of the hydro-power stations declines. The problem seems a dilemma for the 
summer. However, interestingly enough, the peak load hours of electricity consumption 
in Iran are not usually the same as a number of its neighbouring countries, therefore, 
electricity exchange among neighbouring countries may be used to optimise their use of 
electricity in the peak load hours (for instance, in Iran Thursdays and Fridays are 
weekends, however in Turkey, Saturdays and Sundays are holidays).The use of more 
advanced technology in cooling systems will lead to less peak load demand for 
electricity in the summer. Encouraging industries to take annual holidays to coincide 
with the summer peak period will be also met this achievement. Tariffs are powerful 
tools to manage electricity demand, they can be used to shift demand and reduce peak 
load demand to minimise capital requirements.
2.7 Electricity prices (Tariffs)
In Iran, electricity consumption of some sectors are facing tariff levels that are too low 
to encourage efficient use of electricity (Figure 2.8).
2.8 Trend of electricity tariffs in different sectors 
Based on prices of 1990 (1974-1994)
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Iranian farmers pay a very low price (Rls.2.5 per kwh, i.e. 2.4% of its average cost in 
1996) for electricity consumption (SANAT-E-BARQ,1997). It is worth noting that due 
to the quota system determined by the Iranian water organisation, those farmers which 
use more than quota, pay more than official price (Interview, 1997).
Iran is amongst the low tariff countries. Its average tariff was US Centl .07 kwh, or 
around 12% of the average tariffs in OECD countries in 1993 (Ministry of Energy, 
1995). Such low levels of tariff may reflect the general lack of sound electricity pricing 
and the political difficulty of raising tariffs in line with inflation. Based on the current 
five-year Economic Development Plan (1995-1999) electricity tariffs are being 
increased 20% per annum (except in the cultural, educational, agricultural, livestock 
breading and fishery centres as well as households with electricity consumption of less 
than 60 kw per month, where prices will remain the same). The Ministry of Energy 
proposed a tariff increase of 33%, but only 20% was approved by the Parliament. 
During this plan, the target rate of inflation is 11%. However, until 1996, the recorded 
inflation rate was higher than 20% (Interview, 8-th Jan. 1997).
In the era after the Islamic revolution (1979), the agricultural sector has received more 
subsidies for electricity prices than others. Previously the policy was biased toward 
industrial sector (Table A1.18, Figure 2.9). The industrial tariffs increased from Rls.3.5 
per kwh in 1987 to Rls.40 per kwh in 1994 and ranks first with 36% annual growth 
(Vaziri Sabeghi, 1996). The problem with such tariff structure is that the relatively high 
price applied to the industrial sector in which electricity is supplied at higher voltages 
and lower costs.
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Street lighting is another problem area. There is no bill for street lighting charged to the 
municipalities. Instead, a charge of 5 or 10% is added to the bills of most other 
customers by the Ministry of Energy to cover street lighting. It means a lack of incentive 
to encourage efficient use of electricity by municipalities.
The rate setting for the residential consumers also has shortcomings. Within residential 
areas, electricity price discrimination is based on consumption level. In other words, 
concerning equity and energy conservation, progressive rates (increasing block rates) are 
commonly being used for the residential sector. During the first two years after the 
Islamic revolution (1979-1980) the first 100 Kwh electricity consumption per month 
(first block) was free of charge. This amount has now been limited to 40 Kwh per month 
(Table A 1.19). The tariff schedule increased to a dramatic number of 41 consumption 
blocks in 1995 (Table 2.4). Increasing the number of tariff blocks made billing and 
accounting more complicated for both customers and the electricity industry.
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2.4 Residential electricity tariffs and its growth for each block in 1995
‘Rials’
Electricity consumption Blocks, per month (kwh) 1995 Growth
0 - 40 Free
4 - 60 55 (lump-sum)
61 - 100 3.3
101- 150 4 21
151- 180 4.7 18
181- 210 4.7 0
211- 250 4.7 0
251- 260 8.2 74
261- 270 8.9 9
271- 280 9.4 6
281- 290 10 6
291- 300 10.8 8
301- 310 11.6 7
311- 320 12.4 7
321- 330 13.2 6
331- 340 14 6
341- 350 14.7 5
351- 360 15.5 5
361- 370 16.2 5
371- 380 17 5
381- 390 17.8 5
391- 400 18.6 4
401- 410 19.4 4
411- 420 20.2 4
421- 430 21.7 7
431- 500 24.5 13
501- 550 28 14
551- 600 33 18
601- 650 40.5 23
651- 700 45.5 12
701- 725 56.5 24
726- 750 67 19
751- 775 83.5 25
776- 800 91 9
801- 850 96 5
851- 900 98 2
901- 950 104 6
951- 1000 113 9
1001-1100 122.5 8
1101-1200 129 5
1200-... 135 5
Source; Majlis and Pajoohish, No 16, third year, June and July 1995
As Sarhan (1991) argued when examining the case of progressive tariffs in Egypt, the 
number of consumption blocks should in practice range from 2 to 5. However, he 
suggested that the pricing structure of electricity has to be reformed to set electricity 
prices at their marginal costs. Taiwo (1981) found it difficult to justify a block tariff
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(increasing or decreasing). He pointed out that most of the arguments put forward in 
defence of such a tariff are weak. However, one relevant point is that, a block tariff can 
be seen as a method of approximating marginal cost. Therefore, if the marginal cost 
function is known, the block tariff should be dispensed with.
In the case of Iran, it was also argued that there is no logic for this huge number of 
consumption blocks (Majlis and Pajoohish, 1995). If consumption groups are not 
classified correctly, consumption blocks do not have a significant positive effect on 
energy conservation. If concern is about equity, it is argued that it is not the business of 
the electricity industry to redistribute incomes in a sound fashion.
2.8 Some of the basic issues
As analysis revealed, the main issues of the Iranian electricity industry are low 
efficiencies in electricity production and pricing. It is argued that technical efficiency 
has not enjoyed a satisfactory status in the past. The price issue is the lack of clear 
policies on electricity pricing. Tariffs are set through a negotiating process between 
the Ministry of Energy and the Budget & Planning Organisation, which requires 
approval by the Iranian parliament, and hence is open to political manipulation. The 
average per kilowatt-hour charge for electricity in Iran was around half of what the 
average tariff required was to cover its costs. The Iranian government has continued to 
provide subsidies in order to compensate for technical and allocative inefficiencies.
To summarise, this analysis indicates that in the Iranian electricity industry, similar to 
most developing country utilities (Sullivan, 1990, World Bank, 1990, 1992, 1994a, 
1994b, Schramm, 1990,1993, Bhattacharyya, 1995 and World Bank, 1997), subsidised 
tariffs and inefficiencies are the basic issues. Research advanced to tackle the 
problems. The next chapter deals with the analysis of price issue and the formulation 
of efficient electricity pricing.
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Chapter 3 Theory of efficient electricity pricing
3.1. Introduction
Efficient prices are defined as those which lead to the highest possible level of 
social welfare, which is the maximisation of consumer and producer surpluses (Brown 
and Sibley,1986). In the past, electricity pricing in most countries was determined 
mainly on the basis of accounting or historical costs, calculated by examining records of 
past expenditures. However, there has recently been increasing emphasis on the use of 
economic principles, in particular, a great deal of attention has been paid to the use of 
marginal cost based-pricing. It is argued that pricing according to marginal cost leads to 
maximisation of social welfare.
3.2. Theoretical background
The proposed efficient electricity pricing is based upon the well-defined theory of public 
utility pricing, where price is equal to marginal cost. This theory was first described by 
Harold Hotelling in 1938, but in fact, it dates back to 1844 with the work of Jules 
Dupuit. The theoretical aspects of applying marginal cost pricing in electricity supply 
can be found in Keshava (1990).
The equality of price and marginal cost is the equilibrium condition under perfect 
competition. The rationale for marginal cost pricing is that it is necessary for efficient 
allocation of resources, and the application of marginal cost pricing maximises 
aggregate social welfare. This approach may be difficult to apply to private enterprises, 
however, it can be employed in state-owned integrated monopolies (lEA/OECD, 1994). 
Application of marginal cost pricing has been attempted in several countries, notably in 
France, the UK and Sweden, where the economists have had more influence on tariff- 
making (Keshava,1990). The integration of theoretical development vrith empirical 
applications to electricity pricing has been influential in extending this literature in a 
useful direction from both a theoretical and applied perspective. The following
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formulation shows that the welfare gain is maximised by equating price to marginal cost 
(Williamson, 1966). In order to show whether welfare has increased or not, some 
measure of gains and losses is required. The concept of consumer and producer 
surpluses have been used for this purpose. The consumer surplus is equivalent to the 
area under the demand curve, which as demonstrated by Willig (1976) is usually a very 
good approximation of consumers’ welfare. The producers’ surplus is represented by the 
industry’s profit.
Social welfare = producers’ surplus + consumers’ surplus 
W =(TR -T C ) + S 
W = (TR+S)-TC
That is.
Social welfare = Social benefit - Social cost
Differentiating this expression with respect to output, leads to the basic condition, 
namely price equated to marginal cost.
dW d d—  = —  (TR + S) - —  (TC) = 0
Since,
Then,
T R + S - \ ° P m d Q
P-MC = 0 => P = MC
Figure 3.1 illustrates this point where P  ^= MC. The triangular areas A and B measure 
the changes in producer and consumer surpluses and are referred to as dead-weight 
losses. If price is increased from P2 to P  ^(which is equal to MC) a triangle equal to the 
dead-weight loss is obtained (Triangle A), representing the net valuation which society
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places on the foregone consumption (Qj - Qe). Once again, a similar loss would occur if 
the tariff was set initially at a level above marginal cost, a dead-weight loss would occur 
equal to the triangle B. In fact, the change in producer surplus plus consumer surplus 
measures the cost to society as a whole of a decision not to set price equal to marginal 
cost. Since producer surplus plus consumer surplus rises as prices moves toward 
marginal cost from either direction, total surplus is maximised when price set equal to 
MC.
3 .1  M a x i m i s a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  u n d e r
m a r g i n a l  c o s t  pr ic ing  ( p r o g r e s s i v e  tar i f f s )
P
Pi
M C
Two kinds of marginal cost are distinguished in the literature. Short-Run Marginal Cost 
(SRMC) and Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). SRMC is based on fuel, operating, and 
maintenance costs, namely, the supply costs with fixed capacity. By contrast, for LRMC 
all factors are variable. It is argued that the application of SRMC for majority of 
consumers (off-peak users) will be more convenient. This is also inferred from previous 
studies (among them, Kay, 1971, Andersson,1984, Vickrey,1985, Andersson and 
Bohman,1985, Newbery 1985, Della valle,1988. Crew, et al, 1995). The reasons are put 
forward as follows:
1. The structural adjustment program along with the domestic price increment of 
petroleum products and labour costs, imply that the electricity tariff cannot, in principle, 
be fixed for more than one year in Iran.
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2. The calculated value for marginal cost is very sensitive to the assumptions that are 
being made, which are subject to wide uncertainty in the long-run. In other words, 
LRMC should consider the best choice of investment to expand the system, estimates of 
future capital, operation and maintenance and fuel costs as well as expectations of 
electricity demand and inflation. These are subject to big uncertainties in the long run. In 
the case of LRMC pricing, the consumers rather than the electricity industry should bear 
the risk of uncertainty.
3. SRMC is an appropriate one when the electricity generation capacity is not fully 
utilized. In other words, efficiency requires SRMC pricing until capacity is in 
equilibrium (Weyman-Jones,1989).
Recall that the LRMC is the cost of producing an additional unit of electricity per period 
when fuel, labour and capital can be freely varied. This cost bears no relationship to the 
opportunities forgone in using existing capacity. To price at long run marginal cost in 
the short run threatens the risk of misallocation of existing capacity, LRMC pricing is a 
long run equilibrium outcome. Figure 3.2 illustrates this point. Up to electricity 
production of Q the cost of using existing capacity is zero. To price at P will lead to a 
waste of resources as some capacity is left idle. Once the amount Q has been achieved, a 
problem of allocating a fixed output has emerged. Given the demand curve (D), 
optimality will be obtained by charging a price of P^ , not P. However, it is also the case 
in this example that capacity is excessive since consumers are willing to pay less for the 
last unit of electricity than the LRMC of producing it. In the long run disinvestment 
should take place until a capacity of Q’ is achieved (De Meza and Osborne, 1980). 
LRMC is a misleading benchmark for electricity pricing, unless the power sector invests 
and operates in a steady-state equilibrium.
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3.2 Long run marginal cost pricing and 
allocation of resources
Price t
LRMC
AR=D
Output
3.2.1 Peak Load pricing
As shown LRMC pricing may be useful under certain conditions. On the other hand, if 
short run marginal cost alone is used, revenue raised maybe inadequate to the already 
deteriorating system or to expand the system for future electricity demand. This 
argument leads to the suggestion of peak load pricing, namely, SRMC for off-peak and 
LRMC (as an investment criteria) for peak periods. The capacity costs should be borne 
by peak users, while off-peak users should be charged with operating costs only.
3.3. Objectives of electricity pricing
One of the main objectives of the Iranian electricity industry is the need to economise 
electricity production and the gradual elimination of subsidies (Economic Development 
Plan, 1989-1993). The latter closely depends on an efficient electricity pricing policy, 
which appears to capture what the government has meant by the gradual elimination of 
subsidies. In general, it is expected that efficient electricity pricing will be able to fulfil 
the following targets:
- Efficient allocation of resources
- Maximisation of aggregate welfare
- Reduction of wastefiil uses of electricity
- Promotion of all justified uses of electricity
- Provision of sufficient service to the public on demand
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- Maximum utilisation of existing plants
- Achievement of relative self-sufficiency
- Financing expansion plans
The argument is that the structure of two-part tariffs achieves these targets. Its approach 
provides an explicit framework for analysing the costs of electricity production and 
setting tariffs.
3.4 Application for Iran
In Iran, energy input for thermal electricity generation is heavily subsidised, namely, the 
marginal cost tends to be much greater when calculated using shadow-prices rather than 
market-prices. For instance, in 1992 the domestic market prices of fuel oil and gas oil 
were only 10.4 and 11% of those of their shadow prices respectively. Therefore, it is 
necessary to distinguish two levels of marginal cost relevant to electricity pricing; the 
marginal cost at shadow price and marginal cost at market price.
No one will argue against pricing electricity to reflect the opportunity cost of its 
production and consumption. Using shadow prices (economic opportunity costs) links 
marginal cost to efficient resource allocation. These costs represented by shadow prices 
are the true costs of economic resources. Countries with domestic gas and oil resources, 
may use the F.O.B export value to determine the economic value of their resources. It 
means in a country where subsidised friels are available, the appropriate shadow prices 
could be border prices (Newbery, 1985). It appears that such a tariff based on shadow 
marginal cost pricing will be much higher than prevailing tariffs in Iran. It is argued that 
the adjustment should be made from that which is more desirable. For instance, charging 
the full shadow marginal cost to industrial customers may encourage them to import 
private gas turbines since fuels are still subsidised. This practice is economically less 
efficient from a national perspective. It is argued that when market imperfections exist 
in other area of macroeconomics environment, it is useless to try to achieve an ideal 
theoretical construct only in the electricity market (Bhattacharyya, 1995). Two main
48
reasons for pricing electricity below its shadow marginal costs were suggested by 
Turvey (1968):
1. Important close substitutes of electricity sell at significantly below marginal cost
2. Important close complements of electricity sell at significantly above marginal cost
In short, if prices elsewhere in the economy do not reflect marginal costs, then departure 
fiom the marginal cost pricing rule for electricity industry would be justified. In fact the 
second-best approach to the problem has been developed (Lipsey and Lancaster,!956). 
If departure fiom MC pricing is justified, then the second-best (partial equilibrium) 
solution calls for Ramsey pricing. In this context, second-best means that the industry 
maximises the sum of the consumers’s and producers’s surplus subject to the break-even 
constraint. This is equivalent to minimising the dead-weight losses resulting from a 
departure from MC pricing.
As an illustration, consider only three categories of goods in the economy, namely, 
electricity (E), substitutes (S) and complementary goods (C) for electricity. Their 
compensated demands and marginal cost curves are shown in three parts of Figure 3.3. 
For simplicity, the marginal cost is considered constant. Initially the economy in
marginal cost pricing is in (the first-best) equilibrium, with prices ( ,Pc , Pe ) ^nd 
outputs (S°, C°, E°).
Now, suppose that both substitute and complementary goods of electricity are supplied 
under the conditions of imperfect competition, so that in this case study the price of
substitute goods at P^  is lower and the price of complementary goods at P^  is higher 
than their corresponding marginal costs. Clearly consumption of these goods at S' and C 
is differ from those of socially optimal levels of S° and C°.
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3.3 Rationale of the second-best 
electricity pricing
Ps
p ;
Pc
c  c° co
MC,
MC
E'O E
The appropriate compensated demand curve for electricity which takes account of these 
prices is . Namely, the rise in the price of complementary goods {Pq) above its 
marginal cost shifts the electricity demand curve down to left. Moreover, the fall in the 
price of substitute goods ( ) will also cause a decrease in demand for electricity, so
that the compensated demand curve (D )^ shifts downwards (D^). If the Iranian 
electricity supply industry sets its electricity price equal to shadow marginal cost, its 
output will be E', the resulting set of outputs (S', C, E') and the associated resource 
allocation is not Pareto optimal, so that price ratios are not equal to marginal cost ratios. 
To move back towards an optimum level of electricity consumption (E°) necessitates
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dropping the price of electricity towards , below its marginal cost. This will cause 
electricity demand to increase along toward E®.
It is argued that the main tariff applied to the majority of the consumers (off-peak users), 
should be based on to the forecasted shadow short-run marginal cost in the coming year, 
which is then adjusted (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The price adjustments should be smallest 
for consumers whose electricity usage is the most sensitive to price changes and largest 
for those who are least sensitive. In other words, the familiar Ramsey pricing rule is 
applied. This is the most satisfactory adjustment procedure from the viewpoint of 
allocative efficiency (Ramsey, 1927 and Baumol & Bradford, 1970). This rule indicates 
that when a regulator sets prices for the electricity industry and is not allowed to 
subsidise the industry, social welfare is maximised by setting prices according to the 
following formula (Brown and Sibley, 1986):
P i -  M C i  À  1 . , ^
This pricing rule indicates that the percentage mark-up of price over marginal cost for 
each kilowatt hour produced should be equal to the reciprocal of the price elasticity
weighted by the Ramsey number (----- -) . Apart from the first-best rule of settingI +A
price equal to marginal cost, the Ramsey pricing rule is the best known result on 
efficient public utility pricing. It has become known as the Inverse Elasticity Rule 
(1ER). Ramsey prices can be derived mathematically as follows:
The consumer surplus achievable at a given set of prices P = ( P , , P2 ,..., P^ ) is:
CS= f  Pi,..., Pw)dPi
 ^ i=l
Producer’s surplus is written as
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MPS = X  P # ( P i ,  P 2,...,Pm) - C[Q, (.), Q2 (.) Q „ (.) ]
/=1
To obtain efficient prices, total surpluses (CS + PS) should be maximised, where the 
efficient set of prices is characterised by the equality of price and marginal cost in 
each market (first-best solution).
The break-even (as well as profits / subsidies) constraint is as follows:
M
^ P i Q i  - C (Qi , Q2 v s  Qm ) ^  ^
/=1
The Ramsey solution is now to choose prices Pj, P2 ,..., Pm to maximise the following 
Lagrangian:
M  M
L = f  £  Ô' dPi + P^+1) • [ E  Q' - C(-) ] ^;=1 /=1
This yields
It indicates that the mark-up of price over marginal cost for product i is inversely 
related to the elasticity of demand, and cross-elasticities for that product. In the case 
of independent demand, these cross elasticities are zero. This assumption is 
appropriate for the electricity industry, because customers cannot shift from one sector 
to another in response to price changes. For instance, the industrial sector cannot shift 
from industrial customer to residential customer even if the price of electricity for the 
industrial customer becomes much higher than for the residential one. Thus, in the 
case of independent demands, the condition simplifies to the Inverse Elasticity Rule:
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Q^. + (X + i).[P,-— ] . ^ = o  
then
Pi - ^  Qi 1 + ;i 1 P - MC A 1
Pi X Si  P 1 +À s
Where P is the price, MC the marginal cost, and s is the price elasticity of electricity 
demand in the market i .
If all electricity users are charged based on the Ramsey pricing rule, the electricity 
consumption of the more vulnerable consumers might be zero. It is necessary to capture 
the consumer surplus of these consumers which has a high social value. The electricity 
pricing policy concerns these consumers as well. The social objective recognises every 
citizen's basic rights to have access to electricity needs. Therefore, socio-political 
arguments are often advanced in favour of subsidised electricity prices for poor 
households. Economic reasoning may also be used to support subsidises. For instance, 
electricity is more appropriate for lighting purposes than kerosene. Consequently, 
customers who are willing to purchase the electricity requirements to satisfy lighting 
should afford to buy it. Some authors (among them, Munasinghe, 1980) suggest lifeline 
rate for these specific groups. I argue that the tariff for this particular case should be also 
based on the forecasted SRMC for the coming year but on market-priced basis without 
any adjustment. It calculates the costs in a dynamic framework, to catch up with the 
adjusted shadow-price SRMC in the end. This approach can be clarified further with the 
aid of Figure 3.4.
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3.4 Efficient electricity pricing
P
MC
Pe MC (adjusted)
Pv
MC (market prices)
Dj and Dj are electricity demands for the majority and the vulnerable groups of 
consumers respectively. If both classes of consumers are charged the adjusted shadow 
short-run marginal cost (PJ, the electricity consumption of the vulnerable consumer 
classes would be zero and that of the majority would be per annum. The vulnerable 
groups should also be supplied with an acceptable amount of electricity at an affordable 
price (Qy ,Pj, namely, short run marginal cost (nominal prices). From a practical point 
of view, pricing based on market short-run marginal cost is more convenient and easier 
to implement, whereas data on the demand curve (Dj) is generally scarce. The 
significance of the annually upward trend of price for vulnerable groups is mainly 
related to the adjusted economic programme of the government, specially in the area of 
oil product prices. It is worth noting that targeting vulnerable consumers and the 
appropriate electricity consumption levels have to be carefully examined. An 
independent study needs to be undertaken in order to identify the consumer groups who 
are in need for such a subsidised practice. It is argued that, the tariff for any particular 
groups should not fall below the market-price SRMC levels. The government could 
consider giving cash aid to the much more vulnerable groups to pay for electricity. It 
leaves the principle of electricity pricing intact. Such an experiment (cash aid) has been 
undertaken in other developing countries (Mtamila, 1989).
To summarise, Ramsey pricing in the context of short run marginal cost is suggested for 
the majority of the electricity consumers. For the vulnerable consumers the short run 
marginal cost at market price calculations may be appropriate. As previously argued.
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peak load pricing is sound electricity pricing for peak load users. To do so, the long run 
marginal cost pricing should then be taken into consideration for these users.
3.5 Toward efficient electricity production
Ramsey rule pricing or even empirical examination of this rule involves estimation of 
the marginal cost and price elasticity of the electricity demand for each customer 
groups.
The formula (—— ----- = indicates that marginal cost (MC) is an
important factor in efficient electricity pricing. From an economic theory point of 
view, MC is derived from minimising the overall cost of the given output 
(Varian,1993). Marginal Cost is also part of the information discovered by trying to 
find the least expensive way of meeting some future change in the output (Weyman- 
Jones, 1986). Consequently, in the process of efficient electricity pricing, the 
knowledge of the true costs and the most efficient way of electricity production is 
crucial. The informational constraints limit the extent of cost control of electricity 
industry by government agencies. The informational constraints are usually 
distinguished as moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to the 
endogenous variables that are not observed by the government agencies. Adverse 
selection arises when the firm has more information than the government agencies 
about some exogenous variables. The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, 
create a demand for information gathering (Laffont and Tirole,1993). Technical 
efficiency is a prerequisite for cost reduction. Technical efficiency implies whatever is 
done should be achieved at minimum cost. The mean marginal costs of most efficient 
units can be used to infer an attainable marginal cost level for electricity pricing. In 
the following chapters, I will analyse and measure technical efficiency in the Iranian 
power plants and distribution organisations. Such measurements may be used by 
policy makers to determine what tariffs they can offer to customers. From the Ramsey 
pricing rule, allocative efficiency is achieved but the firms have no strong incentives
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to improve their technical efficiencies. Indeed, attempts should be made to promote 
incentives for the public firms to minimise costs.
One justification for using the price-cap regulation in privatised or regulated 
monopolies is that the incentives would provide to minimise costs. It is worth noting 
that the emphasis is on technical rather than allocative efficiency (Beesley and 
Littlechild, 1989). In the privatised electricity industry in the UK, each sector, with 
the exception of generation, is price-capped by the familiar RPI-X formula. Here RPI 
is the retail price index and X is an exogenous estimate of potential productivity 
growth. The initial level of X was set by the government at the time of privatisation, 
as part of the privatisation process, whereas X is reset by regulator as part of the 
continuing regulatory process. Bradley and Price (1988) argue that the RPI-X 
approach (tariff basket not average revenue constraint) may lead to Ramsey pricing.
Chapter 4 Methodology of efficiency Measurement
4.1. Introduction
The theoretical definition of a production function frontier is the maximum 
possible output which can be produced from given quantities of a set of inputs. In 
producer theory, it can be assumed that some producers are inefficient. A number of 
authors have considered the possibility of inefficiency in production, with emphasis 
placed on the theoretical foundations for the measurement of efficiency (e.g.. Fare, 
Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994). In order to determine how efficient any particular firm 
is, one has to have a standard with which to compare. A useful way of introducing the 
measurement of efficiency is to draw on the seminal work of Farrell (1957), who first 
suggested that the comparison of firm performance is made with the best actually 
achieved in the industry. It involves constructing a production frontier, which is used 
as a yardstick for efficiency measurement. The theoretical justification is the concept 
of a boundary production function (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992).
Having realized the inadequacies of separate indices of labour and capital 
productivities, Farrell introduced a total factor productivity index. He illustrated his 
idea using a simple example involving firms which use two inputs Xj and Xg to 
produce a single output q. The unit isoquant of the fully efficient firms is represented 
by AA in Figure 4.1, and assumes constant returns to scale. It shows various 
combinations of inputs which support a unit level of output.
R g 4.1 Illustration of the measure of efficiency
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If point P is a specific firm, then the technical efficiency of firm P will be defined as: 
Technical efficiency =
A producer is said to be technically efficient if production occurs on the boundary of 
producer’s production possibilities set, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain 
maximum output from a given set of inputs. A producer is technically inefficient if 
production occurs in the interior of the production possibilities set. The term technical 
inefficiency is used to embrace all reasons for actual performance falling short of that 
which could be attainable one, given inputs. On this basis, X-inefficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966, Leibenstein and Maital, 1992) is one component of Farrell’s 
technical inefficiency. It also corresponds with what some writers call waste (Fare, 
Grosskopf and Logan, 1985). Stigler (1976) argues that waste is a foregone product 
that could be acquired for less than its cost.
In a perfectly efficient firm OP = OR, namely. Technical efficiency = 1. As the 
distance between OP and OR increases technical efficiency tends to zero. Hence, any 
observation with a score of less than one has measurable potential for improvement.
In Figure 4.1, the input price is represented by the line BB, so that the allocative 
efficiency (price efficiency) of the firm operating at P is defined as:
OS
Allocative efficiency =
The economic efficiency is defined as a product of technical and allocative efficiency, 
which is the overall cost of producing at Q relative to P.
Economic efficiency =
_ OR O^ 
OP ~ OP  ^ OR
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That is;
Economic efficiency = Technical efficiency x Allocative efficiency
One advantage of these radial efficiency measures (Farrell’s method) is that they are 
unit invariant, i.e., changing the units of measurement will not change the value of 
the efficiency measure (Coelli, 1995).
Technical efficiency has been more regularly assessed than allocative efficiency 
because it does not require the knowledge of input or output prices, which are 
frequently unavailable or unreliable.
The concept of technical efficiency saw little empirical use until the late 1970s, when 
two fundamental methodologies were introduced; Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). These approaches differ in the way they 
specify the relevant frontier. A management researcher applying DEA speaks of 
measuring efficiency while an econometrician analysing SFA usually speaks of 
estimating it.
4.2. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
The early theoretical work on technical efficiency (Farrell, 1957) was stimulated in 
the late 1970s with development of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This is a 
mathematical programming technique that envelops the observed data to determine a 
best-practice frontier. This envelopment process gives its name to the Data 
Envelopment Analysis. In 1978, DEA was initiated by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes 
(CCR) by generalising the Farrell technical efficiency measurement to accommodate 
the multiple-input and multiple-output characteristics of the production process. It was 
developed to evaluate the performance of non-profit and public organisations, where 
price data usually does not exist or is unreliable. In the DEA literature, a producer is 
usually referred as a Decision Making Unit (DMU) with common inputs and outputs.
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DEA does not require to consider any functional form for the frontier, so that the 
efficiency of a unit is measured relative to all other units with the assumption that all 
units lie on or below the efficient frontier. The DEA model provides a non-parametric 
technique for measuring the relative technical efficiency of a set of decision making 
units (DMUs) in either the public or private sector.
DEA is usually introduced via the ratio form. Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
generalised the single-output to single-input classical engineering-science ratio
definition to multiple outputs and inputs without requiring pre-assigned weights. 
Technical efficiency can be calculated by solving the fractional program, known as 
the CCR model, for each organisation. The basic characteristic of the CCR model is 
the reduction of the multiple-output, multiple-input situation (for each DMU) to that 
of a single output and input. If there is data on K inputs and M outputs on each of N 
firms, the procedure is as follows (Coelli, 1995,1996):
u' Vi weighted sum of outputs
Maximise = ---—— -^------—-----—V X» weighted sum of inputs
This is subject to the constraint that the corresponding ratio for each unit including the 
one under evaluation does not exceed one, that is:
Subject to: < 1  j = l, ...,N
V xj
Where;
u > 0 , V  > 0
u is an M X 1 vector of output weights and v is a K x 1 vector of input weights, u’ and
v’ are the transpose of u and v.
The analysis aims to find optimal values for u and v such that the ratio of the total 
weighted outputs to the total weighted inputs is maximised. The above ratio yields an 
infinite number of optimal solutions, if ( u* and v* ) is optimal, then (a u* and av* ) is 
also optimal for a  > 0.
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The above fractional model is both non-linear and non-convex. However, it can be 
solved by Linear Programming as originally shown by CCR. It should be linearized 
by restricting the denominator of the objective function to unity, and then adding this 
as another constraint. This useful transformation was the genesis of DEA. In this way, 
the problem is transformed to a problem of maximising the total weighted outputs in 
the presence of the normalised total weighted inputs and the remaining constraints as 
follows:
Maximise p’y;
Subject to v’Xj = 1
p’yj - v ’Xj < 0 j = l,2,...,N,
p > 0 , V > 0
Due to the linear transformation p and v are used instead of u and v. DEA solves such 
problems using the standard techniques of linear programming, thus, the benefits of 
computation and dual variables are available.
Using linear programming to solve the duality problem means fewer constraints are 
necessary than in the original form (K + M < N + 1), which is generally the preferred 
form to solve. For Linear Programs in general the less constraints imposed the much 
easier a problem is to solve. In addition to computational convenience, the dual 
interestingly yields a technical efficiency score for each of the DMUs in the data set 
(Ganley and Cubbins, 1992), thus:
Minimise 0
Subject to -y  ^+ YX > 0
0 % ^ 0 
X >0
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Where X is an Nxl vector of constants. That is a vector describing the percentages of 
other DMUs used to construct the virtual DMU (reference set weights). The values of 
0 obtained will be the efficiency scores for the DMUs and will satisfy 0 < 1. The first 
constraint states that the actual amount of output produced by firm i could have been 
more than achieved by adopting the input combinations of some other firm(s). The 
second constraint indicates that the actual inputs used by firm i are at least as great as 
they would be by adopting some other firms technology out of the reference set. This 
linear programming model should be solved N times, once for each DMU.
DEA faces a drawback as an efficiency measure if there is a section of linear frontier 
which is parallel to one of the axes as illustrated in Figure 4.2. C and D are the two 
efficient DMUs which are on the frontier, and P and B are the two inefficient ones.
4.2 Efficiency Measurement and Input Slacks
Xz/q. A P
O X /q
Regular measures of technical efficiency gives the efficiency scores for Decision
OE OF
Making Units (DMUs) of P and B as and respectively. However, it is
questionable as to whether point E is an efficient point, since one could reduce the 
amount of input Xg used (by the amount CE) and still produce the same output. This is 
known as input slack in the literature. For the given optimal values of 0 and X, the 
input slacks for the i-th firm will be equal to zero only if:
0Xj -XX = 0
And the output slacks are equal to zero if:
-yj + YX = 0
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In empirical studies both the regular measure of technical efficiency (0 ) and any non­
zero input (or output) slacks are usually reported to provide an accurate indication of 
technical efficiency in a DEA approach. On the other hand, it is argued that slacks can 
be viewed as allocative inefficiency (Ferrier and Lovell ,1990, Fare, Grosskopf and 
Lovell, 1994). Consequently, for analysing technical efficiency, it is quite reasonable 
to concentrate upon the regular efficiency scores only.
The above model (CCR), with the assumption of constant returns to scale, presents an 
overall measure of technical efficiency which shows pure technical and scale 
efficiency of a firm (DMU) altogether. Assessment of the effects of reorganisation 
requires information on economies of scale in Decision Making Units (DMUs). In 
addition, the natural monopoly argument for public regulation or ownership of the 
electricity supply industry is based on the assumed existence of substantial scale 
economies. In 1984, Banker, Chames and Cooper (BCC) extended the CCR 
methodology to include variable returns to scale. Implementation of this modified 
problem requires the addition of the convexity constraint in the dual formulation 
(NTX = 1, which NI is an N x 1 vector of ones. It means a restriction on X).
The variable returns to scale does not imply whether the DMU is operating in an area 
of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. This can be identified by imposing the 
constraint of non-increasing returns to scale, that is:
Minimise 0
Subject to - y, + YX > 0
0X; -XX > 0
NFX < 1
X >0
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The nature of the scale inefficiency for a particular DMU is determined by comparing 
the non-increasing returns to scale technical efficiency score with that of variable 
returns to scale technical efficiency score, if they are equal then decreasing returns to 
scale exist for that DMU, otherwise increasing returns to scale apply. As shown in 
Figure 4.3, the variable returns to scale frontier lies to the right of the constant return 
to scale frontier, and displays areas of increasing, constant, and decreasing returns to 
scale. The reference frontier (EABCD) is similar to the textbook total product (TP) 
curve.
4.3 Measuring pure technical and scale efficiency
CRS
,VRSQ
H
O E N
The technical efficiency of K (CCR model) is ——. In the case of variable Returns to
H K
Scale (BCC model), technical efficiency (overall) is decomposed into scale efficiency
, and pure technical efficiency —— , so that;
HJ HK
TEcrs= TEvrs X Scale efficiency
In DEA, the model specification can be oriented toward input minimisation or output 
maximisation. In the case of constant returns to scale (CCR model) the output and 
input-oriented models provide equivalent measures of technical efficiency. As Figure
4.3 depicted, —— is a measure of input saving due to technical efficiency and is 
H K NAd
a measure of output increasing due to technical efficiency. In the case of constant
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returns to scale, these two ratios are equivalent = 7 ^ ) -  However, in the case
H K NM
of variable returns to scale, the efficiency measure based on output maximisation is
not the same as the efficiency measure based on input minimisation ^
H K  NL
Therefore, in the DEA formulation, the objective of input minimisation or output 
maximisation should be clearly specified. The technical efficiency measure of the 
distribution organisations for electricity as well as power plants are mostly based on 
input minimisation, therefore, in this thesis the focus is on the input-based technical 
efficiency calculations.
Productivity growth index
Productivity is one important concept in studying production over time. The 
productivity index is based on binary comparisons, which generally refers to the same 
unit at two different points in time, however, any two units can also be compared. The 
measurement of productivity growth at the unit level is a relatively new area of 
research. The DEA method has been used to compute a Malmquist index for 
measuring productivity growth. A Malmquist index allows for the decomposition of 
productivity growth into two major components, namely technological progress and 
changes in technical efficiency. These two components are analytically different and 
may have quite different policy implications. A Malmquist Index does not require any 
data on prices and does not presume any underlying functional form for technology. 
The Malmquist Index (1953) was originally introduced in a consumer theory context 
as a ratio between two proportional scaling factors deflating two quantity vectors onto 
the boundary of a utility possibilities set. The proportional scaling factor was 
interpreted as a quantity index. This distance function approach was later applied to 
the measurement of productivity in a general production function framework by 
Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982).
Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (1992) developed the Caves, et al. (1982) model 
in a DEA framework to directly calculate the input-based Malmquist Productivity
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Index. They realized that input distance functions are the reciprocal of Farrell type 
base technical efficiency measures. In this approach the Malmquist index is calculated 
on the basis of the efficiency scores derived from the DEA model. It is assumed that 
for each time period t =1,..., T, the production technology F‘ models the 
transformation of inputs, x‘ e , into outputs, q‘ g ,
F‘ = {(x\ q‘): X* can produce q‘},
i.e., the technology consists of the set of all feasible input-output vectors.
Following Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), the input based Malmquist 
productivity index is defined (Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren, Roos, 1992) as follows:
Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) assume that D] (q‘, x‘) and Dfr  ^(g'^%%'^^) 
equal one. i.e., in the terminology of Farrell (1957) there is no technical inefficiency. 
For instance if Dj (q', x^)= 1, then the input vector x‘ is the minimal input vector 
required to produce the output level q^  relative to production technology at period t. If 
D/ (^ ', x*)> 1, then the input vector x‘ is bigger than the minimal input bundle 
required to produce output q^  for given technology at period t. In the latter case the 
observed point (x‘, q*) is not an efficient input bundle. If the assumption of no 
technical inefficiency is discarded, the input based Malmquist productivity index is 
expressed in terms of four input distance functions. These distance functions are the 
reciprocal of Farrell input based technical efficiency measures:
= E',*' X T r '
66
where measures the change in technical efficiency and Tj , measures the shift 
in the frontier between period t and t+1. i.e.,
My q‘ , x‘ ) = Technical efficiency change x Technological change
The two ratios in the square bracket are technical progress measured by the shifts in 
the frontier measured at period t +1 and period t and then averaged geometrically 
(Fare, Grosskopf and Lovel,1994). If technological progress has occurred between t 
and t+1, this means that more can be produced at t+1 with the same amounts of inputs 
compared to t. This is the same as saying that fewer inputs are needed to produce the 
same amount of output, i.e., that the isoquants have moved toward the origin. In 
Figure 4.4 The technology F‘^  ^ accommodates the earlier technology F‘, indicating 
there has been technological progress. Both observation ( x‘^  ^ , q‘^ )^ and ( x‘ , q‘) are 
inefficient with respect to their own frontier, and ( x‘^  ^ , q‘^ )^ does not belong to F‘. 
The formula of Malmquist index can be expressed in terms of distances along the X- 
axis, such as:
M-r (q"', X -, q\x')
4.4 Decomposition o f Malmquist Productivity Index
4+1
O C FB E D A X
The above calculation was based on constant returns to scale technology. One may 
also calculate Malmquist productivity indices based on variable returns to scale. Fare, 
Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994) presented an enhanced decomposition of the
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Malmquist Index (calculation relative to the variable returns to scale technology), so 
that the efficiency change component decomposes into a pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency. The decomposition is as follows:
M\ (q , X , q , X ) = Pure efficiency x Scale change x Technological change
A further decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index can be found in Fare, 
Tatje, Grosskopf and Lovell (1997). They express it as the product of a magnitude 
index, an output bias index, and an input bias index. The definitions of Technological 
change and bias can be found in Stevenson (1980).
An input-based Malmquist index less than one indicates an improvement in 
productivity while a value greater than one points out the declining performance over 
time (Fare, Grosskopf, Yaisawamg, Li and Wang, 1990, Fare, Grosskopf and 
Lovell,1994).
4.4. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
Recall that a production function is defined as the maximum possible output for a 
given set of inputs, hence it defines a boundary or frontier. Deviations of observed 
outputs from this frontier depend on two terms; one is stochastic white noise (a purely 
random process), the other is technical inefficiency. Therefore the problem is the 
estimation of a production frontier and the measurement of technical inefficiency 
relative to this frontier. In contrast to DEA, in this approach the data is bounded by a 
stochastic frontier.
The stochastic frontier production function was independently proposed by Aigner, 
Lovell, Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen, van den Broeck (1977). The stochastic frontier 
model is a classical regression model with a non-normal, asymmetric disturbance. The 
basic structure of the stochastic production frontier model is as follows:
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y = P’x + V - u
Where
v - N ( 0 , a ; )
u = I U I and U ~ N (0 , cj ^  )
The difference of the two terms (v - u) is asymmetric and non-normal, which is a 
central feature of the stochastic frontier functions. The degree of asymmetry depends
on the value of À = ------ . In the case of X = 0 , the function becomes an ordinary
cr V
regression with a normal distribution of the error term (Greene, 1993).
The economic logic behind this specification is that the production process is subject 
to two economically distinguishable random disturbances with different 
characteristics. The biggest advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is the 
introduction of a disturbance term representing statistical noise (v). The component v 
is a two-sided ordinary error term which represents random variations in the economic 
environment facing the firms, which are beyond their control (e.g., exogenous shocks, 
favourable as well as unfavourable external events such as luck, climate, weather, 
region, topography and machine performance). In addition, measurement and 
recording errors in the data and unimportant variables omitted from the model are 
included within v. This random variable (v) in all models to date is assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed as v ~ N (0 , a  ^  ) independent of u. The 
assumption can be justified through the random nature of v and the Central Limit 
Theorem (that a disturbance is the sum of various independent effects), which has the 
usual econometric properties (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979).
The component of u (technical inefficiency) is a one-sided error term representing a 
variety of features that reflect inefficiency. For instance, firm-specific knowledge, 
informational constraints, the skills and efforts of management and employees, work 
failures, material shortages and other disruptions to production. The economic 
interpretation of u is that it captures technical inefficiency, consistent with the
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definition of Farrell (1957). Since technical efficiency cannot be greater than one, u 
has to be kept to one sided values. There are many one sided distributions to choose 
from; half-normal, exponential, general truncated normal and two parameter gamma 
distributions (Bauer, 1990). Theory provides little guidance on selecting a distribution 
for the inefficiency component, and there is some debate about the actual shape of the 
distribution of u (Green, Harris and Mayes, 1991). The half-normal distribution is 
becoming a popular choice (Bauer, 1990, Greene, 1993, Cornwell and Schmidt, 
1995). The choice of a distribution for u is important because the model can be 
estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method in a single step based on the 
assumptions of u and v. Maximum Likelihood might be preferred on the grounds that 
it produces asymptotically efficient estimates of the coefficient of parameters ((3).
Having estimated the model, one obtains a fitted value for (v - u). It was considered 
impossible to identify the efficiency part and the stochastic part of the composed error 
term until the appearance of the leading paper by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and 
Schmidt (1982). The early estimation techniques allowed only the estimation of 
average technical efficiency across all firms. From a policy point of view, what is 
important is a measure of technical efficiency for each firm in the sample. The failure 
to estimate firm-specific technical efficiency was considered as a major disadvantage 
of Stochastic Frontier Analysis relative to DEA where technical efficiency is easily 
measured for each firm. Forsund, Lovell, and Schmidt (1980) have provided a survey 
of such studies in the Journal of Econometrics. In an effort to obtain a solution, 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) presented an explicit formula in the 
context of cross-sectional model for the normal / half-normal case. They suggested 
that u could be predicted by the conditional expectation of u, given the value of 
random variable s = v - u. The expected value of this conditional distribution can be 
derived as an estimate of u (Greene, 1995):
E [ u | s  = v-  u]  = a>- /(1+X^ )[(|)(EX / a) / {1- 0 ( s l  / cr)}- eX / a]
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where (j) (.) is the standard normal density function, and O (. ) denotes the distribution 
function of the standard normal random variable, a  = (a J and X = / <7^.
Since the variation associated with the distribution of u conditional on (v - u) is 
independent of the number of firms, then these estimates cannot be shown to be 
consistent estimates of u. In other words, the variance of the distribution of technical 
inefficiency, conditional on the whole error term, does not vanish when the sample 
size increases. However, there is no alternative consistent estimator when cross 
sectional data are used for the analysis.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis is called the parametric approach because in order to 
estimate the unknown parameters (P), a specific form for the frontier function should 
be specified. The most widely used functional forms are Cobb-Douglas and the 
Translog functional forms (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973). The translog 
function is one of the flexible functional forms which is applied for direct estimation 
of the production function in chapter 6.
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) pointed out that the stochastic frontier approach in the 
case of cross sectional data suffers from three drawbacks:
1. The technical inefficiency of a particular firm cannot be estimated consistently.
2. The estimation of the model and the separation of technical inefficiency from 
statistical noise require specific assumptions about the distribution of technical 
inefficiency.
3. It may be incorrect to assume that inefficiency is independent of the regressors. For 
instance, if a firm knows its level of technical inefficiency, this might alter its input 
choices.
Given these drawbacks associated with cross sectional data. Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis has recently been applied to panel data. With panel data, researchers no
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longer have to assume that the level of inefficiency is independent of the regressors 
and there is no need to specify an explicit distribution for the inefficiency effects 
(Schmidt and Sickles, 1984, Bauer, 1990). Moreover, the great advantage of panel data 
is that it provides a much more precise evaluation of the relative performance of the 
firms under investigation (Lovell, 1996). A firm may appear both on the frontier and 
within it according to changes in its performance year by year. The resulting 
composite frontier gives less weight to unusual observations and is therefore more 
robust to stochastic events (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992).
Stochastic Frontier Analysis with panel data was preferred by Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984). As they pointed out, one of the advantages of panel data is that firm-specific 
technical efficiencies can be estimated without a distribution assumption for technical 
inefficiency. It is possible to proceed with the same assumption as the cross-sectional 
case to obtain greater precision under a given assumption than would be possible with 
a single cross section (Cornwell and Schmidt, 1995). However, in the context of panel 
data, other alternative assumptions regarding technical inefficiency (u) should be 
made:
1. Technical inefficiency varies over time which means that;
Ujj ^  U2J Ujj ^  . . .  9^ U j j .
2. Technical inefficiency does not vary over time which implies that;
U i i  = %  =  % = • • •  = % i = U i
The assumption of time-invariant inefficiency fits the usual framework in the panel
data literature with a firm effect but no time effect. The only difference is that firm
effect (technical inefficiency) is one sided (Baltagi,1995, Maty as and Sevestre,1996). 
Base on this assumption, the stochastic production frontier model is formulated as 
follows:
Yii =  f (Xi, ; P) + Vi, -  Uj 
i =1, 2 ,...,N  , t=  1, 2,...,T
72
where
Yit = output from firm i for year t 
Xjt = input from firm i for year t 
Vit -  statistical noise
Uj = firm effect representing technical inefficiency
A panel data model differs from a regular time-series or cross-section model in that it 
has a double subscript on its variables, with i denoting observations and t denoting 
time. The model can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood techniques, once a 
functional form for / (  ; p) is specified and distribution assumptions on V;t (normal)
and Uj (usually half-normal) are made. The log-likelihood function of the stochastic 
frontier is non-linear and hence its maximum cannot be found without the use of 
iterative methods. The relevant log-likelihood functions are presented by Pitt and Lee 
(1981) and discussed further by Battese and Coelli (1988).
The assumption that technical inefficiency is time-invariant is not usually supported in 
long panels. The recent literature using panel data models has attempted to relax this 
assumption. This typically involves some structure on the technical inefficiency 
(Cornwell, Schmidt & Sickles, 1990, Humbhakar, 1990, Battese & Coelli, 1992, 1995).
With the panel data approach technical inefficiency can be treated as fixed effects or 
random effects. In the case of fixed effects, technical inefficiency is regarded as being 
entirely systematic, while random effects imply the level of technical inefficiency 
might be partly determined by chance. The virtue of a fixed-effects treatment is that it 
relies on a very minimal set of assumptions.
In the past, the chief obstacle of the stochastic frontier method was the effort required 
in the computation of the Maximum-Likelihood estimates of the parameters of the 
model. Recall that the log-likelihood function of the stochastic frontier model is not 
linear and hence its maximum cannot be found without the use of iterative methods. 
This was a limitation for the widespread use of SFA in the applied literature. Now, 
however, this limitation does not apply. Excellent econometric computer packages are
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available. For instance, LIMDEP version 7 written by Greene (1995) appears to be the 
most powerful available software package which considers stochastic frontier 
functions with panel data.
The approach proposed for technical inefficiency measurement at firm level in the 
cross-sectional case (Jondrow et al., 1982), was generalised to the panel data case by 
Battese and Coelli (1988). Their formula for the estimation of technical inefficiency 
for each firm is as follows (Greene, 1995);
E[U| I E „  , E i 2 , . . . ]  = Ej + \|/,[(|) (E ,/ V |/|) /  <D (E/Vi)].
Yi= 1/(1
E|= 7iH + (l-Yi )(-g'),
s, = (1/T,)2, Ej,.
This formulation implies that for each cross sectional unit, Tj estimates of the same Uj 
are computed. LIMDEP does not calculate this formulation automatically. However, 
with a few matrix commands (Appendix 2), this formulation can be computed to 
obtain technical inefficiency estimates for each firm. The computations shown are 
based on the normal / half-normal distributions and random effects models.
4.4. Conclusion
It is recognized that two fundamental techniques are available for empirical 
efficiency analysis, namely, DEA and SFA. Both approaches have been developed 
during the last twenty years and applied in a range of empirical studies to identify 
technical efficiencies of the firms or Decision Making Units (DMUs).
The DEA approach uses a linear programming technique, calculating the efficiency 
frontier by running a series of optimisations for each observation individually. In this
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method, inputs and outputs can have very different units. In the DEA technique, a 
meaningful group of reference sets can be identified for each inefficient observation. 
DEA is able to handle multiple input and multiple output models. Having panel data, 
this approach (based on the Malmquist index) has been advanced for decomposing 
productivity growth into technological change and efficiency change. DEA is 
becoming an increasingly popular management tool, so that the majority of the 
empirical analysis in management science uses the DEA technique, particularly in the 
public sectors where output prices are often irrelevant (Grosskopf, 1986). The wide 
acceptance of the methodology of DEA and the rapid growth of its empirical 
applications are affirmation to its strength and applicability.
In the SFA technique technical inefficiency relative to the production frontier is 
estimated statistically, it involves the specification of a functional form. In this 
approach, the data can warn when they are not very informative (Cornwell and 
Schmidt, 1995). SFA has gained popularity as it offers a better explanation of 
technical inefficiency based on economic theory. In other words, SFA closely 
corresponds to economic theory of production which explains the technical 
relationship between inputs and outputs (Kalirajan and Shand, 1989). As Grosskopf 
(1986) realized, in general. Economists have chosen to use the SFA approach to 
estimate inefficiency.
Given these qualifications, an inevitable question is, which methodology should be 
used? It can be argued that it depends on the particular research being investigated, 
either or both might be appropriate. The argument can be outlined as follows:
1. It is sometimes interesting to compare the findings of the performance of the firms 
(e.g., the electricity supply industry in developing countries) by two different 
methodologies. If both approaches yield equivalent results, there is more confidence 
in using the results as a basis for policy recommendations.
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2. The stochastic production frontier that relates to the case of multiple inputs and 
multiple outputs (e.g. the Iranian electricity distribution organisations) still has not 
been fully developed, therefore, the DEA approach will be the only one calculated.
3. If the input and output data are subject to a random mechanism (e.g., weather, 
measurement error, missing variables, etc.), the SFA approach is then the appropriate 
method (Coelli, 1995, Sengupta, 1996a).
4. The overall technical efficiency can only be decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency by the DEA approach.
5. In the case of panel data, DEA for measurement of the productivity indices at firm 
level (Malmquist index) and SFA, in the case of unbalanced panel data, for estimation 
of the technical inefficiency (e.g., the Iranian power plants) have no competitors.
6. In efficiency analysis, a reference set for each inefficient firm needs to be identified 
as a yardstick. In this regard DEA is the best method.
To summarise, none of the methodologies are perfect. For a comprehensive efficiency 
analysis, DEA and SFA may be thus considered complementary to each other.
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Chapter 5 Previous empirical studies of the electricity industry
5.1 Introduction
There is a tendency among economists to approach the question of ownership 
in terms of economies of scale. Economies of scale exist in the production of a 
specific product if the average cost of production is lower for larger scale producer 
than for smaller one. Economies of scale is a concept which incorporate, among other 
things, returns to scale. Strictly speaking, returns to scale are a feature of the isoquant 
map and economies of scale are a feature of the long run average cost curve. An 
argument for restricting entry into industries with economies of scale is that entry 
leads to undesirable duplication of fixed costs and it is better to have just one firm. 
This implies that competition cannot prevail under the presence of economies of scale. 
In other words, a natural monopoly exists because of economies of scale, when, the 
market can be supplied at lowest cost by a single firm. Thus the shape of average cost 
curve which in turn is determined by the underlying technology is one important 
aspect that determines whether a market should operate competitively or 
monopolistically. Economic theory indicates that the monopolist tends to charge a 
price in excess of marginal cost (P^ > Pmc)* As Figure 5.1 illustrates, it will also 
produce a smaller amount of output relative to competitive market, i.e., where MR = 
MC (Qm < Qmc)- This equality holds in the case of a competitive firm; where MR = 
P^c and the condition leads to MC = P^c- If a natural monopolist operates where price 
equals marginal cost (MC = P^c)? then it will produce an optimum level of output 
(Qmc)^  but the monopolist will be unable to cover its costs (MC < AC). In other 
words, marginal cost pricing (first-best solution) is not feasible (Varian, 1993). When 
such case (MC < AC) occurs, usually in the case of public ownership or regulated 
monopoly second-best pricing is applicable. If prices were set to allow the industry to 
break even, then Ramsey pricing (second-best) will be the best choice.
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5.1 Natural Monopoly and Pricing
Price
MC AC
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M C
AR=D
^ Output
Q m Q mc
Different countries have adopted different approaches for controlling natural 
monopolies. Public ownership is an important way of controlling natural monopolies. 
Regulation of the public firms which is designed to curb monopoly power is the other 
approach. If the industry is not a natural monopoly, there is a considerable scope for 
increasing competition in the market. In other words, if the minimum efficient scale of 
production (the level of output that minimises average cost) is small relative to the 
size of the market, it is expected that competitive conditions will prevail. A 
competitive industry operates at a point where price equals marginal cost (first-best).
It is concluded that privatisation cannot be separated from competition and regulation. 
The underlying idea of privatisation is to improve industry performance by increasing 
the role of market forces. Market forces can be increased by freeing of entry to 
industry and encouraging competition. As a general principle, a presumption in favour 
of private ownership is justified where effective competition or sound regulation is 
feasible. A belief in the ability of competitive processes to encourage efficient 
production is central to the argument behind privatisation. But regulation is focused 
on activities where competition is not feasible.
In the literature, the electricity industry is usually classified as a natural monopoly. 
There are, however, some who call the natural monopoly status of electricity industry 
into question, particularly, in the generating sector. Empirical studies have been 
conducted to examine the existence of economies of scale. It is worth noting that the 
existence of increasing returns to scale and over what range of output they occur has
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an important policy implication for institutional arrangements, allocation of resources 
and electricity pricing.
The study of returns to scale in the electricity supply industry dates back to Nerlove 
(1963) who was the first to examine the characteristics of the electricity industry. 
Having used a cross-sectional sample of 125 firms in 1955, and a formulation of the 
Generalised Cob-Douglas function, Nerlove found economies of scale existed over a 
wide range of output in the steam-electric power generation in the US.
Christensen and Greene (1976) revised and updated Nerlove’s study by formulating 
the translog cost function to examine the economies of scale in electricity generation 
in 1955 and 1970 for the US electric power utilities. The translog cost function allows 
scale economies to vary with the level of output. The structure of production was 
modelled with capital, labour, and fuel as inputs. They found that there were 
significant scale economies available to nearly all firms in 1955, however, by 1970 a 
large share of total electricity was generated by firms which had exhausted scale 
economies. It was then concluded that the US electric power industry can be 
characterised by substantial scale economies at low levels of output.
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), raised the question of effects of regulation on the 
behaviour of the electricity industry. It was argued that regulated firms did not 
minimise costs subject to market prices. The firm was assumed to base their 
production decisions on unobservable shadow prices which reflected the effects of 
regulatory environment on the effective prices of inputs. Steam-electric generation 
was specified as a function of three inputs; capital, labour and fuel. The results 
obtained in the study were compared to those obtained by Christensen and Greene 
(1976). It was argued that the previous study underestimated economies of scale for 
the smaller firms and overestimated them for the larger firms. They suggested that 
there was no evidence for decreasing returns to scale in the electricity industry if 
shadow rather than actual prices were used.
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Lee (1995) argues that the electricity industry in the US appears to have exhausted 
economies of scale, which is consistent with Christensen and Greene (1976). Lee’s 
empirical results also showed that the US pricing policy in the electricity industry 
deviated from marginal cost pricing, while this industry had constant returns to scale 
and marginal cost pricing was feasible, i.e. the first-best solution might be to induce 
further improvement in the electricity industry.
In the Literature, the low efficiency of public ownership relative to private ownership 
has also been disputed. A central argument for privatisation programs across the 
world is that private ownership of a firm leads to lower costs than would be achieved 
under public ownership. The relevant argument about the efficiency difference 
between the public and private enterprise arises from the property rights literature, 
which was initially proposed by Alchian (1965). The property rights theory suggests 
that public ownership should perform less efficiently than private ownership. 
Ownership matters because the transfer of a firm from the public sector to the private 
sector will lead to a change in the incentive structures facing its decision makers 
(Yarrow, 1989). Not all studies, however, show that public ownership perform more 
poorly than private ownership. Some empirical studies provide weak support for this 
hypothesis.
Meyer (1975) compared the cost structures under two alternatives; public versus 
private ownership. He concludes that there is no evidence to support the idea that 
costs for private firms are lower than public firms.
Neuberg (1977) extended the literature to the case of distribution and estimated a cost 
function for electricity distribution. The dependent variable was total distribution 
costs and the independent variables were the number of consumers, amount of 
electricity sold, mileage of distribution line, service area, price of labour and a dummy 
variable for ownership type. The purpose of the study was to estimate the effect of 
ownership on costs. Neuberg used two data samples from 1972; one consisting of 185 
private and 189 public, the other 90 private and 75 public companies and ran separate
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regressions on both. Neuberg found that publicly owned firms exhibit significantly 
lower costs than privately owned firms. The returns to scale appear to be increasing 
though not over the entire existing output range.
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986) investigated the effects of both ownership type and 
regulation on efficiency of electric utilities in the United States. They found no 
evidence of any significant difference in allocative efficiency between private and 
public utilities. The estimation results indicated that two types of firms are equally as 
cost inefficient in the US, so that the average effect of price inefficiency increased 
total average cost of production by 2.4% for both public and private electric utilities.
Rushdi (1991) fitted a translog cost function to the data of the Electricity Trust of 
South Australia (ETSA) from 1950 to 1984. He argued that much of the cost 
advantages occurred by the ETSA were due to the larger size of the plants and/or 
larger number of plants in a single power station and under single management. 
Therefore, he supports the view that there are cost advantages in having the ETSA 
monopoly position.
Andrikopoulos and Vlachou (1995) argue that, the government is doubting the cost 
efficiency of the electricity supply industry in Greece (GPPC) and want to introduce 
BOOT (build, own, operate, and transfer) alternative for new plants and a vertical 
disintegration approach. Andrikopoulos and Vlachou concluded that the GPPC should 
remain in public hands because it is relatively efficient and exhibits economies of 
scale for a wide range of output.
A major problem with previous studies is that they only address the relationship 
between performance and ownership type in the limited contexts. For instance, where 
there is some evidence for superior efficiency of public ownership, there is limited 
competition or the private firms are highly regulated (Boardman and Vining, 1989). 
As Pollitt (1995) argues, most studies are cost-based function and subject to 
methodological criticism. They have employed parametric techniques to estimate
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various types of cost functions and focus on the average relationship in the data. The 
problem is that they do not estimate efficiency from a stochastic frontier function. The 
efficiency of individual generating plants has also received little attention. It is worth 
noting that the majority of studies have used US data. A good discussion of the 
problems related to such models can be found in Schmidt (1985).
Having realised some drawbacks of the previous studies, it is crucial to review the 
empirical studies which have used the most advanced methodologies for economies of 
scale and efficiency measurement. In reviewing the DEA and SFA studies particular 
attention is paid to the assumptions, model specifications, definitions of the variables 
and causes of inefficiency.
5.2 DEA studies of the electrieity supply industry
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of the most active fields of research in 
measuring the efficiency of the public sector. It was essentially designed to compare 
the managerial efficiency of a set of relatively homogeneous Decision Making Units. 
Empirical applications of the DEA models in different areas of operations research, 
management science and applied economics are numerous. An extensive DEA 
bibliography has been presented by Seiford (1996) and Chames, Cooper, Lewin and 
Seiford (1997).
The first empirical study of DEA in the electricity generation was by Fare, Grosskopf, 
Logan and Lovell (1983) who analysed the efficiency of a sample of Illinois electric 
utilities. They showed how Farrell’s measure of overall technical efficiency can be 
broken into three parts namely a measure of pure technical efficiency, a measure of 
input congestion (the congestion component is due to production on a backward- 
bending segment of the isoquant), and a measure of scale efficiency. They calculated 
these measures for a sample consisting of 32 coal-fired steam electricity generating 
plants in the US. For each plant they specified one output (kilowatt hours of 
electricity) and three inputs (capacity in megawatt, fuel in Btu and labour in average
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annual employees). The efficiency scores were calculated under both assumptions of 
constant and variable returns to scale. They concluded that scale inefficiency is both 
more widespread and more severe than congestion and is the main contributor to the 
difference between overall technical efficiency and its purely technical component. 
Their results showed that the 5 largest plants were operating in a region of decreasing 
returns to scale, while the 24 smallest firms were operating in a region of increasing 
returns to scale. Only 3 plants operated at optimal scale (constant returns to scale).
Fare, Grosskopf and Logan (1985) examined the relative performance of the public- 
owned and privately-owned electric utilities in the US. They used Atkinson and 
Halvorsen’s (1984) data to calculate six different efficiency measures; economic 
efficiency, allocative efficiency, overall technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, 
congestion, and scale efficiency. Output was measured in millions of kilowatt hours 
generated by each plant in 1970, and inputs included labour, fuel and capital. Labour 
was measured in full-time equivalent employees, fuel was measured in Btu, and 
capital was measured in installed generating capacity. They found that there were no 
significant differences in overall cost efficiency between publicly-owned and 
privately-owned electricity utilities. In terms of sources of scale inefficiency, 66 
percent of privately-owned utilities exhibited decreasing returns to scale, whereas 80 
percent of publicly-owned utilities were at a point of increasing returns to scale, 
suggesting that privately-owned utilities have over-expanded, whereas publicly- 
owned utilities could benefit from further expansion.
Fare, Grosskopf, and Pasurka (1989) analysed the effects of the environmental 
regulations on the efficiency of electric utilities in the US. The performance of the 
utilities was compared for two years; 1969 versus 1975, and the sample included 23 
coal-fired steam electric utilities. The output-based technology frontier was 
constructed to calculate the overall technical efficiency and its related components. 
The data contained one output; net electricity generation measured in million 
kilowatt-hours, and three inputs; labour (measured in the average number of 
employees), capital (measured in the installed generating capacity in megawatts), fuel
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(measured in Btu). They found that overall technical efficiency declined after 
regulation, although not significantly. In the meantime, the major cause of that 
efficiency loss was due to congestion and scale inefficiency.
Fare, Grosskopf, Yaisawamg, Li, and Wang (1990) examined the productivity growth 
in Illinois electric utilities. They developed an input-based Malmquist productivity 
index. The DEA approach was used to calculate the Malmquist productivity index for 
a sample of 19 coal-fired steam electric generating plants in Illinois during 1975- 
1981. The output was measured as electricity generation in million kilowatt-hours. 
The inputs were labour (average annual number of employees), fuel (in Btu) and 
capital (in megawatts for capacity). They suggested that neglecting technical 
efficiency in the analysis of productivity growth may lead to inappropriate 
conclusions.
Hausman and Neufeld (1991) compared the relative technical efficiency of publicly- 
owned versus privately-owned electric utilities of the US at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Since this is prior to rate-of-retum regulation, regulatory effects do not 
confuse the analysis. The sample covered 97 municipal and 218 private plants. The 
input-based technology frontier was constructed under the alternative assumptions of 
constant and variable returns to scale. Input prices for capital, coal, and labour 
variables were used in calculation of the allocative efficiency. The results showed that 
considering all types of efficiency measures, the municipal electric utilities were 
significantly more efficient than the private electric utilities.
Yaisawamg and Klein (1994) analysed the effects of environmental (sulphur dioxide) 
control on productivity change in the coal-fired electric plants for the years 1985- 
1989. The input-based technology frontier was employed under the alternative 
assumptions of scale economies. DEA was used to compute the Malmquist input- 
based productivity index. Yaisawamg and Klein decomposed the Malmquist index 
into changes in technical efficiency, changes in scale efficiency, and changes in 
technological frontier. The data contained two outputs; one desirable-net generation
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(millions of kilowatt hours) and one undesirable- S02 emission (tonnes). The inputs 
consisted of three desirable variables- fuel (Btu), labour (average number of 
employees) and capital (thousands of 1973 Dollars) along with one undesirable 
variable - sulphur (percentage of sulphur content of fuel). Their findings are consistent 
with those of Christensen and Greene (1976) who found a similar proportion of 
electricity being generated in the increasing returns region in 1970. However, the 
results differ from those of Christesen and Greene in finding a more substantial 
proportion of electricity is generated in the decreasing returns region. They argued 
that exhausted economies of scale were one of the reasons for industry’s productivity 
slowdown in the 1970s.
Weyman-Jones (1991) was the first to apply DEA for efficiency measurement in 
electricity distribution. He calculated the technical efficiency of twelve area electricity 
boards in England and Wales prior to and during the privatisation process. The 
efficiency frontier was assumed to show constant returns to scale technology. The 
input-based technical efficiency measure for each board was computed, assuming the 
area electricity boards consume two inputs; labour and capital, to distribute electricity 
to three groups of customers; domestic, commercial, and industrial sectors. Output 
was measured in annual kilowatt-hours sold by each area board. Labour was measured 
in the number of employees. Two definitions of capital were used in the calculation; 
the total values of area board assets and the amount of mains distributions in service 
(measured in circuit kilometre). The first definition was found to be unsatisfactory for 
several reasons, including the problem of using accounting data which include 
valuations on land and buildings that have little or no effect on technical efficiency 
with which electricity is distributed. The second definition was therefore used. It was 
also argued that it was not necessary to include electricity losses as an input because 
the absolute circuit-kilometre measure of mains distributions would pick up some of 
this effect. In this study, the wide divergence of efficiency was discovered, and only 
five of the twelve boards were operating on the technically efficient production 
frontier. Two of these boards dominated the efficient reference sets for seven 
inefficient boards.
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Weyman-Jones (1992) raised the question of yardstick regulation in the electricity 
distribution. He presented the technical efficiency measures of the Area electricity 
Boards in England and Wales. The input-based technical efficiency was employed for 
two studies; Study A contained four outputs; domestic sale, commercial sale, 
industrial sale (measured in kilowatt-hours), and maximum demand (measured in 
kilowatt), and three inputs; manpower (measured as the total number of employees 
per area board), network size (measured in kilometres), and transformers (measured in 
MVA). The objective in study A was to measure technical efficiency allowing for 
variable returns to scale. Study B was developed following Neuberg’s (1977) input 
and output suggestion. The data contained one output (the number of customers), one 
input (manpower), and six environmental variables. The environmental variables were 
the network size, transformer capacity, total sales, maximum demand, density, and 
industrial share. The conclusion was that the efficiency improved and the variation of 
efficiency declined as the area electricity boards approached privatisation. The 
argument also revealed a significant problem for a regulator seeking to carry out 
yardstick comparisons of technical efficiency. However, the conclusion does not 
undermine the case for carrying out yardstick comparisons, but it confirms that 
yardstick comparisons require careful design.
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) examined productivity growth in electricity 
distribution in a multiple-output, multiple-input framework between 1970 and 1986 in 
Sweden. Productivity was measured by means of the Malmquist index, and 
comparisons were made between different types of ownership and between different 
service areas. They considered the input-oriented approach as the most relevant 
measure of technical efficiency. The model contained; low voltage and high voltage 
electricity supplied, as well as the number of low voltage and high voltage customers. 
Four inputs were; labour and different types of capital.(i.e., low voltage power lines, 
high voltage power lines and total transformer capacity).The results showed no 
significant differences in productivity growth between different types of ownership.
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Miliotis (1992) investigated the relative technical efficiency of 45 distribution districts 
in the Greek Public Power Corporation (PPG). Each one being responsible for 
medium and low voltage electricity supply to a particular geographical region. Results 
were derived under different sets of assumptions and were compared with simple 
productivity indices. The variables were; network size (KM), transformation capacity 
(KVA), general expenses, labour (administrative and technical), number of customers, 
total area (KM^) and electricity supplied (kwh). The DEA scores appeared to be more 
reliable than simple productivity indices. Comparing different DEA cases, Miliotis 
was able to explain the reasons for the low efficiencies of inefficient electricity 
distribution districts in Greece.
Bagdadioglu (1995) evaluated the Turkish experience of privatisation and calculated 
the technical and managerial efficiencies for the Turkish electricity supply industry 
using cross-sectional data firom 1991. The empirical results suggested no significant 
difference in average technical efficiency between public and private ownership. 
However, examination of organisation and plant level results suggested relatively 
better performance by private ownership. Turkey seems to be tempted to follow a 
privatisation approach similar to the UK. Bagdadioglu argued that this practice was 
unlikely to materialise due to the weak institutional and unfavourable macro economic 
conditions in Turkey. Due to such reasons, the government’s next move was toward a 
step-by-step approach and selling power plants one-by-one rather than selling them all 
at once.
Bagdadioglu, Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) examined the relationship between 
technical efficiency and ownership in the Turkish electricity distribution 
organisations. It was argued that the input-based approach was more suitable for 
efficiency measurement in the Turkish distribution market, because the distribution 
organisations are obliged to supply electricity and provide distribution services at a 
level dictated and approved by the authorities. The outputs were defined as the 
amount of electricity supplied, the number of customers, maximum demand and 
service area. Inputs included labour, transformer capacity, network size, general
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expenses and network losses. Labour was measured as the number of employees per 
organisation. Following the arguments by Weyman-Jones (1991) only the physical 
measures of capital, namely, the transformer capacity and network size were used. 
The mean scale efficiency score was quite high (96%) suggesting that the scale 
inefficiency is unlikely to be the main source of overall inefficiency. Twenty 
distribution organisations appeared scale inefficient because they operated in the 
increasing returns region while twenty one distribution organisations were scale 
inefficient as a result of operating in the decreasing returns region. The results 
provided no evidence for significant difference between private and public power 
plants. Pure technical inefficiency was identified as the major contributor to the 
overall technical inefficiency for the whole sample. However, pure technical 
inefficiency was a more serious problem for some public power plants than it was for 
the private power plants.
Pollitt (1995) conducted the first study in which the DEA approach was applied to 
international data to compare the technical efficiency of 145 US and UK distribution 
organisations operating in 1990. The data set included information on 119 privately 
owned and 26 publicly owned utilities. Pollitt divided the full sample into three sub­
samples according to the number of employees used to categorise the size of utilities 
as large, medium, and small. The efficiency firontier was constructed assuming both 
constant and variable returns to scale. The results indicated that there was no 
significant difference in technical efficiency between alternative types of ownership. 
There was also no evidence that the UK distribution system was performing poorly 
relatively to the US distribution utilities prior to privatisation.
Pollitt (1996) used DEA to examine the relative technical efficiency of a sample of 78 
publicly and privately owned nuclear power plants operating in 1989. The data comes 
firom five countries; US (62), UK (13), Canada (1), Japan (1), and South Africa (1). 
The Tobit model was used to test the null hypothesis that ownership has no effect on 
technical efficiency. In modelling, it was assumed that a single output (electricity) was 
produced by three inputs; capital, labour, and fuel. The capital was measured in MW
of nameplate (gross) capacity, labour was measured as the number of employees, and 
fuel was measured in TBtu (Btu x 10^ )^. The results indicated that there was little 
evidence of differing performance between the two types of ownership. It was also 
suggested that the UK nuclear power plants could expect to reduce costs through a 
significant lowering of staffing levels.
Yunos and Hawdon (1997) were the first to perform the comparison of the relative 
technical efficiency of 28 electricity industries of developing countries in 1987. The 
study concentrated on Malaysia, a country which adopted a privatisation policy in mid 
1980s. It was suggested that changes in the organisation of electricity generation 
could be justified on efficiency grounds. The model adopted the input minimisation 
approach and employed four inputs (installed capacity, labour, total system losses, 
and generation capacity factor) and gross electricity produced as output.
Hawdon (1997) presented the technical and scale efficiencies for 82 developing 
countries power sectors in order to evaluate World Bank lending policy in 1988. To 
model the structure of production, the gross electricity production (Gwh) as output 
and four inputs; the number of employees in generation, number of employees in 
distribution, total installed capacity (MW), and fuel (terajoules) were considered. It 
was argued that since electricity generation is an intermediate product, input 
minimisation seems to be the appropriate basis for efficiency comparison. It was 
found that the overall technical efficiency of power sectors in developing countries 
was relatively low at around 69%. 78% of the inefficiency was identified as pure 
technical, and the rest as scale inefficiency. Two thirds of the sample of developing 
countries were operating in the increasing returns to scale region and only 15% 
displayed constant returns to scale. In the case of Sub Saharan Africa, the proportion 
of increasing returns to scale countries was relatively high (85%). Therefore, it was 
suggested that World Bank aid should be directed towards increasing the scale of the 
power sectors in these countries.
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The above review indicates that empirical applications of input-based approach are 
dominant relative to applications of output-based efficiency measurement. Most 
studies were directed to analyse the effect of ownership on technical efficiency of 
electricity industries. The results are not in agreement with each other. For instance, 
Hausman and Neufeld (1991) argued that considering all types of efficiency measures, 
the municipal electric utilities (public) were significantly more efficient than the 
private electric utilities. Pollitt (1995, 1996) concluded that there was weak evidence 
of differing performance between two types of ownership. Yunos and Hawdon (1997) 
suggested that changes in the organisation of electricity generation (privatisation) 
could be justified on efficiency grounds. What is learned from previous studies is that, 
there is controversy over the effect of ownership on efficiency of electricity industry. 
More empirical work is needed to shed possible light on this issue. The previous 
studies are particularly useful since they present, besides the results, the definition of 
variables, assumptions and orientation of fi*ontier technology which are used as a 
guidance in empirical analysis (chapter 6).
5.3 SFA studies of electricity supply industry
The literature on the SFA technique is growing rapidly. The availability of 
commercial software such as LIMDEP has allowed this theoretically and practically 
advanced technique to become a more suitable method of providing valuable 
information on production and efficiency measurement. Several excellent surveys of 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis and efficiency measurement already exist, including 
Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), Lovell and Schmidt (1988 ), Bauer (1990), 
Battese (1992), Lovell (1993), Greene (1993), Pollitt (1995), Coelli (1995) and 
Cornwell and Schmidt (1995), the latter article paid more attention to the use of panel 
data. In this review, the focus is on the application of the SFA technique to the 
electricity supply industry.
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Schmidt and Lovell (1979) specified a Cobb-Douglas technology for steam-electric 
generating plants and developed the first model of stochastic cost frontier. The main 
purpose of this paper was to show that it was possible to obtain the total inefficiency 
and its technical and allocative components by extension of the analysis of Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Recall that 
Aigner et al (1977) considered maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic 
production frontier with a disturbance of the form v-u, where v is normal and u is 
half-normal. For estimation of a cost frontier rather than a production frontier the 
disturbance is of the form v + u. Schmidt and Lovell estimated the stochastic cost 
frontier for a sample of US steam-electric generating plants. The output was 
electricity generated in million kwh, capital was the actual cost of the plant, fuel was 
the actual consumption of fuel (million Btu). Labour was measured in total employee 
man-hours. They found returns to scale were about 1.25. The coefficient of fuel was 
very large (0.96) and highly significant. The coefficient of capital was only marginally 
significant, and that of labour was insignificant. These results were also compared to 
the direct estimates of the stochastic production frontier, in which the coefficient of 
labour was negative, the coefficient of capital was so small, and the coefficient of fuel 
was significantly larger than one. This study provided only sample mean estimates of 
technical inefficiency. In other words they did not compare the technical efficiency of 
the various plants. But Schmidt and Lovell obtained estimates of allocative 
inefficiency by plant, and so a search for its sources was feasible. They argued that 
inefficiency (allocative) was negatively and significantly correlated with size of plant, 
as measured by output.
Kopp and Smith (1980) estimated Cobb-Douglas, CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution ) and translog production frontiers and their technical inefficiencies using 
the Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) approach for a sample of coal-fired electric 
power plants. A stochastic frontier with normal/half-normal assumptions was 
considered. Their results suggested that the restrictive functional forms were rejected 
in favour of the more flexible translog model. They initially used three inputs; labour, 
capital, and fuel for each three specifications. They found that capital and fuel are the
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most important inputs to production technology. Labour appeared to sustain a direct 
relationship to the scale of plant. Their final translog specification included net 
electricity generation as the dependent variable and two independent variables of fuel 
(measured in Btu) and capital (measured in installed nameplate capacity). In this 
paper other parametric approaches were also compared with stochastic frontier, where 
they argued that technical inefficiency was more dependent on the particular frontier 
estimator used than on the functional form of the production frontier.
Hammond (1992) employed maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the 
stochastic cost function with a logarithmic transformation. The frontier was estimated 
using cross-sectional observations at plant level. Following Jondrow, Lovell, Materov 
and Schmidt (1982), technical inefficiencies of the individual plants were estimated. 
On the basis of evidence from the inter-war period in Britain, the conclusion was that 
a decentralised structure for electricity industry was not only possible, but might also 
encourage efficiency.
The earliest literature on stochastic frontier models considered the case of a single 
cross section. Identification of the model was achieved by strong assumptions about 
the distributions of the v (stochastic term) and u (technical inefficiency term). The 
literature on the use of panel data in frontier models grew out of dissatisfaction with 
these strong assumptions. Panel data is useful because it allows weaker assumptions, 
or obtains greater accuracy under a given set of assumptions than would be possible 
with a single cross section. Pitt and Lee (1981) were the first who suggested the use of 
panel data to estimate stochastic frontier production functions and to estimate firm 
inefficiency. They considered a sample of 50 Indonesian weaving firms, each 
observed for 3 years. They argued that the half-normal distribution for technical 
inefficiency was preferred from the computational point of view. Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) were the first to elaborate systematically on the link between the frontier and 
panel data literature and on the advantages of panel data for estimation of firm 
inefficiency. They argued that the previous stochastic frontier models on cross- 
sectional data suffered from three serious difficulties, as discussed in chapter 4. They
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argued that these problems were potentially avoidable if panel data was used for 
stochastic frontier models.
Cote (1989) used panel data to estimate a stochastic cost frontier model for the US 
generating power plants. The sample contained 37 privately-owned, 9 publicly-owned 
and 16 cooperative-owned electric utilities observed over the period 1965-73. The 
objective of this paper was the estimation of firm inefficiency using panel data with a 
fixed-effects model. Output was defined as the net generation of electricity measured 
in millions of Kwh per year. Capital was measured by the non-land cost of plants in 
thousands of dollars. Fuel was measured in Btu per year. Labour was measured by 
average numbers of plant employees x 2000 hours per year. The prices of fuel, labour 
and capital were also taken into account. Following Schmidt and Lovell (1979), Cote 
estimated a stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function for each ownership 
structure using maximum likelihood technique. The mean technical inefficiency for 
each of the three organisational forms (private, public and co-operative) was 
presented, but not at the firm level. His results suggested that co-operatives were the 
most efficient type of ownership structure, while small private and public electric 
utilities had a similar level of technical inefficiency. It was argued that due to the large 
number of firms in the sample, the normalisation of the most efficient firm as 100% 
technical efficiency was less questionable.
5.4 DEA and SFA studies of electricity supply industry
There are few studies of electricity industry that have been conducted using the same 
data in order to compare the performance and properties of the techniques.
Pollitt (1995) was the first person to examine the technical efficiency of the publicly 
and privately-owned electric utilities in a sample of 768 thermal power plants 
operating in 14 developed countries in 1989. In addition to using both DEA and SFA 
techniques, some other techniques were also applied. For details of his approaches, 
the reference was given as Lovell and Schmidt (1988). The full sample was divided
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into four sub-samples according to the plants’ load factors to obtain a more 
meaningful comparisons across the plants. The data included one output which was 
the net electricity generation (measured in millions of kilowatt-hours), and three 
inputs; labour (measured as the number of employees employed at the plant level), 
capital (measured in nameplate capacity in megawatts), and fuel (measured in Btu). 
The results exhibited no significant difference in technical efficiency at the plant level 
between private and public ownership. This finding was valid between the sub 
samples as well as the methods. Pollitt also used the based load plants to examine the 
overall technical and allocative efficiencies by different methodologies. The 
components of overall technical efficiency were calculated applying DEA with 
assumption of variable returns to scale technology. In the SFA formulation the 
translog cost function was adopted where prices were required. The input price data 
contained the historical and current price of capital and the prices of labour and fuel. 
The results suggested that private plants were allocatively more efficient than their 
public counterparts in the sample. The evidence from the overall technical efficiency 
resulted in similar, but weaker, support for the superior performance of private 
utilities over the public utilities. The conclusion was that the ownership is not a major 
determinant of differences in technical efficiency.
5.5 Conclusion
Most of the published efficiency studies of electricity industry have concentrated 
almost solely on efficiency measurement of the electricity industry in developed 
countries and relatively few examine those of developing countries. In addition, none 
of the developing country studies conducted so far have employed the SFA approach 
particularly with panel data. There are two prominent cross-sectional studies which 
present efficiency performance of power sectors in developing countries for 1987 and 
1988 using the DEA approach. It will be a worthy contribution to examine efficiency 
performance of these developing countries, by applying both DEA and SFA 
approaches in a panel data arrangement.
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Numerous empirical studies employing different methodologies have considered the 
effect of ownership on the efficiency of firms operating in the electricity supply 
industry. The property rights literature asserts that private ownership is inherently 
more efficient than public ownership (Alchian, 1965). However, the theoretical 
predictions of the property rights have not unanimously been confirmed empirically. 
The results known so far on this issue yield conflicting conclusions. A major problem 
with the previous studies is that they have mainly concentrated on the relationship 
between performance and ownership type in restricted context. Pollitt (1995) asserts 
that if observed differences in efficiency reflect the proximity of the scale of operation 
to the minimum, it may be wrong to attribute differences in efficiency to ownership 
type. In the literature the association between firm size and efficiency is frequently 
presumed. It seems that a model which examines the effect of both size and ownership 
on efficiency measures may shed light on the issue.
Some previous studies of the advanced countries, in modelling the SFA approach, 
have used cost function frontiers. The estimation of a cost function frontier involves 
information on the price of all the inputs including capital. This information is 
difficult to obtain in developing countries. Thus, the estimation of the production 
function frontier is more attractive than estimation of cost function frontier for 
developing countries. This formulation does not require any price information. 
However, estimation of production function frontiers yields technical inefficiency but 
not allocative inefficiency. Almost all empirical models involve logarithmic 
transformation. The literature dealing with SFA commonly assumes that technical 
inefficiency conform to half-normal distribution. The previous studies have done an 
excellent task in introducing appropriate variables in model specifications.
In the previous DEA studies, empirical applications of input-based approach are 
dominant relative to applications of output-based efficiency measurement. This is 
mainly due to a dominant environment in which input minimisation for given outputs 
seems to be the appropriate orientation, i.e., public electricity utilities are required to 
meet demand. For productivity growth studies, the Malmquist index gives a good
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explanation, however, this index has not been applied in most previous studies, 
perhaps, due to lack of panel data. Developing countries have their own special 
conditions that shape the performance of their power sectors, therefore, it is less 
reliable to draw policy conclusions from advanced country studies. It seems much 
more reasonable to perform a case study for a country (Iran) that seeks such 
information. It will be even more useful to investigate the information at firm level. 
The studies on the electricity industries are usually cross-sectional, measuring the 
performance for a particular year. A growing body of literature dealing with Frontier 
Analysis in the context of panel data, along with availability of well-developed 
software (such as LIMDEP 7, DEAF 2, and LAMBDA 4) makes it possible to present 
more concrete results than those available in the current literature.
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Chapter 6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with an investigation into technical efficiency of the 
Iranian electricity industry. This industry is first compared with that of other 
developing countries. This study naturally seeks to learn which countries in the 
sample are the most or least efficient. Consistent data was collected for 26 developing 
countries. If additional countries are introduced into the analysis, they may reduce, but 
cannot increase the technical efficiency of a given country. This is quite natural, since 
a country might be highly efficient by developing country standards, but not by 
international standards.
This analysis uses the data collected on thermal power plants. This selection ensures 
that plants in the sample constitute a homogenous technology. The previous studies 
(Yunos & Hawdon, 1997 and Hawdon, 1997) used the DEA approach in a cross- 
sectional framework to measure relative performance of developing countries in 1987 
and 1988. It is useful to compare the technical efficiency of the electricity industry of 
developing countries under the DEA and the SFA specifications by using panel data 
of 1987 and 1988. Considering the effects of ownership and plant size in a Tobit 
efficiency model, the intention is to shed light on the controversy over ownership and 
efficiency.
In the next step, the relative efficiency of the Iranian electricity industry is calculated 
with respect to its own performance over time. For the detailed industry inquiry, the 
Iranian power plants and regional distribution organisations are also investigated. The 
application of the Malmquist DEA methods to panel data provides an appropriate tool 
to calculate indices of total factor productivity, technological, technical and scale 
efficiency changes in power plants of developing countries.
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In determining the effective factors for efficiency improvements, the DEA efficiency 
scores are used as dependent variable in a Tobit regression model. Throughout this 
chapter, the technology is modelled in terms of input-based orientation, the objective 
is to provide electricity with a minimum resource level. In fact, as Coelli (1995) 
argues, in many studies the researchers have to select input-oriented models because 
DMUs have particular orders to fill (e.g. electricity generation) and hence the input 
quantities appear to be the primary decision variables. Generally speaking, one should 
select an orientation according to which quantities (inputs or outputs) the managers 
have most control over.
The stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency are estimated using the 
program LIMDEP 7 released by William H. Greene in October 1995. The DEA 
efficiency scores and the Malmquist indices are calculated using the program DEAP2 
developed by Tim Coelli in 1996 which has been designed for economists. Other 
useful DEA software, LAMBDA4 (Hawdon and McQueen, 1996) was also used for 
the measurement of efficiency scores in which the equivalent scores were obtained 
with DEAP2.
6.2 Empirical model
The basic structure of stochastic frontier models is as follows:
yi,=f(Xi„P)+V|,-Uj
i= l ,2 , . . . ,N , t= l ,2 ,. . . ,T  
where
y;t = output from firm i for year t 
Xjt = input from firm i for year t 
Vit = statistical noise
Uj = firm effect representing technical inefficiency
It is customary in panel data models to arrange the observations in vector form, taking 
the individuals (with all their observations) one after the other. A panel data set may 
alleviate the problem of multicollinearity; since the explanatory variables vary in two 
dimensions, they are less likely to be highly correlated.
Technical inefficiency (uj is assumed to be time-invariant for each firm. Technical 
inefficiency and its relative ranking are unlikely to change greatly over short time 
periods, so time-invariant assumption seems reasonable (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984, 
Kalirajan and Shand, 1989). If N (number of firms) is large but T (period of time) is 
small, the time-invariant assumption fits the usual framework more closely both to 
usual panel data technique and stochastic frontier analysis (Schmidt and Sickles, 
1984, Schmidt, 1985). In addition, the comparison between the SFA and DEA 
methodologies are considerably facilitated by this invariance assumption (Gong and 
Sickles, 1992).
The effects are treated as random, because economic effects are random and not fixed 
(Mundlak, 1978). As Schmidt and Sickles (1984) indicate the conventional random 
effects model can be used for short panels in which the assumption of independence 
between technical inefficiency and the explanatory variables (inputs) has empirical 
support (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990).
The stochastic error term (v^ J is assumed to have a normal distribution and technical 
inefficiency (uj is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution. The frontier 
production functions are estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure available 
in LIMDEP. When the random effects model was estimated. Maximum Likelihood 
estimates of the cross sectional model were computed first to obtain the starting 
values. This produced a full set of results which ignored the panel nature of the data. 
A second full set of results then followed for the random effects model. The random 
effects models were estimated with balanced and unbalanced panels. Technical 
inefficiencies for individual firms were obtained through the formula suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1988). The procedure is fully illustrated in appendix 2.
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6.3 Choice of data, variables and related problems
A reliable efficiency analysis depends clearly on the quality of the data. To understand 
the results and policy implications, it is important to get a real feel for the data. Some 
of the statistics of 26 developing countries for 1987 and 1988, were taken from two 
surveys of developing countries electric power sectors carried out by the World Bank 
(Escay, 1990,1991). Other necessary data was extracted from two series of UN 
publications; the Energy Balances & Electricity Profiles and Electric Power in Asia 
and the Pacific (Tables A4.1, A4.2).
For the first time in 1967 information and statistics for the Iranian electricity industry 
were collected and published in the form of an annual statistical report, although, the 
data has never been used to examine the issue of technical inefficiency. The major 
source of Iranian data is the statistics of the Ministry of Energy. Other sources are 
publications of the Central Bank and the Statistics Centre of Iran. The findings 
presented utilize data from those official statistical sources and the information 
obtained from experts in prominent positions in the Ministry of Energy as well as 
field visits.
The data contains information on the three common inputs (labour, capital and fuel) 
employed to generate electricity in thermal power plants. In measuring the efficiency 
performance of regional companies for electricity distribution three inputs (labour, 
network size and transformer capacity) and four outputs (electricity sales to residential 
and industrial sectors as well as the number of residential and industrial customers) 
are used.
The measurement of outputs and inputs followed standard practice found in the 
literature. The fuel input includes natural gas, gas oil and fuel oil. These fuels are used 
in the generation stage and are aggregated into a single input by summing over their 
Btu (or terajoules) equivalents (Table A1.29). Labour is measured as the number of 
employees. Capital is defined as installed generating capacity, measured in MW.
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Network size and transformer capacity is measured in kilometre (KM) and Mega Volt 
Ampere (MYA) respectively. Electricity production and sales are based on million 
kilowatts hours (Gwh). In some cases, the variables have very different magnitudes, 
and so the data was scaled down to reduce the possibility of convergence problems 
(Greene, 1995). Recall that technical efficiency analysis required only data on the 
physical units of inputs and outputs.
It is worth noting that all the Iranian statistical information is based on the Iranian 
calendar, where, for example, 1995 shown, this implies the period from the 21st of 
March 1995 to the 20th of March 1996. For purpose of detailed description, the full 
data set with their relevant sources have been included in the Appendices.
6.4 An intercountry comparison using both DEA and SFA
The objective of this section is to evaluate the performance of the electricity sector in 
Iran using an intercountry comparison of efficiency and productivity growth. The 
panel data used in the analysis comprises information on a sample of 26 electricity 
utilities in developing countries for 1987 and 1988. These countries produced 17.5 % 
out of total thermal electricity production of developing countries in 1988.
6.4.1 Specification and estimation of the production function
In modelling electricity production function, it was assumed that electricity is 
produced by three inputs; capital, labour and fuel. A translog production function 
versus a Cobb-Douglas functional form was first applied. Most of the coefficients of 
the translog were found to be insignificant. Generally speaking, the Cobb-Douglas 
form fits the data well. In the case of Cobb-Douglas form, the initial model obtained 
as follows:
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Lgit = 0.148 + 0.084 LKj, + 0.053 LLjt+ 0.952 LE;,
(t statistics) ( 1.168) (1.043) (20.222)
= 0.998
(see appendix 2, section A for detailed results)
Where;
LQ = Log (Q), Q = electricity production (Gwh)
LK = Log(K), K = capital (MW)
LL = Log (L), L = labour (Total)
LE = Log (E), E = Energy (terajoules)
The signs of the coefficients of stochastic frontier are as expected. The model did not 
show a highly statistically significant effect from labour. It confirms the argument that 
capital and fuel appear to be the most important input to the electricity production 
technology (Schmidt & Lovell, 1979, Kopp & Smith, 1980). Therefore, the preferred 
model is based on capital and energy inputs. The estimated model is as follows:
LQ;, = 0.184 + 0.146 LIQ. + 0.935 LE,,
(t statistics) ( 2.564 ) ( 18.405 )
R" = 0.997,N= 52, a j  = 0.00193, a j  = 0.07032 
(see appendix 2 section B for detailed results)
6.4.2 Technical inefficiency estimation
The stochastic production function estimates are only a means to an end, namely 
technical inefficiency estimation. To obtain the individual technical inefficiencies, the 
method proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988) in the context of panel data was 
applied (Chapter 4). The estimation of technical inefficiencies for 26 developing 
countries is presented in Table 6.1.
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6.1 Inefficiency estimation 
(1987-
of 26 developing countries 
1988)
Country Stochastic frontier 
(technical inefficiency)
Thailand 0.016
Haiti 0.030
Nepai 0.040
Guatemaia 0.049
Maii 0.077
Pakistan 0.139
Costa Rica 0.153
Centrai African Republic 0.172
Maiaysia 0.184
Nicaragua 0.197
Morocco 0.213
Egypt 0.219
Mexico 0.221
Nigeria 0.225
Sri Lanka 0.231
Niger 0.235
Indonesia 0.272
Zambia 0.274
Dominican Republic 0.292
Bangladesh 0.305
Argentina 0.343
Peru 0.343
Venezuela 0.375
Iran 0.397
Ghana 0.451
El Salvador 0.534
mean 0.230
The estimated average technical inefficiency (mean of w) is 0.23, indicating 23% 
technical inefficiency in electricity production of developing countries. In other 
words, power plants in the sample of developing countries are only 77% technically 
efficient. Thailand by having the most efficient power plants is placed on the top, 
while El Salvador for its least efficient power plants is on the bottom. The Iranian 
power plants with an efficiency of 60.3% ranked 24-th in the sample.
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6.4.3 Technical efficiency measurement
The SFA results can be compared and evaluated with the DEA efficiency scores. In 
the meantime, it is useful to present the reference sets for inefficient power plants as a 
yardstick. In this regard, the DEA approach is the best choice.
In the literature, there is no regular way to handle DEA with panel data in order to get 
models comparable with SFA. However, in the case of a short panel, it seems 
satisfactory that the data is merged and efficiency scores are calculated for only one 
data set (Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995, Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar and 
Heshmati,1996, Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1998). For comparison of the SFA and 
DEA results, it is necessary to calculate DEA for capital and fuel inputs, i.e., with the 
same variables in SFA. First, the impact of labour left out from the results obtained 
from DEA is compared with that of DEA including labour. This is done by the 
correlation method for efficiency scores that are calculated by two DEA 
specifications. There are two methods of measuring correlation (Harnett and Soni, 
1991), namely, Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient and Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient. The formula for Pearson’s product moment correlation 
coefficient is:
 ^ ^  nXjxy - ________
Spearman’s Rank correlation can be calculated using the following formula:
Where;
X = DEA efficiency scores calculated for three inputs (capital, fuel and labour) 
y = DEA efficiency scores calculated for two inputs (capital and fuel) 
d =differences between rankings by two DEA calculations 
n = number of countries (26)
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The computation of Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (r = 0.89) 
indicates a good correlation between two kind of DEA calculations. In the case of 
Spearman’s rank correlation (R = 0.828) a null hypothesis (no difference in ranks as 
evidenced by two DEA calculations) cannot be rejected at the significant level of 0.01 
(0.828 > 0.515). Consequently, dropping the labour from the calculation does not 
effect the results.
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the various DEA measurement and 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients appear in Appendix 4.The results of the DEA 
calculation with capital and energy inputs are presented in Table 6.2.
6.2 Efficiency measures of electricity supply industry in 26 developing countries
Overall Pure Scale Scale Stochastic
Country technical technical frontier
efficiency efficiency efficiency type efficiency
1 Argentina 0.73 0.73 1 - 0.6575
2 Bangladesh 0.664 0.665 0.999 1rs 0.6952
3 Centrai African Republic 0.57 1 0.57 1rs 0.8283
4 Costa Rica 0.702 0.784 0.895 1rs 0.8472
5 Dominican Republic 0.812 0.826 0.983 1rs 0.708
6 Egypt 0.824 0.833 0.99 drs 0.7813
7 El Salvador 0.449 0.464 0.966 1rs 0.4661
8 Ghana 0.505 0.596 0.847 1rs 0.5492
9 Guatemala 0.831 0.86 0.966 1rs 0.9511
10 Haiti 0.691 0.886 0.78 1rs 0.9703
11 Indonesia 0.786 0.798 0.985 drs 0.7284
12 Iran 0.747 0.773 0.967 drs 0.6032
13 Malaysia 0.787 0.788 1 - 0.8161
14 Mali 0.643 0.772 0.833 1rs 0.9232
15 Mexico 0.901 1 0.901 drs 0.7792
16 Morocco 0.919 0.927 0.992 1rs 0.7875
17 Nepai 0.72 1 0.72 1rs 0.9604
18 Nicaragua 0.637 0.647 0.984 1rs 0.8035
19 Niger 0.543 0.775 0.7 1rs 0.765
20 Nigeria 0.726 0.726 0.999 1rs 0.7755
21 Pakistan 0.85 0.85 1 - 0.8615
22 Peru 0.657 0.659 0.997 1rs 0.6574
23 Sri Lanka 0.642 0.66 0.973 1rs 0.7691
24 Thailand 1 1 1 - 0.9843
25 Venezuela 0.714 0.714 1 - 0.6252
26 Zambia 0.68 0.86 0.791 1rs 0.7256
mean 0.720 0.792 0.917 0.770
Note: Observations which score less 
irs = increasing returns to scale, drs =
than 1 are inefficient.
= decreasing returns to scale, - = constant returns to scale.
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The average overall technical efficiency in developing countries power plants was 
found to be relatively low at 72%. This finding is in agreement with the argument that 
efficiency in power sectors has been a neglected goal for public policy in many 
developing countries (Hawdon, 1997). The relatively high average scale efficiency 
score (0.917) suggests that scale inefficiency is a less serious problem than managerial 
(pure) inefficiency (0.792) in the power plants of developing countries under 
investigation. Managerial inefficiency is a very serious problem for some developing 
countries, namely for El Salvador and Ghana. Power plants, in general, are operating 
at a scale less than the long-run optimum (constant returns to scale). Most of these 
power plants exhibit increasing returns to scale. This suggests that if they were not 
efficient, scale expansion should improve performance. Thailand is found to be fully 
efficient in this regard.
The managerial (pure) technical efficiency of the electricity sector in different 
countries varies widely from 46.4 percent to 100 percent. Electricity sectors in 
Thailand, Nepal, Mexico and the Central African Republic achieved the highest 
scores and form the reference frontier or reference technology.
The overall technical efficiency of Iran is 0.747. Therefore, Iran could be able to 
reduce the consumption of capital and energy inputs by 25.3% without reducing 
electricity output. The results also presents slack for energy input (Appendix 3). 
Recall from chapter 4 that energy input slack indicates the need for further reductions 
(6.5%) in the energy input.
The DEA results have identified the reference sets for inefficient countries (Table 
6.3). Thailand appeared in the reference set of most developing countries. Thailand, 
Nepal, Mexico and the Central African Republic might be used as a yardstick for 
raising the level of efficiency of other developing countries.
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6.3 Reference frontier set for efficiency improvement of the 
Developing countries based on variable returns to scale
Country
Objective
Function
a
Central
African
Republic
Mexico Nepal Thailand
Stochastic
frontier
efficiency
Thailand 1 0.9843
Nepai 1 0.9604
Central African Republic 1 0.8283
Mexico 1 0.7792
Morocco 0.927 0.727 0.273 0.7875
Haiti 0.886 0.991 0.009 0.9703
Guatemala 0.86 0.9995 0.0005 0.9511
Zambia 0.86 0.991 0.009 0.7256
Pakistan 0.85 0.298 0.702 0.8615
Egypt 0.833 0.033 0.967 0.7813
Dominican Republic 0.826 0.845 0.155 0.708
Indonesia 0.798 0.035 0.965 0.7284
Maiaysia 0.788 0.535 0.465 0.8161
Costa Rica 0.784 0.998 0.002 0.8472
Niger 0.775 0.995 0.005 0.765
Iran 0.773 0.132 0.868 0.6032
Mali 0.772 0.899 0.099 0.002 0.9232
Argentina 0.73 0.015 0.985 0.6575
Nigeria 0.726 0.172 0.554 0.274 0.7755
Venezuela 0.714 0.156 0.844 0.6252
Bangladesh 0.665 0.794 0.206 0.6952
Sri Lanka 0.66 0.988 0.012 0.7691
Peru 0.659 0.889 0.111 0.6574
Nicaragua 0.647 0.071 0.907 0.022 0.8035
Ghana 0.596 0.999 0.001 0.5492
Ei Salvador 0.464 0.483 0.506 0.011 0.4661
Thailand and Mexico are the dominant reference set for Iran. The efficiency 
calculations were carried out assuming the presence of constant returns to scale (CRS) 
and variable returns to scale (VRS) technologies. The results for the cases of three 
inputs (capital, energy and labour) and two inputs (capital and energy) are also 
presented (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Thus if Iran wishes to move towards an efficient 
frontier, it might be advised to adopt the weighted combination of the technologies of 
these two countries.
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6.4 Technical efficiency of the Iranian electricity supply industry
(1987-1988)
Three inputs Scale Technical
efficiency
Ranking Central 
African Rep.
Dominican
Republic
Mexico Morocco Thailand
1987 CRS 0.76 12 0.036 0.356 0.185
1988 CRS 0.847 11 0.145 1.632 0.37
1987 VRS 0.76 17 0.426 0.037 0.358 0.18
1988 VRS 0.852 15 0.253 0.335 0.412
Two Inputs
1987 CRS 0.734 9 2.209 0.948
1988 CRS 0.767 15 1.208
1987 VRS 0.749 14 0.147 0.853
1988 VRS 0.798 18 0.116 0.884
6.4.4 Comparison of the SFA results with the DEA seores
The results of the SFA and the DEA approaches are compared using correlation 
methods. Calculation of Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (r = 0.71) 
indicates a relatively good correlation. In the case of Spearman’s rank correlation, the 
null hypothesis (no difference in ranks as evidenced by the DEA and SFA 
approaches) cannot be rejected at the significant level of 0.01 (R= 0.664 > 0.515). 
The DEA measure based on variable returns to scale performed the best. The 
differences between the two approaches are relatively small. Both techniques 
identified Thailand as having the most efficient electricity industry and El Salvador 
the least efficient one. The estimation of efficiency using two different techniques 
adds to the robustness of the results.
6.4.5 Productivity growth index
In studying the productivity performance of power plants in developing countries, the 
distinction between technological progress (innovation), changes in managerial 
efficiency and scale efficiency is extremely useful. In this regard, the Malmquist index 
is a unique tool. Recall from chapter 4 that an attractive feature of Malmquist 
productivity index is that it can be decomposed into economically relevant sources of 
productivity changes- technological change, managerial and scale efficiency changes.
108
In the input-based Malmquist index calculation, a value less than one means 
productivity growth occurred from period t to t +1. If there is productivity retardation, 
then the Malmquist index exceeds one. The unity value of the Malmquist index 
indicates there is no change in productivity.
The Malmquist productivity index and its decomposition for power plants of 26 
developing countries for 1988 relative to 1987 is presented in Table 6.5. By 
decomposing the Malmquist index, the sources of productivity growth/retardation 
were identified. The remedy for a productivity slowdown caused by a decline in 
efficiency could be the elimination of waste and increasing efficiency. If the problem 
were an adverse shift in the best-practice frontier, the relevant developing countries 
goals might be re-evaluated in light of the technological temptation, or more ftmding 
for research and development (R&D). The improvements in the technical-change 
component are considered to be evidence of innovation. Knowledge of scale 
economies, and changes in scale are relevant for choosing the optimal size of plants, 
and ultimately the structure of the industry.
The principal finding is that average managerial inefficiency (1.070) dominated 
average technological progress (0.88) of the developing countries in the period 1987- 
1988. Managerial inefficiency was the major source of productivity change for 16 out 
of the 26 developing countries, whereas technological inefficiency was the major 
source for 7 out of 26 developing countries. In the case of Iran, total factor 
productivity fell during the period 1987 to 1988, with the greatest reduction calculated 
for managerial inefficiency (1.12). Developing countries as a group experienced both 
productivity growth and retardation during 1987-1988. The results suggest that there 
were total productivity gains in twelve countries and total productivity losses in 
thirteen. The Malmquist index varies widely across the power plants of developing 
countries. The greatest productivity progress occurs in the Dominican Republic. The 
greatest productivity slowdown is found in Argentina’s power plants.
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6.5 Malmquist index summary (1988 relative to 1987)
Country
Technical
efficiency
change
Technological
change
Pure
efficiency
change
Scale
efficiency
change
Total
factor
productivity
1 Argentina 1.201 1.095 1.198 1.002 1.315
2 Bangladesh 1.083 0.893 1.076 1.007 0.967
3 Central African Rep. 1.303 0.768 1 1.303 1
4 Costa Rica 1.312 0.768 1.191 1.101 1.007
5 Dominican Republic 0.771 1.007 0.789 0.978 0.777
6 Egypt 0.892 1.019 0.891 1.001 0.909
7 El Salvador 1.201 0.772 1.032 1.163 0.927
8 Ghana 1.27 0.768 1.137 1.117 0.975
9 Guatemala 1.332 0.768 1.286 1.036 1.023
10 Haiti 1.099 0.924 0.907 1.212 1.016
11 Indonesia 1.164 0.945 1.163 1.001 1.1
12 Iran 1.115 1.004 1.12 0.995 1.119
13 Malaysia 1.146 0.922 1.145 1.001 1.056
14 Mali 1.283 0.768 1.104 1.162 0.985
15 Mexico 1 1.049 1 1 1.049
16 Morocco 1.011 1.026 1 1.011 1.037
17 Nepai 1.254 0.768 1 1.254 0.963
18 Nicaragua 1.223 0.779 1.116 1.096 0.953
19 Niger 1.146 0.881 0.99 1.158 1.01
20 Nigeria 1.061 0.94 1.058 1.003 0.997
21 Pakistan 1.21 0.885 1.21 1 1.071
22 Peru 1.223 0.769 1.197 1.022 0.94
23 Sri Lanka 1.374 0.768 1.38 0.996 1.055
24 Thailand 1 0.933 1 1 0.933
25 Venezuela 0.962 1.07 0.966 0.996 1.029
26 Zambia 1.233 0.768 1.049 1.176 0.947
mean 1.139 0.880 1.070 1.065 1.002
6.4.6 Determinants of efficiency
The presentation of firm’s inefficiency should allow further inquiry into the sources 
and causes of such differences among firms which is of great importance to improve 
the design of policies to deal with those sources (Cote, 1989). In this section, the 
effective factors in efficiency improvements are determined. In 1971, Timmer 
explained interstate variation in technical efficiency of US agriculture. Pitt and Lee 
(1981) investigated the determinants of technical inefficiency variation among the 
Indonesian weaving firms by regressing the inefficiencies, obtained from an estimated 
stochastic frontier, upon a vector of firm-specific factors, such as foreign ownership.
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age and size. There is, however, a serious problem with such approaches. In the first 
stage, the inefficiency effects were assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed, while in the second stage they were assumed to be a function of a number 
of firm-specific factors which implied that they were not identically distributed 
(Coelli, 1995). Due to this weakness, the DEA efficiency scores are being used as the 
dependent variable in recent regression models for a second stage estimation (among 
them, Pollitt, 1996, Majumdar, 1996). Following the argument of Favero and Papi 
(1995), having realized the existence of scale inefficiency in power sectors of 
developing countries, the concentration is on VRS measures of efficiency in 
investigating the determinants of efficiency. Therefore, the DEA efficiency scores 
from the analysis of developing countries power plants are submitted to the Tobit 
model in order to test the hypothesis that public ownership might have the adverse 
effect on technical efficiency. The Tobit model is chosen, because the dependent 
variable is restricted to values between zero and one. For estimation, maximum 
likelihood technique is preferred, since maximum likelihood estimates of the Tobit 
model (not OLS) provides unbiased and consistent estimates of parameters. The Tobit 
model is also known as a censored normal regression model because some 
observations (less than zero and greater than one values) are censored.
A firm’s scale of operation or plant size is often considered as a factor in determining 
efficiency (Pitt and Lee, 1981, Mayes, Harris, & Lansbury, 1994 and Yunos & 
Hawdon, 1997). An attempt is made to examine the combined impact of ownership 
and size on performance of developing countries power plants. From examining 
different econometric models, the preferred model is presented as follows:
E = 0.903 + 0.208 SIZE - 0.153 PUBOWN 
(t statistics) ( 2.54 ) (-1.16)
R" =0.22, N = 26
(see appendix 2 section C for detailed results)
E = pure technical efficiency (0 < E < 1)
SIZE = measured as installed capacity (MW)
PUBOWN = Share of public electricity production out of total electricity production
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The result of the final specification is broadly in line with expectations. The model is 
able to explain up to 22% of the variation in efficiency by variables related to 
ownership and size of power plants. As can been seen, public ownership although 
negatively related to the efficiency scores, is not significant in the conventional sense. 
The result may be taken at best as weak evidence for superior performance by private 
ownership. On the other hand, the efficiency criteria are positively related to power 
plant size. The results imply that in such circumstances where public ownership 
coincides with big power plants, their combined effects on efficiency performance 
could be neutralised. In other words, developing countries may benefit from scale 
economies to compensate inefficiency of their power sectors due to state-owned 
management.
The significance of size is interpreted as an indication of greater efficiency of larger 
power plants. Strictly speaking, the relation between size and efficiency does not, in 
general, guarantee the existence of increasing returns to scale. In fact the efficiency 
score is a measure of the distance between the observed points and the envelope 
obtained by joining the most efficient points. This distance does not say anything of 
the shape of the envelope and therefore it cannot be interpreted as an indicator of 
increasing returns to scale (Favero and Papi ,1995). However, the shape of the 
envelope (the DEA results) indicates the evidence of increasing returns to scale in 
most developing countries power plants. This finding that scale effects play an 
important role, is consistent with the individual plant studies emphasising the 
importance of scale economies and their potential for stimulating productivity growth 
(Nerlove,1963 and Christensen & Greene, 1976).
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6.5 Efficiency trends in the Iranian eleetricity supply industry
The Iranian electricity supply industry comprises 30 main power stations, 12 small­
sized gas turbines and 64 diesel generators scattered around the country. The main 
power stations produced 93% of total electricity production in 1995. The share of 
small-sized gas turbines and diesel generators was 6% and 1% respectively.
DEA is used to measure the relative efficiency of the Iranian electricity industry over 
the last three decades. Efficiency measures are calculated for the alternative 
assumptions of constant and variable returns to scale, based on the CCR and BCC 
models. The procedures are discussed in chapter 4. The impact of different policies on 
the efficiency performance of the Iranian electricity supply industry is empirically 
evaluated.
Data and Variables
The unique data used in this analysis consists of annual observations covering the 
period from 1967 to 1995 for three inputs and one output. The data was provided by 
the Head of Information Resources Management Department in the Ministry of 
Energy (Table A l.l). The basic inputs used by thermal power plants to produce 
electricity are labour, capital and fuel.
Output is measured in millions of kilowatt-hours (Gwh) generated by all thermal 
power plants (i.e. steam, gas turbines and diesel generators). Labour is measured in 
the number of employees in the electricity generation sectors. Capital is defined as 
installed capacity, measured in thousands of kilowatts (MW), which includes steam, 
gas turbine and diesel generator capacities. Fuel usage is measured in Btu, which 
comprises fuel oil, gas oil and natural gas.
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The DEA Results
The average overall technical efficiency of the Iranian electricity industry over the last 
three decades is 92.5%. This indicates that input usage could be reduced by 7.5% on 
average to allow the industry to operate efficiently in the past. During the period of 
1967-1976, the electricity supply industry appears to have been operating in the 
increasing returns to scale region, explaining the relative importance of the scale 
effects. In addition, the dominance of scale inefficiency over managerial inefficiency 
is an important characteristic of this period (Table 6.6).
In the era after the Islamic revolution (1979), the quick provision of electricity 
requirements was given high priority. Gas turbines were installed to increase supply 
quickly but at relatively high technical inefficiency. In this period, the electricity 
supply industry operated under decreasing returns to scale. It seems that economies of 
scale in the electricity industry, as a whole, have largely disappeared due to the 
advancement of gas-fired generation (Horowitz, Seeto and Woo, 1986). This finding 
has interesting policy implications. The existence of decreasing returns to scale means 
that the Iranian electricity industry, as a whole, has over expanded, and implies that 
the unbalanced expansion of gas turbines in Iran should be terminated. Moreover, it is 
argued that the Ministry of Energy might consider handing over some of its affiliated 
companies to the private sector. The detailed analysis of the main power plants 
(Section 6.5) indicates that the Ministry of Energy is best advised to concentrate on 
the main power stations with economies of scale and get rid of others altogether.
In the Iranian electricity industry, a downward trend in managerial efficiency took 
place in the 1980s due mainly to managerial replacements with inexperienced new 
managers in the era after the Islamic revolution. In 1979, input usage could have been 
reduced by 16.7% on average if the power plants were to operate efficiently. In recent 
years, however, efficiency scores of the Iranian electricity industry have been rising 
continuously and the finding reveals that, there has been the adoption of new 
technology and skills training.
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6.6 Efficiency development in the Iranian electricity industry
(1967-1995)
Year
Overall
technical
efficiency
Pure
technical
efficiency
Scale
efficiency
Scale
type
1967 0.776 1 0.776 1rs
1968 0.827 1 0.827 1rs
1969 0.867 1 0.867 1rs
1970 0.906 1 0.906 1rs
1971 0.892 0.973 0.917 1rs
1972 0.912 0.971 0.939 1rs
1973 0.969 0.998 0.971 1rs
1974 1 1 1 -
1975 0.965 0.965 0.999 drs
1976 0.987 1 0.987 1rs
1977 0.902 0.903 0.999 -
1978 0.834 0.835 0.999 drs
1979 0.828 0.833 0.993 drs
1980 0.853 0.858 0.994 drs
1981 0.886 0.89 0.996 drs
1982 0.915 0.922 0.993 drs
1983 0.921 0.927 0.994 drs
1984 0.934 0.941 0.992 drs
1985 0.922 0.929 0.992 drs
1986 0.942 0.95 0.991 drs
1987 0.923 0.93 0.992 drs
1988 0.953 0.955 0.998 drs
1989 0.952 0.957 0.994 drs
1990 0.979 0.981 0.998 drs
1991 1 1 1 -
1992 0.981 0.982 0.999 drs
1993 1 1 1 -
1994 1 1 1 -
1995 0.995 1 0.995 drs
mean 0.925 0.955 0.969
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6.6 Power plants study
In this section, the efficiency measures of the main power plants of the Iranian 
electricity industry are examined.
6.6.1 Specification and estimation of the production function
The data for capital, energy and labour inputs of fifteen main power plants are 
available in 1994 and 1995 (Tables A1,21,A1.22). Therefore, the model specification 
was first carried out in the context of panel data for one output and three inputs. The 
model is estimated as follows:
L Q ,r  3.144 + 0.191 LKit + 0.095 + 0.920 Le;,
(t statistics) (2.516) (0.734) (10.993)
R '= 0.968, N = 30
(see appendix 2 section D for detailed results)
Where;
Q =Electricity production (MWh)
K = Capital (installed capacity, MW)
L = Labour (in generating sector)
E = Energy (Btu)
The coefficient of labour is insignificant, therefore, in the final model, only capital 
and energy are included. The study is extended to thirty power plants and having 
considered the new constructed plants, the panel is based on unbalanced data during 
the six-year period 1990 to 1995 (Tables A1.23 to A1.28). The functional 
specification is of translog form, because of its flexibility and the importance of 
enveloping the data, the translog form can be thought of as a generalisation of the 
Cobb-Douglas function which made it the preferred choice of most researchers 
(Griffin, 1991). The underlying translog technology is specified as follows:
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LQ ;r  -14.06 + 1.013 LK,-, + 0.707 LE,, + 1  (0.316) (L Kj, f
2
(t statistics) (2.022 ) ( 6.625 ) ( 8.007)
- 0.308 (LKh,X LE J  + i(0 .265)(L E „)'
2
(-44.169) (30.915)
R" = 0.986, N=165, = 0.01120, = 0.11078
(see appendix 2 section E for detailed results)
All coefficients have acceptable signs and are statistically significant. The coefficients 
on the cubic terms [(LIQ^  f  , ( LEjj )^ ] are positive which mean that average products 
demonstrate an upward trend on average product (AP) curves. For instance, since the 
coefficient of (L K )^  is positive, then increasing K will eventually cause the average 
product of K to increase with K (Heathfield and Wibe, 1987).
6.6.2 Technical inefficiency estimation
Having estimated the stochastic production function, the individual technical 
inefficiency was obtained using the Battese and Coelli approach (1988). The 
procedure for this approach can be found in Chapter 4. The estimated model implies 
that the five most efficient power plants are Zarand, Tabriz, Beesutoon, Isfahan and 
Shahid Raj aie. The least efficient power plants are Sheervan and Rey. The estimated
average technical inefficiency (mean of w ) is 27.3%. i.e. the Iranian power plants are 
only 72.2% technically efficient (Table 6.7).
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6.7 Inefficiency estimation by stochastic production frontier 
(unbalanced panel)
Power plants Technical
inefficiencv
6.6.3 Technical efficiency measurement
The DEA efficiency scores are calculated for power plants between the years 1990 to 
1995. During the 1990s, the average overall technical efficiency of the Iranian power 
plants ranged between 0.691 and 0.749 (Table 6.8). The low average levels of 
technical efficiency indicate that inputs were over-used in the past.
Power plants that are regarded as overall technically efficient are operating at constant 
returns to scale (e.g.. Tous, Isfahan and Shahid Montazeri in 1995). The performance
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of the overall technically inefficient power plants could be improved as they adjust 
their operations to match that of the plants making their reference set. The reasons for 
overall technical inefficiency vary across power plants from managerial to scale 
inefficiencies. For the inefficient power plants, the shares of managerial inefficiency 
(pure technical inefficiency) and scale inefficiency are identified. Pure and scale 
inefficiencies are important to determine the strategies for improving the performance 
of power plants. A detailed insight can be gained by observing various efficiency 
scores for individual power plants shown in the following Tables (Tables 6.8 to 6.10).
6.8 Overall technical efficiency of the Iranian power plants 
(1990-1995)
Power plants 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1-Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 0.856 0.958 0.783 0.551 0.571 0.532
2-Montazer Ghaem 0.917 1 0.971 0.907 0.819 0.83
3-Loshan(Shahid Beheshti) 0.672 0.796 1 0.85 0.828 0.81
4-Neka (Salimi) 0.75 0.907 0.861 0.801 0.792 0.811
5-Besat 0.797 0.842 0.822 0.673 0.774 0.812
6-Tabriz 1 1 1 0.969 0.908 0.986
7-Mashad 0.574 0.61 0.605 0.575 0.639 0.683
8-Tous steam 0.71 0.771 0.792 0.817 0.838 1
9-lsfahan (Islam Abad) 1 0.998 0.959 0.996 1 1
10-Ramin (Ahwaz) 0.831 0.866 1 0.963 0.911 0.916
11-Rey 0.54 0.604 0.583 0.54 0.51 0.543
12-Bandar Abbas 0.83 0.948 0.872 0.887 0.835 0.795
13-Shahid Montazeri 0.874 0.947 0.972 1 1 1
14-Shahid Madhaj 0.641 0.771 0.718 0.81 0.831 0.784
15-Soofian 0.573 0.606 0.64 0.575 0.587 0.601
16-Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 0.646 0.702 0.829 0.562 0.465 0.68
17-Dorud (Bakhtar) 0.479 0.494 0.479 0.341 0.456 0.409
18-Sheervan 0.423 0.479 0.473 0.346 0.439 0.445
19-Shariati 0.553 0.578 0.545 1 0.44 0.469
20-Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 0.449 0.446 0.486 0.497 0.493 0.514
21-Bushehr 0.466 0.433 0.566 0.529 0.501 0.474
22-Zarand 0.934 0.884 0.718 0.671 0.643 0.662
23-Rasht 0.889 1 0.794 0.47 1 0.407
24-Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 0.567 0.565 0.62 0.499 0.57 0.594
25-Kermanshah(Bakhtaran) 0.518 0.512 0.557 0.498 0.5 0.513
m ean 0.700 0.749 0.746 0.693 0.694 0.691
In the past, the highest average pure (managerial) technical efficiency was only 86.9%
(1992). The pure technical inefficiency appeared to be the main problem across the 
inefficient power plants for the first six years of 1990s. For instance, in 1995 
managers could be able to eliminate 21.3% of the inefficiency in the power plants 
without the need to change scale. (Table 6.9).
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6.9 Pure technical efficiency of the Iranian power plants
(1990-1995)
Power plants 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1-Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 0.91 0.96 0.905 0.911 0.824 0.728
2-Montazer Ghaem 0.921 1 0.992 0.957 0.896 0.906
3-Loshan(Shahid Beheshti) 0.677 0.813 1 0.878 0.854 0.828
4-Neka (Saiimi) 1 1 1 1 1 1
5-Besat 0.805 0.842 0.832 0.689 0.797 0.828
6-Tabriz 1 1 1 0.97 0.91 0.986
7-Mashad 0.612 0.632 0.645 0.649 0.639 0.723
8-Tous steam 0.714 0.776 0.795 0.823 0.839 1
9-lsfahan (Islam Abad) 1 1 0.97 1 1 1
10-Ramin (Ahwaz) 0.833 0.871 1 0.97 0.918 0.925
11-Rey 0.542 0.604 0.583 0.543 0.514 0.546
12-Bandar Abbas 0.989 1 0.998 0.996 0.956 0.882
13-Shahid Montazeri 0.874 0.961 1 1 1 1
14-Shahid Madhaj 0.666 0.804 0.725 0.825 0.841 0.8
15-Soofian 0.767 0.684 0.841 0.845 0.792 0.643
16-Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 1 1 1 1 0.822 0.952
17-Dorud (Bakhtar) 1 1 1 0.984 1 0.587
18-Sheervan 0.553 0.589 0.619 0.375 0.582 0.536
19-Shariati 0.585 0.645 0.67 1 0.574 0.513
20-Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 0.536 0.493 0.636 0.617 0.598 0.535
21-Bushehr 0.754 0.488 0.626 0.634 0.576 0.514
22-Zarand 1 1 1 1 1 0.807
23-Rasht 1 1 1 1 1 1
24-Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 0.779 0.757 0.899 0.893 1 0.672
25-Kermanshah(Bakhtaran) 0.921 0.922 1 1 0.949 0.755
mean 0.818 0.834 0.869 0.862 0.835 0.787
Considering the whole sample, the power plants have relatively low average scale 
efficiency scores in 1990s (Table 6.10). For instance, in 1995, most power plants 
(68%) were operating in the increasing returns to scale region. The rest with equal 
share (16%) exhibited decreasing returns or constant returns to scale. The results 
indicate that scale expansion should improve performance. The presence of increasing 
returns to scale implies that large power plants are required for efficient production.
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6.10 Scale efficiency of the Iranian power plants
(1990-1995)
power
plants
Scale efficiency Scale Type
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1 0.94 0.999 0.865 0.605 0.693 0.731 1rs drs 1rs irs irs irs
2 0.996 1 0.979 0.948 0.915 0.916 1rs - drs drs drs drs
3 0.993 0.98 1 0.967 0.969 0.978 1rs 1rs - irs irs irs
4 0.75 0.907 0.861 0.801 0.792 0.811 drs drs drs drs drs drs
5 0.99 1 0.989 0.977 0.971 0.98 1rs - 1rs irs irs irs
6 1 1 1 0.999 0.998 1 - - - drs irs -
7 0.937 0.965 0.937 0.886 0.999 0.945 1rs 1rs 1rs irs drs irs
8 0.994 0.994 0.996 0.992 1 1 1rs 1rs 1rs irs - -
9 1 0.998 0.988 0.996 1 1 - drs drs drs - -
10 0.998 0.994 1 0.993 0.991 0.99 1rs 1rs - drs drs drs
11 0.996 1 1 0.994 0.993 0.995 1rs - - irs irs irs
12 0.839 0.948 0.874 0.891 0.874 0.902 drs drs drs drs drs drs
13 1 0.985 0.972 1 1 1 - drs drs - - -
14 0.963 0.959 0.99 0.982 0.988 0.979 1rs 1rs 1rs irs irs irs
15 0.747 0.885 0.761 0.68 0.741 0.934 1rs 1rs 1rs irs irs irs
16 0.646 0.702 0.829 0.562 0.565 0.714 1rs 1rs 1rs irs irs irs
17 0.479 0.494 0.479 0.347 0.456 0.697 1rs 1rs 1rs irs irs irs
18 0.765 0.813 0.765 0.922 0.753 0.829 1rs 1rs 1rs irs irs irs
19 0.946 0.896 0.814 1 0.766 0.914 1rs 1rs irs - irs irs
20 0.837 0.905 0.764 0.805 0.824 0.96 1rs 1rs irs irs irs irs
21 0.618 0.886 0.904 0.834 0.868 0.922 1rs 1rs irs irs irs irs
22 0.934 0.884 0.718 0.671 0.643 0.82 1rs 1rs irs irs irs irs
23 0.889 1 0.794 0.47 1 0.407 1rs - irs irs - irs
24 0.728 0.746 0.689 0.559 0.57 0.884 1rs 1rs irs irs irs irs
25 0.563 0.555 0.557 0.498 0.527 0.68 1rs 1rs irs irs irs irs
mean 0.862 0.900 0.861 0.815 0.836 0.880 - - - - - -
Having considered three inputs (capital, energy and labour), the DEA efficiency 
scores are calculated for fifteen main power plants in 1995 (Table 6.11). The mean 
level of overall technical efficiency for power plants was 0.85 suggesting that these 
power plants could, on average, reduce their operating costs by 15%. In some cases, 
however, substantially less efficient scores were identified (e.g. Shahid Firozi, 0.53 
and Rey, 0.54 ).
DEA suggests that Shahid Firozi and Rey can become efficient by simply reducing 
their input consumption proportionately to their efficiency score level. It is worth 
noting that the Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) power plant is the first thermal power plant 
(1959) built in Iran. In the case of Rey power station, it consists of only 40 gas 
turbines (gas power station).
Seven power plants are scale inefficient because they operate under increasing returns 
to scale whereas three are scale inefficient as a result of operating under decreasing 
returns to scale. The former group can become scale efficient if they increase their
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operations until they reach the level of constant returns to scale, the latter group have 
over-expanded.
Although Montazer Ghaem and Ramin power plants have quite high scale efficiency 
scores, their managerial inefficiency make a big contribution to their overall 
inefficiency, i.e. given their scale of operations, these plants consume more inputs 
than needed to produce the given output level.
6.11 Efficiency measures of main power plants in 1995
Power Plants
Overall
technical
efficiency
Pure technical 
efficiency
Scale
efficiency
Scale
type
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 0.532 1 0.532 1rs
2 Montazer Ghaem 0.901 0.905 0.996 1rs
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 0.813 0.877 0.927 irs
4 Neka (Salimi) 0.88 1 0.88 drs
5 Shahid Rajaie 1 1 1 -
6 Besat 0.814 0.885 0.919 irs
7 Tabriz 1 1 1 -
8 Mashad 0.685 0.763 0.897 irs
9 Tous steam 1 1 1 -
10 Isfahan (Islam Abad) 1 1 1 -
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 0.916 0.921 0.995 drs
12 Rey 0.543 0.611 0.89 irs
13 Qum 1 1 1 -
14 Gilan 0.784 0.829 0.945 irs
15 Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan) 0.845 0.891 0.949 drs
mean 0.848 0.912 0.929 -
Five power plants are identified as most efficient under constant returns to scale 
(Table 6.12). Amongst them, Isfahan and Tabriz have a high number of appearances 
(six times) in the reference set of other power plants. These efficient power plants 
might be used as a yardstick in raising the level of efficiency of other power plants.
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6.12 Reference frontier for inefficient power plants 
based on constant returns to scale (1995)
Power plants CRS
0
Shahid
Rajaie
Tabriz Tous Isfahan Qum VRS
0
Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 0.532 0.043 1
Montazer Ghaem 0.901 0.404 0.354 0.179 0.905
Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 0.813 0.09 0.251 0.877
Neka (Salimi) 0.88 0.285 1.247 0.622 1
Shahid Rajaie 1 1
Besat 0.814 0.053 0.307 0.885
Tabriz 1 1
Mashad 0.685 0.031 0.324 0.763
Tous steam 1 1
Isfahan (Islam Abad) 1 1
Ramin (Ahwaz) 0.916 1.017 0.921
Rey 0.543 0.348 0.611
Qum 1 1
Gilan 0.784 0.265 0.34 0.829
Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan) 0.845 0.154 0.967 0.24 0.891
6.6.4 Productivity growth index
Panel data was available for twenty five power plants from 1990 to 1995, and a 
Malmquist index was constructed to identify the differences in the total factor 
productivity of power plants.
Table 6.13 presents the average Malmquist productivity index and its decomposition; 
technological change, pure technical and scale efficiency changes. Recall that the 
distinction between efficiency growth and technological change is important because 
they are essentially different phenomena, and so different policies may be required to 
handle them. The improvements in the technological change component are evidence 
of innovation while improvements in the efficiency-change component are evidence 
of catching-up with the frontier.
This decomposition provides an attractive way of examining convergence of 
productivity growth, as well as allowing identification of inefficiencies. These 
calculations indicate that power plants experienced both productivity growth and slow 
down between 1990-1995. The results suggest that there was technological progress in 
most power plants. However, four power plants (Shahid Firozi, Rasht, Shariati, and 
Hesa) displayed technological regress in this period.
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The Malmquist index varies widely across power plants in the period 1990-1995. The 
highest total productivity progress occurs at the Rasht power plant. However, on the 
other hand, the Rasht power plant registered technological regress during this period, 
so much its total productivity progress originates from scale efficiency. The greatest 
productivity slow down is found at the Tous power plant due mainly to managerial 
inefficiency.
The principal finding is that scale inefficiency dominated technological progress and 
pure technical efficiency in power plants in the period 1990-1995. The moderate total 
productivity progress over the period is due mainly to technological progress and pure 
technical efficiency.
Instead of presenting the disaggregated results for each power plant and year, a 
summary description of the average performance of each power plant over the entire 
(1990-1995) time period is presented (Table 6.13).
6.13 Malmquist index summary of power plant means 
(1990-1995)
Power Plants
Technical
efficiency
change
Technological
change
Pure
technical
efficiency
change
Scale
efficiency
change
Total factor 
productivity 
change
Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 0.909 1.007 0.956 0.951 0.915
Montazer Ghaem 0.98 0.991 0.997 0.984 0.971
Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 1.038 0.995 1.041 0.997 1.033
Neka (Salimi) 1.016 0.997 1 1.016 1.013
Besat 1.004 0.995 1.006 0.998 0.999
Tabriz 0.997 0.98 0.997 1 0.977
Mashad 1.036 0.975 1.034 1.002 1.01
Tous steam 1.071 0.971 1.07 1.001 1.04
Isfahan (Islam Abad) 1 0.99 1 1 0.99
Ramin (Ahwaz) 1.02 0.993 1.021 0.998 1.012
Rey 1.001 0.992 1.001 1 0.993
Bandar Abbas 0.992 0.987 0.977 1.015 0.979
Shahid Montazeri 1.027 0.982 1.027 1 1.009
Shahid Madhaj (Zargan-Ahwaz) 1.041 0.995 1.037 1.003 1.036
Soofian 1.009 0.987 0.965 1.046 0.996
Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 1.01 1.008 0.99 1.02 1.018
Dorud (Bakhtar) 0.969 0.983 0.899 1.078 0.953
Sheervan 1.01 0.999 0.994 1.016 1.009
Shariati 0.968 1.016 0.974 0.993 0.983
Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 1.028 0.988 1 1.028 1.016
Bushehr 1.003 0.99 0.926 1.083 0.993
Zarand 0.933 0.99 0.958 0.974 0.924
Rasht 0.856 1.006 1 0.856 0.861
Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 1.009 0.969 0.971 1.04 0.978
Kermanshah(Bakhtaran) 0.998 0.987 0.961 1.038 0.985
mean 0.996 0.991 0.991 1.005 0.987
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6.6.5 Determinants of efficiency
Recall that for policy implications, it is important to search for the effective factors of 
efficiency improvement so that appropriate policy strategies can be arranged. In the 
modelling, the share of steam electricity production out of total electricity production 
is included and serves as an indicator of the size of power plant. It is, therefore, 
expected to have a positive effect on the efficiency score. The presence of research 
and development (R&D) activity in the power plant is probably a significant 
explanatory variable. In this regard, the share of R&D employees out of total 
employees is used in the model specification. The preferred Tobit model is as follows:
E p = 0.72 + 0.003 + 0.039
(t statistics) (2.66) (1.62)
R  ^= 0.43 N=15
(see appendix 2 section F for detailed results)
Where
Ep = pure technical efficiency in power plants
= share of steam electricity production out of total electricity production 
Lrd = share of R&D employees out of total employees in production sector
Forty three percent of efficiency variations could be explained by means of these two 
variables (S-p^  and Lpg). The model indicates that the increasing share of steam power 
plant in power stations has a significant effect on efficiency improvement. The finding 
implies that there is immediate benefit from a combined cycle pattern, so that the gas 
power stations should be converted into combined cycle plants. As expected, the 
R&D activity in power plants has a positive effect on efficiency improvement with a 
significance level of between 10% and 5%. The analysis shows that those power 
plants which spend a great deal on R&D tend to have higher efficiency scores than 
those which spend little.
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6.6 Electricity distribution organisations study
There are 30 public distribution organisations, each operating in one of the Iranian 
geographical regions. These organisations employ similar technology (homogenous 
set of units), thus forming a suitable sample for applying the DEA model. DEA is 
preferred since accommodates the multi-input, multi-output nature of the electricity 
distribution organisations.
Data and variables
The data used in this analysis were extracted from the publication of the Ministry of 
Energy (Table A1.20). The data contains conventional input and output variables 
consistent with the empirical studies of electricity distributions reviewed in Chapter 5. 
Four outputs and three inputs were employed as follows:
Output 1 = electricity sales to residential customers (measured in Gwh)
Output 2 = electricity sales to industrial customers (measured in Gwh)
Output 3 = number of residential customers 
Output 4 = number of industrial customers 
Input 1 = network size (measured in kilometre)
Input 2 = transformer capacity (measured in MVA)
Input 3 = labour (numbers of employees in distribution sectors)
As argued by Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992), both the amount of electricity 
supplied and the number of customers were considered. For the capital input, the 
physical measures of capital, namely the transformer capacity and network size were 
used (Weyman-Jones, 1991).
6.7.1 Technical efficiency measurement
In this section the efficiency measurement of the thirty distribution organisations of 
electricity in Iran is under investigation. The efficiency scores presented in Table 6.14
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are carried out assuming constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale, 
suggested by the CCR and BBC models (chapter 4). The overall technical, pure 
technical and scale efficiencies are calculated for the distribution organisations in 
1995. Recall that technical efficiency can be measured by two different approaches, 
input-based or output-based. The distribution organisations are required to supply 
electricity at a predetermined output level. Therefore, the input based approach is 
more suitable for efficiency measurement in the Iranian distribution organisations 
where they can become more efficient only by using fewer inputs.
Having considered the whole sample, the calculated mean pure technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency scores have almost the same value, suggesting that both 
managerial and scale inefficiency are equally the cause of overall technical 
inefficiency in the electricity distribution organisations of Iran. Most distribution 
organisations exhibit increasing returns to scale. Only Mazandaran distribution is 
scale inefficient as a result of operating in the decreasing returns region whereas 
nineteen organisations are scale inefficient due to increasing returns to scale. These 
organisations have the potential to increase output greater than the increase in their 
input to attain constant returns to scale. Ten organisations are scale efficient. These 
findings suggest that the structure of regional distribution monopolies for the Iranian 
electricity industry is appropriate. Some other previous studies also found significant 
increasing returns to scale in distribution sector (Meyer, 1975, Neuberg, 1977, 
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1998).
Amongst the inefficient organisations, seven organisations (3, 5, 11, 15, 16, 20, 29) 
are pure technically efficient, indicating that their overall technical inefficiency 
originates from scale inefficiency. Five organisations (1,12, 13, 28 and 30) have slack 
variable in labour input (Appendix3). This may be treated as evidence of over 
employment. The central feature of the results is that most organisations do not appear 
to show a great level of overall efficiency. The least efficient organisations are 
Kerman, Sistan & Baluchestan and Kokeeloeh & Booyer Ahmad.
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For entire organisations, the average pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency are 
90% and 90.5% respectively. The results for the whole distribution organisations 
indicate that DEA found 9 efficient and 21 inefficient organisations under constant 
returns to scale. The average overall technical efficiency score for every organisation 
was 81% out of 100%, with a range of 50% to 100%. The number of efficient 
distribution organisations increases to 16 under the variable returns to scale 
technology, suggesting that 7 organisations are measured as technically inefficient 
solely because of scale inefficiency.
6.14 Technical efficiency of regional companies for electricity distribution
(1995)
Organisations
Overall technical 
efficiency
Pure technical 
efficiency
Scale efficiency Scale
type
1 Azarbaijan Sharghi 0.694 0.702 0.989 irs
2 Azarbaijan Gharbi 0.631 0.631 0.999 -
3 Ardebil 0.693 1 0.693 irs
4 Isfahan 1 1 1 -
5 Char Mahal Bakhtiari 0.658 1 0.658 irs
6 Markazi 1 1 1 -
7 Hamadan 0.747 0.833 0.897 irs
8 Lorestan 0.637 0.748 0.851 irs
9 Tehran 1 1 1 -
10 Gharb Tehran 1 1 1 -
11 Qum 0.869 1 0.869 irs
12 Khorasan 0.717 0.718 0.998 irs
13 Mashad 0.962 0.976 0.985 irs
14 Khozestan 1 1 1 -
15 Kokeeloeh & Booyer A. 0.582 1 0.582 irs
16 Zanjan 0.822 1 0.822 irs
17 Ghazveen 1 1 1 -
18 Kermanshah 0.852 0.919 0.927 irs
19 Kordestan 0.793 0.971 0.817 irs
20 Ham 0.629 1 0.629 irs
21 Pars 1 1 1 -
22 Bushehr 1 1 1 -
23 Shiraz 0.897 0.954 0.94 irs
24 Kerman 0.507 0.513 0.988 irs
25 Gilan 0.8 0.802 0.997 irs
26 Mazandaran 0.69 0.714 0.966 drs
27 Hormozgan 1 1 1 -
28 Yazd 0.633 0.833 0.76 irs
29 Semnan 0.909 1 0.909 irs
30 Sistan & Baloochestan 0.561 0.652 0.86 irs
mean 0.809 0.899 0.905
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The DEA results indicate that the performance of the overall technically inefficient 
organisations can be improved by adjusting their operations to match those of the 
organisations making their reference set (Table 6.15). Nine organisations are 
technically and scale efficient. Each of the 21 overall technically inefficient 
distribution organisations can become efficient by adjusting its operation to the 
associated target point determined by the efficient distribution organisations which 
define its reference frontier. The reference technology is defined for constant returns 
to scale production structure. Ears distribution organisation appears in the reference 
sets for twenty one inefficient organisations. This organisation is considered as the 
best practice efficient electricity distributor in Iran.
The DEA results show that distribution organisations corresponding to the advanced 
provinces (such as Tehran, Isfahan, Ears) have high efficiencies. Low efficiencies are 
observed for less developed regions (such as Sistan & Bloochistan, Ham, Kerman) 
with more scattered population and smaller network size. Scale inefficiency appears to 
be a big problem in most distribution organisations.
The efficiency score suggests that Kerman distribution is 50.7% efficient. In general, 
this means that Kerman distribution can reduce all its inputs by at least 50.7% without 
reducing its outputs. For instance, it needs to reduce its number of staff by nearly 
50.7% while maintaining the same level of outputs in order to become efficient. The 
reference set weights (0.174, 0.498 and 0.247) show the relative importance of each 
reference distribution organisation in determination of the target values. For instance, 
Gharb Tehran distribution has the highest weight (0.498), so its share is relatively 
more important for the Kerman distribution than two other distribution organisations 
of Markazi and Ears (Table 6.15).
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6.15 Reference Frontier set for inefficient organisations 
Base on constant returns to scale (1995)
Organisation
Objective
function
0
Isfahan Markazi Tehran Gharb
Tehran
Khozestan Pars Bushehr Hormozgan
Isfahan 1
Markazi 1
Tehran 1
Gharb Tehran 1
Khozestan 1
Ghazveen 1
Pars 1
Bushehr 1
Hormozgan 1
Mashad 0.962 0.025 0.02 0.689
Semnan 0.909 0.088 0.064
Shiraz 0.897 0.042 0.01 0.392
Qum 0.869 0.007 0.021 0.214
Kermanshah 0.852 0.427
Zanjan 0.822 0.019 0.232
Gilan 0.8 0.073 0.596
Kordestan 0.793 0.32
Hamadan 0.747 0.027 0.392
Khorasan 0.717 0.957
Azarbaijan Sharghi 0.694 0.088 0.6 0.16 0.066
Ardebil 0.693 0.23
Mazandaran 0.69 0.006 0.042 1.001
Char Mahal B. 0.658 0.19
Lorestan 0.637 0.157 0.033 0.195
Yazd 0.633 0.085 0.001 0.004 0.255
Azarbaijan Gharbi 0.631 0.029 0.001 0.253 0.703
Ham 0.629 0.116
Kokeeloeh & B. 0.582 0.007 0.083
Sistan & B. 0.561 0.064 0.204
Kerman 0.507 0.174 0.498 0.247
Note: Each row contains efficiencies (0 ) and reference set weights (X )
6.8 Results and discussion
The main findings of the earlier sections are briefly reviewed. The analysis revealed 
that public ownership, could have an adverse effect on efficiency improvement. The 
result may confirm the favourable impact of the structural reform in developing 
countries. However, ownership is not the only relevant factor in explaining efficiency 
changes. What the current study has been able to demonstrate is that a substantial 
proportion of the variation in efficiency within the electricity industry in developing 
countries is due to a factor related to size of the plant. Most of the highly efficient 
power plants are found to be relatively large. The results also indicate that increasing 
returns to scale prevail in the electricity generation of most developing countries. 
These findings imply that the privatisation proposal concerning efficiency
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improvement of the power sectors in most developing countries is not the only 
solution.
The findings also indicate that a more effective check on the efficiency of individual 
electricity industries, power plants and distribution organisations is required to avoid 
the unnecessary use of resources. Frontier analysis is proposed as a useful tool for 
analysing the performance of the electricity industry, power plants and distribution 
organisations. SFA is useful because it is able to identify the best and the worst 
performers in the context of panel data. DEA is useful because it identifies the 
reference sets, which suggest ways of improving the inefficient performance. As can 
be seen, each inefficient electricity industry, power plant and distribution organisation 
has a reference set consisting of the plants or organisations with the most similar 
operating characteristics, and input and output combinations. This information can be 
used as a direction of an inefficient unit to perform at least as well as those making up 
its reference set. Adjustment to the constant returns to scale frontier can be thought of 
as a long-run target, whilst adjustment to its variable returns to scale counterpart can 
be regarded as a short-run goal. The reference set identification seems extremely 
important, e.g., Iran has the advantage of having strong technical expertise. The rapid 
build up of power plants after the Iran-Iraq war is confirmation of the technical 
capacity of Iranian experts in achieving rapid results if specific performance targets 
are set and managers are held responsible for the results (World Bank, 1994a). It is 
suggested that representatives from the efficient organisations meet with the 
inefficient ones to exchange ideas and share experiences regularly, this would help 
improvements made in the efficient plants and organisations to be replicated in the 
inefficient plants and organisations.
It was feasible to compare the efficiency scores of developing countries power plants 
using two techniques (DEA and SFA) in the context of panel data. The comparison of 
the two techniques is encouraging. The results of both techniques have a relatively 
high correlation and provide equivalent rankings of efficiency levels.
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It is shown that there is not much variation in the mean overall efficiency levels of 
Iranian power plants over the period 1990 to 1995, so that the evidence of an increase 
in overall efficiency levels of power plants was not found over time. The results show 
that the more recently constructed plants are substantially more efficient than the 
oldest plants. The exception is the Gilan gas turbine power station. It is worth noting 
that, this gas power station was converted to combined cycle in 1997. Technological 
progress is critical for enhancing productivity improvement in power plants. The 
benefits of such progress can only be felt if power plants adopt the new technology. 
By implication, the Ministry of Energy should invest in new technology to achieve 
productivity growth in power plants and improving technical efficiency. Most 
improvements in performance experienced by the advanced countries, particularly 
through economies of scale and thermal efficiency improvements, also need to be 
introduced in developing countries.
The important conclusions which emerge from the study indicate that adopting the 
reference frontier for the electricity industries of developing countries, the Iranian 
power plants and distribution organisations could reduce costs by 23%, 27.3 % and 
19% respectively. Judging from the degree of technical inefficiency observed, the 
opportunity costs from this particular failure of the decision-making process seem to 
be quite large for developing countries. Much better use of energy and policies 
designed to increase the utilisation of existing capacity should yield benefits in terms 
of improved performance and reduced opportunity costs. The optimum use of energy 
in power plants is crucial. In Iran, the government determines the price of energy used 
in power stations which are far below their economic opportunity cost (e.g. 10.4% for 
fuel oil and 11% for gas oil in 1992). At such low price levels, energy savings are 
unattractive and power plants are not under pressure to save energy. Even in energy 
intensive industries like cement and brick production, the cost of energy amounts to 
less than 6% of the cost of production. Therefore, it is not surprising the conclusion of 
the Iranian Committee on Energy Conservation in its March 1993 study stated that the 
energy intensity of Iran was almost three times higher than that of Turkey and five 
times higher than in Indonesia (World Bank, 1994a). In addition to wastage and
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inefficiency inherent in such an energy policy, the long term implications are more 
serious, since energy prices significantly influence the whole technological trajectory 
of the Iranian economy (Karshenas and Pesaran, 1995).
It is suggested that if power plants and distribution organisations are operating in an 
increasing returns to scale region they should exploit these increasing returns 
possibilities and move closer to the point where constant returns are to be found. If 
some operate under decreasing returns to scale conditions, they should make the 
necessary operational adjustments to minimise diseconomies of scale.
Given that the analysis is restricted to the electricity supply industry in developing 
countries, the prevalence of increasing returns to scale is not surprising. The 
hypothesis that scale economies in the electricity generation process appears to be 
exhausted might be rejected by most developing countries. The empirical results also 
imply that the electricity pricing cannot be followed by equivalent marginal cost 
pricing, while this industry has variable returns to scale. As a consequence, the 
suggestion of second-best pricing (Ramsey pricing rule) can be more appropriate than 
marginal cost pricing for publicly-owned power industries of most developing 
countries.
The existence of potential improvements in scale efficiency suggests that appropriate 
policies toward the electricity industry of developing countries, Iranian power plants 
and distribution organisations will be the expansion of the scale of their activities. By 
identifying the effective factors in efficiency improvement, the appropriate decisions 
can be advanced within the power plants and distribution organisations. The 
importance of the productivity index decomposition for policy strategies was also 
pointed out.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
“We can make several things clearer, but we cannot make anything clear”
(Frank P. Ramsey)
This thesis applies two popular techniques of efficiency measurement in a sample of 
electricity industries in developing countries. The empirical evidence suggests that 
public ownership of electricity production might have an adverse effect on technical 
efficiency. However, given the existence of increasing returns to scale in most of the 
power plants in the sample (65.4%), the combined effect of plant size and public 
ownership could have a positive effect on efficiency. In other words, it might be that 
net efficiency gains are obtained from expansion and better management of state- 
owned electricity industries in such countries.
The technical efficiency calculations using two different techniques indicate that 
around 21-23% of total costs in the electricity industry of developing countries could 
be removed while maintaining existing levels of output, which would represent 
significant resource savings.
To increase the technical efficiency of the Iranian power plants, steam power plants 
should take an increasing share of production and R&D activities should be increased. 
From the policy-making point of view, most of the power plants and distribution 
organisations appear to have increasing returns to scale which suggests that the scale 
of operations at these power plants and distribution organisations should be increased.
This study considers estimation of production function parameters and technical 
inefficiency for power plants using panel data. The analysis is also extended to 
distribution organisations. The results indicate that there seem to be significant 
possibilities for resource savings in the Iranian electricity industry. A good case can
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be made for focusing policy towards those factors which show the greatest scope for 
improvement. In electricity generation energy reduction is crucial. Labour provides 
the major source of potential savings in the distribution organisations.
The low efficiencies of the Iranian electricity industry have spurred the search for a 
new structured approach in the industry. A hands-off approach in the distribution 
organisations (and transmission) does not seem to be appropriate, due partly to the 
existence of increasing returns to scale. This study also reveals that economies of 
scale in electricity generation are less persistent than in distribution organisations. 
Therefore, the proposed structure of the Iranian electricity industry is competition in 
the generation, and national transmission with regional distribution monopolies. This 
structure introduces competition in the generation sector, while regulation is taken 
into consideration the transmission and distribution sectors. A more detailed 
discussion of such a structure can be found in Bhattacharyya (1995) and Vaziri 
Sabeghi (1996). In some countries (UK, Norway and New Zealand), the selling of 
electricity to consumers (supply function) has been seen as an activity separate from 
distribution, and one in which competition is also potentially possible.
It is argued that the most important and most demanding task is the regulation of the 
electricity industry. The suggestion is that a national independent institution 
responsible for the oversight of the electricity industry should be established. The 
useful lesson fi*om other countries is that regulatory reform was undertaken while the 
industry was still in public ownership (Newbery,1994). Regulation, in a broad sense, 
consists of laws, licence conditions, agreements, and other instruments that control or 
guide the behaviour and operation of electricity supply industry (lEA/OECD, 1994). 
Regulatory body should largely consider incentive issues. A theory of incentives in 
regulation can be found in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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7.2 Implications for policy
Frontier analysis has interesting policy implications for the electricity supply industry. 
Having completed the procedure, solutions for appropriate electricity pricing, choice 
of technology and sound management will be presented.
7.2.1 Electricity pricing
Electricity prices should be consistent with the cost of supply to consumers and 
government subsidies need to be eliminated. The maximization of allocative 
efficiency leads to price equal to marginal cost. Returns to scale and the need to cover 
costs mean that Ramsey pricing (second-best solution) may have to replace marginal 
cost pricing. In other words, marginal cost pricing in electricity industries (first-best 
solution) would be suggested when evidence of constant returns to scale is found in 
the industry. The analysis on Ramsey pricing provides insights into how the pricing of 
electricity may be made more efficient
The government should set up the mechanisms to gradually increase energy prices for 
the power plants, so that the Ministry of Energy pays the international fuel prices to 
the Ministry of Petroleum. At the same time, the cost of electricity production should 
be related to the cost of most efficient firms, which were identified in the empirical 
work in chapter 6. The idea is to make each firms price regime relevant to factors 
other than its own unit costs, so that if a firm makes costly or inefficient decisions, it 
cannot pass these costs on to electricity consumers. On the other hand, it is crucial to 
provide necessary incentives for the public firms to achieve the standard objectives of 
technical efficiency. Price-cap regulation (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989) and the 
theory of yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985) seek to promote incentives for 
privatised or regulated monopolies to minimise their costs. There is evidence that 
yardstick competition- the relating of one monopolist’s price level to the cost levels of 
firms in similar conditions- enhances technical efficiency (Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson, 1998).
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7.2.2 Technology and investment
Variations in technological efficiency can be attributed to the problems of investment. 
The inferior technology might have been responsible for the low level of 
technological efficiency. The decomposition of total factor productivity change 
indicates that technological progress was relatively neglected in Iranian power plants, 
so that one of the inefficiency sources are poor operating (or investment) techniques. 
An inefficient unit could be advised to examine the performance of its reference set 
for guidance. For the Iranian electricity industry, as a whole, the reference set consists 
of techniques used in Thailand and Mexico. Based on the implementation of their 
techniques, the Iranian electricity industry could raise its efficiency above the low 
level of 75%. This could be achieved through co-operation arrangements with Thai 
and Mexican power companies, and supplemented by sending employees for training 
to the power industries of such countries. The authorities are paying attention to the 
development of human capital and the creation of skilled labour forces. More effort 
should be spent in developing training programmes for managerial employees in the 
electricity industry.
It is shown that R&D activity benefits technical efficiency. Strengthening domestic 
R&D capacity and investment in innovation could enable the adoption of imported 
technology and the development of new technology in the long run.
In Iran, the Ministry of Energy has the major responsibility for energy conservation 
strategy implementation, while some other countries (such as Mexico and Thailand) 
have created an inter-ministerial energy commission to tackle the problem (World 
Bank, 1994a). The estimates show that, in the power plants belonging to the Ministry 
of Energy, around 27% of energy (or 180 million barrel oil equivalent) could have 
been saved during the period 1990 to 1995. The opportunity costs and the 
environmental effects of such energy consumption (Pearson, 1991, 1993) are beyond 
the scope of the present study, but could be a task for further research. The role of gas 
turbine power stations in energy wastage is extremely important, so that the combined
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cycle arrangement could solve this problem. It is also advisable to design generating 
systems where some of the rejected heat is recovered for productive use, such as 
process uses in industry, space-heating, water-heating etc.
7.2.3 Management
The low level of efficiency monitoring in the electricity industry and lack of 
incentives for cost reduction provide insufficient pressure for the achievement of 
managerial efficiency. Special emphasis should be placed on the efficiency 
monitoring of the electricity supply industry. It is advisable that the salary of 
managers is linked to the performance of their organisations, which give them 
incentives to reduce costs. Frontier analysis, as demonstrated in this study may serve 
as a powerful tool for management. The findings would let managers know whether 
too many inputs were being used in their organisations. Moreover, managers could 
use this information to determine how efficient they are with respect to the best 
performance.
To date, the electricity industry is in public ownership in Iran. Institutional 
arrangements and high concentration (less competitive conditions) can be criticised 
due to the lack of sufficient incentives for increasing technical efficiency. As Cave
(1993) argues, high concentration is found to be hostile to technical efficiency. Policy 
priority could involve the private sector and the enhancement of competition in 
electricity generation. Such a practice was achieved in privatising the electricity 
supply industry in the UK, where the generation of electricity was first separated from 
the monopolistic distribution system. This policy reflects a belief that, with the 
national grid operating as a common carrier, the generating section may become less 
concentrated, leading to greater price competition and increased efficiency.
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It will take time for the Iranian electricity industry to prepare for privatisation. To take 
an example, as Bacon (1995) argues, the implementation of selling methods is an area 
that clearly requires care. The investment in generation may be considered as the 
vehicle for private sector participation, e.g., in various states in the US, independent 
electricity producers sell their electricity to the existing vertically-integrated company. 
It is worth pointing out that involvement of the private sector in electricity generation 
needs sound and stable planning. The governments of developing countries need to 
give necessary guarantees for investment of the private sector due to the long period 
of investment in electricity generation. The obligation of the Ministry of Energy in 
Iran to purchase the electricity from the private sector using a forward price seems 
puts this idea into practice.
In developing countries, the existence of an independent regulatory system is crucial 
to a successful privatisation programme. Indeed, for the governments of developing 
countries, the transition from the easier task of intervening directly to the more 
difficult but constructive role of regulating their electricity industries is a 
recommended move.
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7.3 Implications for further research
There are a number of ways in which this research might be extended. This analysis 
focuses on measuring the technical efficiency with inputs which are transformed into 
outputs. It does not provide quantitative measures of allocative efficiency in electricity 
production. Further research could concentrate on the measurement of allocative 
efficiency. The effect of ownership on allocative efficiency is also an important issue 
which requires further investigation.
The rapidly growing demand for electricity in Iran calls for a detailed analysis of the 
electricity consumer groups. More importantly, in a Ramsey pricing structure, the 
price elasticities of electricity demand for different consumer groups should be 
known.
The efficiency analysis is an appropriate topic for further research and deserves 
further consideration. Regular application of frontier analysis could be used to 
monitor the success of the Iranian electricity industry in the control of its costs. In the 
meantime, an analysis similar to the one conducted in the electricity industry may be 
relevant for other Iranian industries and public organisations.
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Appendix 1
Iranian electricity data (1967-1995)
Table A l.l Electricity production of the Iranian thermal power plants (Ministry of Energy)
(1967-1995)
Year
Electricity
Production
Installed generating Capacity Labour Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Diesel Total (K) L (Pr.) Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural Gas
Gwh MW MW MW MW Person LitrexlO® LitrexlO® M^xlO®
1967 1184 324 62 154 540 1437 311 136 13
1968 1576 332 72 194 598 1839 420 118 33
1969 1861 425 114 242 781 2062 496 128 21
1970 2585 417 129 248 794 2208 672 165 22
1971 2811 604 118 249 971 2354 597 166 163
1972 3342 723 87 291 1101 2944 514 192 346
1973 6482 1165 204 283 1652 3957 899 317 723
1974 7744 1350 347 300 1997 4791 846 399 944
1975 9333 1528 566 375 2469 5292 1283 405 1077
1976 10236 1398 610 420 2428 5638 1454 500 1116
1977 11542 1621 1394 451 3466 5751 1145 990 1533
1978 11137 1606 2505 447 4558 6311 1015 1472 1380
1979 14022 2274 2523 485 5282 8301 1064 1398 2335
1980 14261 3374 2533 556 6463 7927 1473 983 2278
1981 16177 4063 2533 606 7202 7404 1900 948 2360
1982 19876 4040 2554 642 7236 9011 1947 1010 3177
1983 24306 4615 2575 699 7889 9252 2618 1280 3621
1984 28344 4994 2705 679 8378 10859 3183 1622 3885
1985 31170 5794 2825 729 9348 11850 3568 2191 3993
1986 31528 5494 2874 781 9149 12150 4150 1642 3856
1987 34164 6181 2937 744 9862 12388 3559 1480 5451
1988 36464 5981 2235 704 8920 12222 3839 1517 5730
1989 41203 7823 3154 704 11681 12054 4101 1259 6863
1990 48813 7786 3258 728 11772 12255 4810 1143 8316
1991 52654 7943 3258 681 11882 10920 5144 965 9099
1992 54452 8460 3949 667 13076 11923 4853 1103 9858
1993 61512 9264 5078 626 14968 9150 5786 1073 11501
1994 69641 10654 6138 581 17373 9579 5887 1151 12541
1995 72768 11476.5 6693.5 509 18679 10410 6700 1349 12598
Sources:
Ministry o f Energy, Development Trend o f the Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995. 
Ministry o f Energy, The detailed statistics o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1374 (1995),June,1996.
Notes: Megawatt (MW) = 10  ^kw (kilo watts); Giga watt hour (GWH) = 10® kwh.
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Table A l.2 Trend of total electricity production (1967-1994)
“Million Kwh”
Year Hydro
Power
Thermal power Plants Total Ministry of 
EnergyMinistry of Energy Others
1967 658 1184 2291 4133 1842
1968 855 1576 2194 4625 2431
1969 1336 1861 2342 5539 3197
1970 1671 2585 2502 6758 4256
1971 2679 2811 2615 8105 5490
1972 3528 3342 2683 9553 6870
1973 2842 6482 2769 12093 9324
1974 3421 7744 2840 14005 11165
1975 3445 9333 2922 15700 12778
1976 3975 10236 3100 17311 14211
1977 4213 11542 3229 18984 15755
1978 6249 11137 2461 19847 17386
1979 5419 14022 2468 21909 19441
1980 5619 14261 2500 22380 19880
1981 6229 16177 2500 24906 22406
1982 6447 19876 2753 29076 26323
1983 6203 24306 2500 33009 30509
1984 5750 28344 2500 36594 34094
1985 5550 31170 2500 39220 36720
1986 7517 31528 2526 41571 39045
1987 8390 34164 3643 46197 42554
1988 7311 36464 3825 47600 43775
1989 7522 41203 3987 52712 48725
1990 6083 48813 4206 59102 54896
1991 7056 52654 4416 64126 59710
1992 9330 54452 4637 68419 63782
1993 9823 61512 4679 76014 71335
1994 7445 69641 4933 82019 77086
Sources:
Central Bank o f Iran, Economie Report and Balance sheet, different issues.
Ministry o f Energy, Development Trend o f the Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995.
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TableAl.3 Share of electricity production by Ministry of Energy
“percent”
Year Ministry of Energy Others
Hydro-Power Thermal Total
1967 15.9 28.7 44.6 55.4
1968 18.5 34.1 52.6 47.4
1969 24.1 33.6 57.7 42.3
1970 24.7 38.3 63 37
1971 33 34.7 67.7 32.3
1972 36.9 35 71.9 28.1
1973 23.5 53.6 77.1 22.9
1974 24.4 55.3 77.7 20.3
1975 22 59.4 81.4 18.6
1976 23 59.1 82.1 17.9
1977 22.2 60.8 83 17
1978 31.5 56.1 87.6 12.4
1979 24.7 64 88.7 11.3
1980 25.1 63.7 88.8 11.2
1981 25 65 90 10
1982 22.2 68.3 90.5 9.5
1983 18.8 73.6 92.4 7.6
1984 15.7 77.5 93.2 6.8
1985 14.1 79.5 93.6 6.4
1986 18.1 75.8 93.9 6.1
1987 18.2 73.9 92.1 7.9
1988 15.4 76.6 92 8
1989 14.3 78.2 92.5 7.5
1990 10.3 82.6 92.9 7.1
1991 11 82.1 93.1 6.9
1992 13.6 79.6 93.2 6.8
1993 12.9 80.9 93.8 6.2
1994 9.1 84.9 94 6
Source: Calculated based on Table A1.2
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Table A 1.4 Electricity production components by the Ministry of Energy
“Million Kwh”
Year Hydro-Power Steam Gas Turbine Diesel Total
1967 658 732 56 396 1842
1968 855 1088 77 411 2431
1969 1336 1336 85 440 3197
1970 1671 1978 155 452 4256
1971 2679 2097 194 520 5490
1972 3528 2513 265 564 6870
1973 2842 5374 541 567 9324
1974 3421 6545 688 511 11165
1975 3445 7785 955 593 12778
1976 3975 8455 1122 659 14211
1977 4213 8203 2558 781 15755
1978 6249 6316 3928 893 17386
1979 5419 7769 5327 926 19441
1980 5619 8197 5088 976 19880
1981 6229 9174 5883 1120 22406
1982 6447 12562 6141 1173 26323
1983 6203 16296 6826 1184 30509
1984 5750 18309 8780 1255 34094
1985 5550 20200 9570 1400 36720
1986 7517 22860 7160 1508 39045
1987 8390 25360 7305 1499 42554
1988 7311 26968 8146 1350 43775
1989 7522 33056 6974 1173 48725
1990 6083 38836 8723 1254 54896
1991 7056 41947 9463 1244 59710
1992 9330 42362 10866 1224 63782
1993 9823 48166 12419 927 71335
1994 7445 53376 15402 863 77086
Sources:
Central Bank o f Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, different issues
Ministry o f  Energy, Development Trend o f the Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995.
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Table A l.5 Electricity production pattern of the Ministry of Energy
“percent”
Year Hydro-Power Steam Gas Turbine Diesel
1967 35.7 39.7 3.1 21.5
1968 35.2 44.7 3.2 16.9
1969 41.8 41.8 2.6 13.8
1970 39.3 46.5 3.6 10.6
1971 48.8 38.2 3.5 9.5
1972 51.3 36.6 3.9 8.2
1973 30.5 57.6 5.8 6.1
1974 30.6 58.6 6.2 4.6
1975 27 60.9 7.5 4.6
1976 28 59.5 7.9 4.6
1977 26.7 52.1 16.2 5
1978 36 36.3 22.6 5.1
1979 27.9 39.9 27.4 4.8
1980 28.3 41.2 25.6 4.9
1981 27.8 40.9 26.3 5
1982 24.5 47.7 23.3 4.5
1983 20.3 53.4 22.4 3.9
1984 16.9 53.7 25.7 3.7
1985 15.1 55 26.1 3.8
1986 19.3 58.5 18.3 3.9
1987 19.7 59.6 17.2 3.5
1988 16.7 61.6 18.6 3.1
1989 15.4 67.9 14.3 2.4
1990 11.1 70.7 15.9 2.3
1991 11.8 70.3 15.8 2.1
1992 14.6 66.4 17 2
1993 13.8 67.5 17.4 1.3
1994 9.7 69.2 20 1.1
Sources: Calculated based on Table A1.4
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Table A l.6 Sales of electricity produced by the Ministry of Energy
“Million Kwh”
Year Household Industry Commerce Agriculture Others Total
1967 473 504 271 33 180 1461
1968 639 656 364 49 252 1960
1969 691 914 607 79 293 2584
1970 808 1427 854 91 292 3472
1971 983 2035 1029 121 351 4519
1972 1218 2745 1250 141 369 5723
1973 1423 4048 1585 213 527 7796
1974 1620 5001 1757 267 507 9152
1975 2034 5287 2191 330 604 10446
1976 2620 5576 2639 371 528 11734
1977 3238 5897 2888 426 617 13066
1978 3797 5821 3420 441 666 14145
1979 4702 6109 3772 518 815 15916
1980 4479 4739 3837 695 614 14364
1981 5809 6326 4749 873 477 18234
1982 7350 6488 5999 1158 758 21753
1983 8857 7798 5609 1519 1370 25153
1984 10069 8631 6286 1848 1343 28177
1985 11316 8834 6914 2439 1309 30812
1986 12416 8703 7812 2160 1528 32619
1987 13668 7848 9201 2565 1458 34740
1988 13994 7852 9569 2947 1785 36147
1989 15791 8466 10867 3352 1480 39956
1990 17344 10220 11930 3716 1897 45107
1991 19128 10637 13609 3792 2009 49175
1992 19509 13262 14004 3576 1955 52306
1993 22143 15572 14984 4023 1392 58114
1994 22473 20470 13747 5169 1766 63625
Sources:
Central Bank of Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, different issues.
Ministry o f Energy, Development Trend o f Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995.
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Table A l.7 Composition of electricity consumption
“percent”
Year Household Industry Commerce Agriculture Others
1967 32.4 34.5 18.5 2.3 12.3
1968 32.6 33.5 18.6 2.5 12.8
1969 26.7 35.4 23.5 3.1 11.3
1970 23.3 41.1 24.6 2.6 8.4
1971 21.7 45 22.8 2.7 7.8
1972 21.3 48 21.8 2.5 6.4
1973 18.2 52 20.3 2.7 6.8
1974 17.7 54.6 19.2 2.9 5.6
1975 19.5 50.6 21 3.1 5.8
1976 22.3 47.5 22.5 3.2 4.5
1977 24.8 45.1 22.1 3.3 4.7
1978 26.8 41.2 24.2 3.1 4.7
1979 29.5 38.4 23.7 3.3 5.1
1980 31.2 33 26.7 4.8 4.3
1981 31.9 34.7 26 4.8 2.6
1982 33.8 29.8 27.6 5.3 3.5
1983 35.2 31 22.3 6 5.4
1984 35.7 30.6 22.3 6.6 4.8
1985 36.7 28.7 22.4 8 4.2
1986 38.1 26.7 23.9 6.6 4.7
1987 39.3 22.6 26.5 7.4 4.2
1988 38.7 21.7 26.5 8.2 4.9
1989 39.5 21.2 27.2 8.4 3.7
1990 38.5 22.7 26.4 8.2 4.2
1991 38.9 21.6 27.7 7.7 4.1
1992 37.3 25.4 26.8 6.8 3.7
1993 38.1 26.8 25.8 6.9 2.4
1994 35.3 32.2 21.6 8.1 2.8
Source: Calculated based on Table A1.6
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Table Al .8a Effective factors in the residential electricity demand
Year
Residential 
electricity 
demand (Gwh)
Nominal 
GNP 
(billion Rials)
Wholesale 
Price Index
Residential 
electricity Price 
Index (*)
Population
(million)
1967 473 556.5 5.41 60.4 26.3
1968 639 595.2 5.45 61.9 27.08
1969 691 769.8 5.66 62.4 27.89
1970 808 731.5 5.8 61.7 28.66
1971 983 922.9 6.23 61.2 29.61
1972 1218 1179.0 6.55 60.8 30.41
1973 1423 1686.3 7.43 60.5 31.23
1974 1620 3015.4 8.69 60.3 32.5
1975 2034 3362.7 9.15 60.3 33.38
1976 2620 4532.4 10.38 60.3 33.71
1977 3238 5311.5 11.9 60.4 34.69
1978 3797 5086.2 13.03 60.4 36.11
1979 4702 6217.8 15.61 52.1 37.2
1980 5118 6658 20.36 47.7 39.3
1981 5809 8042.2 24.31 54.6 40.85
1982 7350 10539.8 27.65 62.9 42.48
1983 8857 13369.6 29.79 63.5 44.18
1984 10069 14792.6 32.08 63.5 45.7
1985 11316 15741.6 34.42 71.3 47.5
1986 12416 16208.2 43.08 85 49.4
1987 13668 19909.7 55.89 92.4 50.6
1988 13994 22187.7 68.15 94.1 51.9
1989 15791 27575.4 80.7 95 53.1
1990 17344 30049 100 100 54.5
1991 19128 41534.3 126.63 123.4 55.8
1992 19509 54415.2 168.92 195.7 57
1993 22143 76756.3 211.7 220.1 58.1
1994 22473 107368.1 301.43 227.8 59.6
Sources:
To deflate variables expressed in Rials, wholesale price index is used (Ministry of Energy, 1996, Majumdar,1996) 
Central Bank of Iran, Economics Office, National Accounts, (1974-1987), July 1996 
Statistics Centre o f Iran, Statistical Yearbook, 1996
(*) This unique data (based on Households Budget Surveys during 1967-1994) was provided by Mr. Mirzaee, 
Head o f Consumer Price Index (CPI) Department at the Central Bank o f Iran.
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Table A 1.8b Potentially effective factors in the residential electricity demand
“Nominal price’'
Year
Temperature 
Heating Days
Rain fall 
Annual
Fuel Oil 
Priee
Natural Gas 
Price
Gas Oil 
Price
Kerosene
Price
LPG
Price
Tehran (Ct) Tehran, mm Rls/Litre Rls/m^ Rls/Litre Rls/Litre Rls/Litre
1967 22.6 129 1.2 1.3 2.4 2.5 4.5
1968 21.8 388 1.2 1.21 2.4 2.5 4.5
1969 22.5 230 1.2 1.16 2.4 2.5 4.5
1970 23.8 146 1.2 1.12 2.4 2.5 4.5
I97I 21.3 295 1.2 1.55 2.4 2.5 4.5
1972 21.8 271 1.2 1.53 2.4 2.5 4.5
1973 21.9 199 1.2 1.39 2.4 2.5 4.5
1974 21.9 288 1.2 1.57 2.4 2.5 4.5
1975 22.9 220 1.2 1.55 2.4 2.5 4.5
1976 23 250 1.2 1.49 2.4 2.5 4.5
1977 23.1 312.4 1.2 1.62 2.4 2.5 5.5
1978 23 217.2 1.2 1.74 2.4 2.5 6.8
1979 22.4 299.1 1.2 1.9 2.4 2.5 6.8
1980 23.8 185.7 1.2 1.82 2.4 2.5 6.8
1981 22.2 216.8 1.2 1.96 2.603 2.5 9.9
1982 21.1 323.6 1.2 2.58 3.008 2.5 9.9
1983 22.6 210.8 1.2 2.63 3.008 2.5 9.9
1984 22.8 284 1.2 2.72 3.008 2.8 9.9
1985 22.9 192.1 1.2 2.75 3.008 2.5 9.9
1986 22.3 292.1 1.2 2.8 3.054 2.5 9.9
1987 22.5 295.1 2 2.5 4.625 4 9.9
1988 22.3 218 2 2.49 4.72 4 9.9
1989 23.4 173 2 2.38 4.72 4 9.9
1990 23.2 190 2 2.38 4.72 4 9.9
1991 21.6 260 2 4.4 10 4 19.6
1992 21.2 328 5 5.75 10 4 23.2
1993 22.2 219 5 6.34 10 15 23.2
1994 23.2 255 5 12.79 10 15 26.8
Sources:
Statistics
Ministry
Centre o f Iran, different issues
o f Petroleum, Institute o f International Energy Studies, Data Bank, 1996, Tehran.
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Table A l.9 Composition of power plants energy consumption
based on million barrel oil equivalent (boe)
Year Gas Oil Fuel Oil Natural Gas Total
1967 0.87 2.07 0.08 3.02
1968 0.76 2.79 0.21 3.75
1969 0.82 3.3 0.13 4.25
1970 1.06 4.47 0.14 5.66
1971 1.06 3.97 1.02 6.06
1972 1.23 3.42 2.17 6.82
1973 2.03 5.98 4.54 12.55
1974 2.55 5.62 5.93 14.11
1975 2.59 8.53 6.77 17.89
1976 3.2 9.66 7.01 19.88
1977 6.33 7.61 9.64 22.43
1978 9.42 6.75 8.67 24.84
1979 8.95 7.07 14.68 30.7
1980 6.29 9.79 14.32 30.4
1981 6.07 12.63 14.83 33.53
1982 6.46 12.94 19.97 39.37
1983 7.73 17.4 22.76 47.89
1984 10.38 21.16 24.42 55.96
1985 14.02 23.72 25.1 62.83
1986 10.5 27.58 24.24 62.32
1987 9.47 23.66 34.26 67.39
1988 10.05 25.52 36.02 71.58
1989 8.06 27.26 43.14 78.45
1990 7.31 31.97 52.27 91.55
1991 6.18 34.19 57.19 97.56
1992 7.06 32.26 61.96 101.28
1993 6.87 38.46 72.29 117.61
1994 7.37 39.13 78.82 125.32
1995 8.63 44.53 79.18 132.35
Sources: Calculated based on Tables A l.l  and A1.29
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Table A 1.10 Composition of domestic energy consumption
“Million boe”
Year Gas Oil Fuel Oil Natural Gas Total
1972 23.7 22.1 59.1 104.9
1973 29.6 25.5 76.1 131.2
1974 33.5 29.3 80.5 143.3
1975 40.5 32.6 77.3 150.4
1976 47 36.9 88 171.9
1977 57.3 39.2 150.2 246.7
1978 60.5 38.9 104.3 203.7
1979 59 40.8 134.5 234.3
1980 58.2 48.3 59.1 165.6
1981 63.1 56.1 61 180.2
1982 72.1 53.8 113.1 239
1983 86.8 63.9 97.4 248.1
1984 94.3 72.1 135.1 301.5
1985 109 72.5 151.5 333
1986 102.2 77.9 98.1 278.1
1987 107.3 68.1 127.6 303
1988 109 75.2 127 311.2
1989 110.4 74.3 133.9 318.6
1990 118.9 76.9 147.7 343.5
1991 126.5 80.5 202.4 409.4
1992 131.3 82.5 220.6 434.4
1993 138 89.5 232 459.5
Sources:
Central Bank o f Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, different issue 
Calculated based on Table A 1.29
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Table A l.l 1 Energy share of power stations out of domestic consumption
'percent”
Year Gas Oil Fuel Oil Natural Gas Total
1972 5.18 15.46 3.68 6.5
1973 6.85 23.43 5.98 9.57
1974 7.62 19.19 7.38 9.85
1975 6.4 26.16 8.76 11.89
1976 6.81 26.19 7.97 11.56
1977 11.05 19.41 6.41 9.09
1978 15.58 17.36 8.31 12.2
1979 15.17 17.32 10.91 13.1
1980 10.81 20.28 24.23 18.36
1981 9.61 22.53 24.33 18.61
1982 8.97 24.07 17.65 16.48
1983 8.91 27.23 23.36 19.3
1984 11 29.36 18.07 18.56
1985 12.86 32.7 16.57 18.87
1986 10.28 35.41 24.72 22.41
1987 8.83 34.75 26.85 22.25
1988 9.21 33.95 28.37 23
1989 7.3 36.66 32.22 24.62
1990 6.15 41.55 35.39 26.65
1991 4.88 42.45 28.26 23.83
1992 5.37 39.09 28.09 23.31
1993 4.97 42.97 31.17 25.6
Sourees: Calculated based on Tables A1.9 and Al.lO
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Table A 1.12 Energy consumption pattern of power stations
“percent”
Year Gas Oil Fuel Oil Natural Gas
1967 28.8 68.5 2.7
1968 20.1 74.4 5.5
1969 19.3 77.6 3.1
1970 18.6 79 2.4
1971 17.5 65.5 17
1972 18 50.1 31.9
1973 16.2 47.6 36.2
1974 18 40 42
1975 14.5 47.7 37.8
1976 16.1 48.6 35.3
1977 23 34 43
1978 38 27 35
1979 29 23 48
1980 20.7 32.2 47.1
1981 18.1 37.7 44.2
1982 16.4 32.9 50.7
1983 16.2 36.3 47.5
1984 18.6 37.8 43.6
1985 22.3 37.7 40
1986 17 44 39
1987 14 35 51
1988 14 35.7 50.3
1989 10.3 34.7 55
1990 8 35 57
1991 6.3 35.1 58.6
1992 7 31.8 61.2
1993 5.8 32.7 61.5
1994 5.9 31.2 62.9
1995 6.52 33.65 59.83
Source: Calculated based on Table A1.9
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Table A 1.13 Number of employees and customers in the electricity industry
Year Electricity industry employees Total customers 
(thousands)
Electrified
villages(in production) Total
1967 1437 7204 798 148
1968 1839 9178 1009 171
1969 2062 11979 1178 217
1970 2208 13676 1379 265
1971 2354 15642 1516 382
1972 2944 18093 1669 491
1973 3957 20197 1895 653
1974 4791 24604 2132 994
1975 5292 26208 2416 1561
1976 5638 28168 2791 2360
1977 5751 30047 3105 3559
1978 6311 32082 3399 4327
1979 8301 38299 3829 5886
1980 7927 37357 4336 7733
1981 7404 37715 4988 9637
1982 9011 39613 5602 11786
1983 9252 44636 6138 14366
1984 10859 52571 6677 16804
1985 11850 56970 7130 19113
1986 12150 56776 7762 20437
1987 12388 56638 8192 21585
1988 12222 59011 8828 22484
1989 12054 60740 9338 23267
1990 12255 66137 9641 24130
1991 10920 66743 10090 25130
1992 11923 69139 10516 26158
1993 9150 61168 11088 29046
1994 9579 57611 11717 31128
Sources:
Statistics Centre o f Iran, Statistieal Yearbook, different issues.
Ministry o f Energy, Development Trend of the Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995.
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Table A 1.14 Domestic end-use energy consumption pattern
“percent”
Year Electricity Petroleum Products Natural Gas Solid Fuel
1967 4.12 84.27 1.31 10.3
1968 4.24 85.25 1.36 9.15
1969 4.57 85.54 1.52 8.37
1970 4.51 75.97 12.77 6.76
1971 4.77 75.92 13.32 5.99
1972 5.07 75.72 13.04 6.17
1973 5.39 74.83 13.19 6.59
1974 5.53 77.4 10.91 6.15
1975 5.22 77.25 9.78 7.76
1976 4.95 79.02 9.39 6.64
1977 4.74 81.2 8.27 5.8
1978 5.01 83.98 6.71 4.31
1979 5.07 82.82 7.05 5.07
1980 5.46 82.85 6.23 5.46
1981 5.78 82.07 7.41 4.75
1982 6.02 79.69 9.14 5.15
1983 5.76 81.36 8.75 4.13
1984 5.8 81.21 9.84 3.15
1985 6.16 81.47 9.33 3.05
1986 7.02 80.17 9.55 3.26
1987 6.81 80.25 10.04 2.9
1988 6.97 79.81 10.26 2.96
1989 7.17 76.05 14.64 2.15
1990 7.46 71.69 18.87 1.99
1991 7.2 68.62 21.97 2.22
1992 7.06 68.33 22.57 2.07
1993 7.11 66.61 24.25 2.03
Sources: Ministry o f Energy, Energy Balances 1372 and 1373 (1993 &1994)
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Table A 1.15 Peak load and electricity consumption trends
Year
Electricity 
Consumption 
Per Capita
Electricity
Consumption
Growth
Peak Load
MW Date
1967 55.6 * 528 June
1968 72.4 34.2 609 July
1969 92.6 31.8 783 June
1970 121.1 34.4 998 July
1971 152.6 30.2 1239 Oct.
1972 188.2 26.6 1461 Feb.
1973 249.6 36.2 1841 Oct.
1974 281.6 17.4 2186 Oct.
1975 312.9 14.1 2572 Aug.
1976 348.1 12.3 2737 July
1977 376.7 11.4 2876 Feb.
1978 391.7 8.3 3486 July
1979 427.8 12.5 3621 Aug.
1980 365.5 -9.8 4143 June
1981 446.4 26.9 4229 Feb.
1982 512.1 19.3 4923 Feb.
1983 569.3 15.6 5582 Aug.
1984 616.6 12.0 6333 July
1985 648.7 9.4 6606 July
1986 660.3 5.9 7464 July
1987 686.6 6.5 7743 Aug.
1988 696.5 4.1 7762 Aug.
1989 752.5 10.5 8911 July
1990 827.7 12.9 9537 Aug.
1991 881.3 9.0 10939 July
1992 917.6 6.4 11950 July
1993 1000.2 11.1 13308 July
1994 1067.5 9.5 14424 July
Sources:
Ministry o f Energy, 
Ministry o f Energy, 
Calculated based on
Development Trend o f the Iranian electricity industry in 28 years (1967-1994), August 1995. 
Energy Balances 1373 (1994)
Tables A1.6,A1.8a
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Table Al .16 Energy conservation of the power industry in some countries 
“percent” (1985-1986)
Countries Energy conservation
1985 1986
Australia 31.8 32.4
Bangladesh 29 29.6
China 35.1 34.6
Honk Kong 37.9 37.8
Iran 30 30.6
Japan 38.1 38.2
Malaysia 30.2 31.3
New Zealand 32.7 31.6
Philippines 31.7 32.5
South Korea 37 36.8
Source: UN, Electrie Power in Asia and the Pacific, 1985 &1986
Table A l.l 7 Operating performance of the Iranian electricity industry 
‘percent” (1967-1994)
Year Load Factor Energy conservation overall Loss Ratio
1967 40 25.6 20.7
1968 45.6 27.2 19.4
1969 46.6 28.6 19.2
1970 48.7 29.8 18.4
1971 50.6 29.4 17.7
1972 53.7 30 16.7
1973 57.8 31.4 16.4
1974 58.3 32.9 18
1975 56.7 31.6 18.3
1976 59.3 31.3 17.4
1977 62.5 30.8 17.1
1978 56.9 27.2 18.6
1979 61.3 27.1 18.1
1980 54.8 28 17.6
1981 60.5 28.8 18.6
1982 61 29.8 17.4
1983 62.4 30 17.5
1984 61.5 30.3 17.4
1985 63.5 30 16.1
1986 59.7 30.6 16.5
1987 62.7 30 18.4
1988 64.4 30.1 17.4
1989 62.4 30.7 18
1990 65.7 31.1 17.8
1991 62.3 31.4 17.6
1992 60.9 31.1 18
1993 61.2 30.2 18.5
1994 61 32 17.5
Sources: Calculated based on Tables A l.l ,  A 1.2, A1.6 and A l . l5
Load factor = X 100
Energy conservation
electricity generated(kwh) 
peak demand (kw) x 8760
electicity generated (Btu)
X 100
Overall electricity loss ratio =
fiiel inputs (Btu)
electricity loss (kwh)
electricity generated (kwh) X 100
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Table A 1.18 Revenue of the Ministry of Energy by class of service
‘Thousands of Dollars/Million Kwh”
Year/Sections 1967 1969 1971 1975 1976 1982
Household
Values 24401 42185 81482 331365
Quantity 691 983 2034 7350
Ct/Kwh 3.53 4.3 4 4.51
Industry
Values 12314 31111 68838 153607
Quantity 914 2035 5287 6488
Ct/Kwh 1.35 1.53 1.3 2.37
Commerce
Values 20476 37398 84278 301442
Quantity 607 1029 2191 5999
Ct/Kwh 3.37 3.63 3.85 5.02
Agriculture
Values 1145 - 4913 15728
Quantity 79 121 330 1158
Ct/Kwh 1.45 - 1.49 1.36
Total
Values 71638 125838 251890 874898
Quantity 2584 4519 10442 21753
Ct/Kwh 2.8 2.77 2.78 2.41 2.41 4.02
Sources:
UN, Electric Power in Asia and the Pacific, 1967,1975 & 1976,1981 & 1982
Table A1.19 Residential electricity tariffs (1987-1994)
“Rials”
Electricity consumption blocks 
per month (Kwh)
1987 1993 1994
0 - 40 Free Free Free
41 - 60 3.3 55(lump-sum) 55(lump-sum)
61 -150 3.3 3.3 3.3
151-180 3.3 3.3 3.8
181 -210 3.3 3.3 3.8
211-250 3.3 3.3 3.8
251 - 260 3.3 5.85 6.7
261 - 270 3.6 6.3 7.25
271 - 280 3.9 6.7 7.7
281 - 290 4.2 7.15 8.2
291 - 300 4.5 7.7 8.85
301 -310 4.7 8.25 9.5
311 -320 4.9 8.8 10.1
321 - 330 5.1 9.25 10.75
331 - 340 5.3 9.9 11.4
341 - 350 5.5 10.45 12
351 - 360 5.7 11 12.65
361 - 370 5.9 11.55 13.2
371 - 380 6.1 12.1 13.9
381 - 390 6.3 12.65 14.55
391 - 400 6.5 13.2 15.2
401-410 6.8 13.75 15.8
411 -420 7.1 14.3 16.45
421 - 430 7.4 15.4 17.7
431 - 500 7.5 16.5 20
501 - 580 21.85
581 - 660 24.15
661 - 750 26.45
75 0 -... 70
Source:
Ministry o f Energy, Tariffs and their General Conditions, different issues,1987,1993,1994.
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Table A 1.20 Performance of the electricity Distribution Organisations in 1995
Organisations Electricity Sales 
Million Kwh
Number of Customers Network
size
Transformer
Capacity
Employee
Res. Indus. Res. Indus. KM MVA Distribution
y1 y2 y3 y4 Xl x2 x3
1 Azerbaijan Sharghi 1071.938 510.796 387370 2799 7842 1547 1363
2 Azerbaijan Gharbi 723.899 240.978 228114 1394 5998 1245 939
3 Ardebil 267.792 44.3 98973 473 3601 303 425
4 Isfahan 1530.024 3526.94 817619 8233 12998 2589 1914
5 Char mahal B. 188.781 50.494 116073 556 2503 283 282
6 Markazi 466.308 2665.688 270520 1654 4724 1055 577
7 Hamadan 497.582 117.336 255782 1884 4127 794 596
8 Lorestan 345.59 654.952 178522 1042 3644 749 609
9 Tehran 5125.654 3068.754 1910161 4765 29657 6306 4216
10 Gharb Tehran 762.303 792.547 324070 1306 3810 1064 702
11 Qum 357.723 190.889 160378 1018 2660 656 345
12 Khorasan 921.54 270.084 585762 1828 9318 1398 1422
13 Mashad 890.961 519.052 444860 3168 5473 1572 985
14 Khuzestan 2492.586 4149.409 510586 1872 6633 4024 2465
15 Kokeeloeh & B. 115.153 15.719 54660 98 1081 283 322
16 Zanjan 204.576 169.72 147330 812 3314 478 290
17 Ghazvin 300.292 603.186 169616 1447 2598 627 342
18 Kermanshah 273.577 96.925 261350 869 3499 828 629
19 Kordestan 327.126 55.366 195850 712 2818 501 433
20 ilam 105.684 15.019 71211 462 1291 288 282
21 Pars 1166.163 507.118 611841 4250 6982 914 978
22 Bushehr 582.065 44.716 112668 378 2626 696 460
23 Shiraz 544.423 385.574 243599 2025 3721 1211 745
24 Kerman 713.44 983.364 359647 589 8764 1873 1364
25 Gilan 760.488 560.094 415226 3136 11255 1170 904
26 Mazandaran 1385.912 653.798 694512 4438 14308 2096 1682
27 Hormozgan 912.873 135.428 142902 382 3823 912 1046
28 Yazd 298.81 373.297 181250 970 3490 537 488
29 Semnan 158.913 294.085 110630 992 1742 528 664
30 Sistan & Baluch 396.676 79.851 157386 252 3295 1124 1837
Source:
Ministry o f Energy, Detailed Statisties o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1994
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Table Al .21 Iranian power plants performance in 1994
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating Capacity Employee Fuel consumption
Steam Gas
Turbine
Total
(K)
Total
(L)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Person Litre xIO® Litre xIO^ m3 xIO^
Shahid Firozi 231401 40 22 62 144 0 0 91010
Montazer Ghaem 5994179 600 618 1218 608 979799 24840 660549
Loshan 1860680 240 112 352 398 0 196 495061
Neka (SalimI) 9618194 1680 278 1958 996 596287 1022 2097315
Shahid Rajaie 5197798 1000 563 1563 507 483108 2566 748755
Besat 1541127 195 107 302 361 146332 12283 324303
Tabriz 3501082 736 57 793 526 891762 5732 23356
Mashad 1410390 131 203 334 383 1163 3524 553644
Tous steam 3318489 600 0 600 493 28508 8611 893443
Isfahan 5066017 820 31 851 1308 824812 2328 334866
Ramin (Ahwaz) 5158080 945 0 945 1097 0 0 1180597
Rey 1976787 0 1101 1101 530 0 50624 759367
Qum 1825143 0 460 460 89 0 28095 513011
Gilan 2853078 0 876 876 164 0 14821 863424
Bandar Abbas 6637883 1280 42 1322 751 241553 1054 1453420
Sources:
Ministry o f Energy (1995), Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1994 
Ministry o f Energy, The Iranian electricity industry in 1373 (1994), October 1995 
Ministry o f Energy, Energy Balances in 1373 (1994)
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Table A 1.22 Iranian power plants performance in 1995
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating Capacity Employee Fuel consumption
Steam Gas
Turbine
Total
(K)
Total
(L)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Person Litre xIO^ Litre xIO* m3 xIO^
Shahid Firozi 186906 50 20 70 144 0 198 74063
Montazer Ghaem 5233720 625 579 1204 586 943399 66030 475409
Loshan 1488387 240 104.76 344.76 396 0 22310 377697
Neka (Salimi) 8759371 1680 262 1942 1007 682058 162 1804427
Shahid Rajaie 7064862 1000 622.5 1622.5 540 825679 29534 940412
Besat 1562609 247.5 119 366.5 334 210675 12067 219679
Tabriz 4536145 736 53 789 540 1124190 9464 68794
Mashad 1304450 133 186.74 319.74 374 447 5372 516779
Tous steam 3591871 600 0 600 488 86060 186 927741
Isfahan 4306004 835 0 835 661 742232 2324 267251
Ramin (Ahwaz) 4379797 1260 0 1260 848 0 0 1010240
Rey 1497471 0 1028.5 1028.5 448 0 147566 458162
Qum 1755488 0 423 423 95 0 86930 445450
Gilan 2471831 0 814.5 814.5 224 0 14651 780673
Bandar Abbas 5899279 1280 40 1320 744 83971 921 1579804
Source:
Ministry o f Energy, Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian eleetricity industry in 1995.
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Table A 1.23 Iranian power plants performance in 1990
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Total
(K)
Fuel Qil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3 xIO®
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 321404 40 20 60 5354 819 125179
2 Montazer Ghaem 3346521 583 19.25 602.25 874382 27833 0
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 794580 240 103.4 343.4 0 5 237498
4 Neka (Salimi) 8846166 1660 287.9 1947.9 251927 5319 2293218
5 Shahid Rajaie * * * * * * *
6 Besat 1557596 195 117.5 312.5 66854 5936 413343
7 Tabriz 4657068 736 52.26 788.26 1022061 63572 0
8 Mashad 1043575 120 185.9 305.9 139169 1633 250141
9 Tous steam 2401850 600 0 600 13917 8763 660576
10 Esfahan (Islam Abad) 5391916 830 31.76 861.76 1188082 2802 206528
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 1955472 600 0 600 0 0 472634
12 Rey 3317607 0 1013.22 1013.22 0 129926 1204037
13 Qum * * * * * * *
14 Gilan * * * * * * *
15 Bandar Abbas 6693303 1208 121.28 1329.28 171903 2198 1577528
16 Shahid Montazeri 3693789 784 0 784 974527 9498 0
17 Shahid Madhaj 656010 140 82.8 222.8 0 0 205656
18 Soofian 158821 0 78 78 0 66181 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 12265 0 75 75 0 4531 0
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 27096 0 47.6 47.6 0 13512 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan) * * * * * * *
22 Sheervan 220969 0 117 117 0 933 104128
23 Shariati 409308 0 118.2 118.2 0 3929 187985
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 165840 0 127.8 127.8 0 88248 0
25 Beesutoon * * * * * * *
26 Boosher 101965 0 63.9 63.9 0 52213 0
27 Zarand 292327 50 0 50 100960 0 0
28 Rasht 249224 0 44.8 44.8 0 47 96570
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 163234 0 74.4 74.4 0 68749 0
30 Kermanshah(Bakhtaran) 65230 0 51.8 51.8 0 30049 0
Source;
Ministry o f Energy (1991), Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1369 (1990) 
♦denotes this power plant is not in operation
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Table A 1.24 Iranian power plants performance in 1991
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Total
(K)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3 xIO^
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 344223 40 20 60 226 0 140235
2 Montazer Ghaem 3639965 600 19.25 619.25 947731 22792 0
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 1437426 240 103.4 343.4 0 0 388300
4 Neka (Salimi) 10518757 1680 287.9 1967.9 577576 3327 2457398
5 Shahid Rajaie * * * * * * *
6 Besat 1550938 195 117.5 312.5 49687 3122 417361
7 Tabriz 4089343 774 52.26 826.26 967313 10681 0
8 Mashad 1048923 120 185.9 305.9 51087 3619 338382
9 Tous steam 2527667 600 0 600 17669 61 707263
10 Esfahan (Islam Abad) 4982929 834 31.76 865.76 967428 2768 298323
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 2601632 600 0 600 0 0 625596
12 Rey 3598235 0 1013.22 1013.22 0 29860 1352600
13 Qum * * * * * * *
14 Gilan * * * * * * *
15 Bandar Abbas 6953033 1280 39.76 1319.76 226641 1084 1436525
16 Shahid Montazeri 4455836 800 0 800 1292765 5326 0
17 Shahid Madhaj 859561 130 82.8 212.8 0 0 239211
18 Soofian 161855 0 78 78 0 65560 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 18438 0 75 75 0 6439 0
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 39528 0 47.6 47.6 0 19610 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan) * * * * * * *
22 Sheervan 329395 0 117 117 0 3209 156437
23 Shariati 403463 0 118.2 118.2 0 2993 186810
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 187720 0 127.8 127.8 0 103150 0
25 Beesutoon * * * * * * *
26 Boosher 102320 0 145.42 145.42 0 57980 0
27 Zarand 170478 50 0 50 46126 0 0
28 Rasht 269235 0 44.8 44.8 0 5 114157
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 74483 0 74.4 74.4 0 32324 0
30 Kermanshah (Bakhtaran) 49991 0 51.8 51.8 0 23960 0
Source:
Ministry o f Energy (1992),Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electrieity industry in 1370(1991) 
♦denotes this power plant is not in operation
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Table A 1.25 Iranian power plants performance in 1992
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Total
(K)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3 xIO^
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 362423 50 20.25 70.25 2560 0 144537
2 Montazer Ghaem 4193656 625 212.625 837.625 1024375 19218 63309
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 2271343 240 104.75 344.75 0 191 609391
4 Neka (Salimi) 10049517 1680 289.25 1969.25 672202 779 2192035
5 Shahid Rajaie 638366 250 0 250 0 0 146591
6 Besat 1928262 247.5 119 366.5 80498 9482 532997
7 Tabriz Power 3796696 774 53 827 889857 24311 57706
8 Mashad 1077992 120 186.625 306.625 4985 4883 404876
9 Tous steam 2642667 600 0 600 16951 159 730529
10 Esfahan (Islam Abad) 4010091 835 32.125 867.125 729908 2976 300166
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 3438558 608 0 608 0 0 767752
12 Rey 3127199 0 1029.625 1029.625 0 27210 1174039
13 Qum * * * * * * *
14 Gilan 539486 0 422.85 422.85 0 0 155359
15 Bandar Abbas 6532051 1280 40 1320 185787 1527 1518266
16 Shahid Montazeri 4409121 800 0 800 1172019 4222 0
17 Shahid Madhaj 747871 290 84 374 0 0 232344
18 Soofian 144934 0 79 79 0 60006 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 46620 0 75 75 0 14757 112
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 47116 0 48 48 0 26075 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan) * * * * * * *
22 Sheervan 321397 0 120.75 120.75 0 1909 149987
23 Shariati 410480 0 121.5 121.5 0 2234 186999
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 208701 0 106.875 106.875 0 113820 0
25 Beesutoon * * * * * * *
26 Boosher 223916 0 148.75 148.75 0 104784 0
27 Zarand 222460 60 0 60 73767 6445 0
28 Rasht 232774 0 44.5 44.5 0 17 100212
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 49535 0 74.5 74.5 0 21170 0
30 Bakhtaran (Kermanshah) 58285 0 52.25 52.25 0 27731 0
Source:
Ministry o f Energy (1993), Detailed Statistics of the Iranian electricity industry in 1371(1992) 
♦denotes this power plant is not in operation
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Table A 1.26 Iranian power plants performance in 1993
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Total
(K)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3x10®
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 239174 50 20.6 70.6 2296 549 96124
2 Montazer Ghaem 3305347 624 598.5 1222.5 859985 10369 0
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 1841487 240 104.6 344.6 0 2705 491090
4 Neka (Salimi) 10169940 1680 290 1970 1035891 2226 1998893
5 Shahid Rajaie 3568911 750 0 750 297632 0 554670
6 Besat 1316973 247.5 118.5 366 116332 12557 327839
7 Tabriz 4038665 774 53 827 1019632 11450 38526
8 Mashad 1158468 120 187 307 1929 4729 459563
9 Tous steam 3109122 600 0 600 51995 440 821929
10 Esfahan (Islam Abad) 4389422 835 32.2 867.2 724643 2063 355627
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 4138944 912 0 912 0 0 950814
12 Rey 2274834 1028 0 1028 0 24019 894732
13 Qum 86884 0 423 423 0 26158 3181
14 Gilan 2693668 0 814.5 814.5 0 0 804189
15 Bandar Abbas 6682657 1280 40 1320 235559 2478 1494942
16 Shahid Montazeri 5253888 800 0 800 1387494 2410 523
17 Shahid Madhaj 1508311 290 84 374 0 0 414262
18 Soofian 127400 0 80 80 0 53467 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 53612 0 75 75 0 13428 3141
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 34196 0 84 84 0 17266 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan ) * * * * * * *
22 Sheervan 348799 0 724.2 724.2 0 2849 158607
23 Shariati 366312 0 726 726 0 2564 0
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 230002 0 138 138 0 115880 0
25 Beesutoon * * * * * * *
26 Boosher 234694 0 148.75 148.75 0 108638 0
27 Zarand 143855 60 0 60 52876 0 0
28 Rasht 104607 0 44.6 44.6 0 189 49383
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 66598 0 74.4 74.4 0 28442 0
30 Kermanshah (Bakhtaran) 67555 0 52 52 0 32262 0
Source:
Ministry o f Energy (1994), Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electricity industiy in 1372 (1993) 
♦denotes this power plant is not in operation
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Table Al .27 Iranian power plants performance in 1994
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbines Total
(K)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3 xIO^
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 231401 40 22 62 0 0 91010
2 Montazer Ghaem 5994179 600 618 1218 979799 24840 660549
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 1860680 240 112 352 0 196 495061
4 Neka (Salimi) 9618194 1680 278 1958 596287 1022 2097315
5 Shahid Rajaie 5197798 1000 562.5 1563 483108 2566 748755
6 Besat 1541127 195 107 302 146332 12283 324303
7 Tabriz 3501082 736 57 793 891762 5732 23356
8 Mashad 1410390 131 203 334 1163 3524 553644
9 Tous steam 3318489 600 0 600 28508 8611 893443
10 Isfahan (Islam Abad) 5066017 820 31 851 824812 2328 334866
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 5158080 945 0 945 0 0 1180597
12 Rey 1976787 0 1101 1101 0 50624 759367
13 Qum 1825143 0 460 460 0 28095 513011
14 Gilan 2853078 0 876 876 0 14821 863424
15 Bandar Abbas 6637883 1280 42 1322 241553 1054 1453420
16 Shahid Montazeri 5271814 800 0 800 1378131 3054 0
17 Shahid Madhaj 1386392 290 96 386 0 0 345587
18 Soofian 120118 0 79 79 0 50360 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 46592 0 75 75 0 15529 7683
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 36398 0 48 48 0 19617 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan) 789286 500 0 500 0 612 188323
22 Sheervan 302423 0 120.78 120.78 0 1263 141670
23 Shariati 276361 0 121.5 121.5 0 810 129413
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 241541 0 128.28 128.28 0 120475 0
25 Beesutoon 1041678 640 0 640 261705 0 0
26 Boosher 220978 0 157.5 157.5 0 108608 0
27 Zarand 145686 0 50 50 54298 0 0
28 Rasht 163180 0 24 24 0 4556 70501
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 30607 0 80 80 0 13200 0
30 Bakhtaran (Kermanshah) 49781 0 52.26 52.26 0 24471 0
Source:
The Ministry o f Energy (1995), Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1373 (1994) 
The Ministry o f Energy, Energy Balance in 1373 (1994)
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Table Al .28 Iranian power plants performance in 1995
Power Plants
Electricity
Production
(Q)
Installed generating capacity Fuel Consumption
Steam Gas Turbine Total
(K)
Fuel Oil Gas Oil Natural
Gas
MWH MW MW MW Litre xIO^ Litre xIO^ m3 xIO^
1 Shahid Firozi (Tarasht) 186906 50 20 70 0 198 74063
2 Montazer Ghaem 5233720 625 579 1204 943399 66030 475409
3 Loshan (Shahid Beheshti) 1488387 240 104.76 344.76 0 22310 377697
4 Neka (Salimi) 8759371 1680 262 1942 682058 162 1804427
5 Shahid Rajaie 7064862 1000 622.5 1622.5 825679 29534 940412
6 Besat 1562609 247.5 119 366.5 210675 12067 219679
7 Tabriz 4536145 736 53 789 1124190 9464 68794
8 Mashad 1304450 133 186.74 319.74 447 5372 516779
9 Tous steam 3591871 600 0 600 86060 186 927741
10 Esfahan (Islam Abad) 4306004 835 0 835 742232 2324 267251
11 Ramin (Ahwaz) 4379797 1260 0 1260 0 0 1010240
12 Rey 1497471 0 1028.5 1028.5 0 147566 458162
13 Qum 1755488 0 423 423 0 86930 445450
14 Gilan 2471831 0 814.5 814.5 0 14651 780673
15 Bandar Abbas 5899279 1280 40 1320 83971 921 1579804
16 Shahid Montazeri 4669625 800 0 800 1228231 3689 0
17 Shahid Madhaj 1517175 290 84 374 0 0 410190
18 Soofian 149742 0 79 79 0 62609 0
19 Shahin Shahr (Hesa) 27147 0 75 75 0 7566 2073
20 Dorud (Bakhtar) 25003 0 48 48 0 15360 0
21 Gharb (Hamadan) 3574031 1000 0 1000 137713 104 723947
22 Sheervan 267288 0 120.78 120.78 0 1045 126111
23 Shariati 114062 0 121.5 121.5 0 533 50914
24 Chah Bahar (Kenarak) 249227 0 128.28 128.28 0 121778 0
25 Beesutoon 2424510 640 0 640 573404 3236 17959
26 Boosher 126293 0 148.75 148.75 0 66841 0
27 Zarand 167769 60 0 60 62080 0 0
28 Rasht 7520 0 22 22 0 0 3900
29 Shahid Zanbagh (Yazd) 81866 0 74.5 74.5 0 34591 0
30 Kermanshah(Bakhtaran) 23110 0 52.26 52.26 0 11304 0
Source:
Ministry o f Energy (1996), Detailed Statistics o f the Iranian electricity industry in 1374 (1995)
Table A 1.29 General conversion factors for energy
1 tone Gas Qil 1172 litre 7.50 barrel
1 tone Fuel Oil 1008 litre 6.70 barrel
1000 cu ft Natural Gas 28.32 cu m 0.178 barrel
1 Kwh electricity 3412 Btu 0.000588 barrel
1 litre Gas Qil 33577 Btu
1 litre Fuel Oil 34444 Btu
1 M3 Natural Gas 39900 Btu
1 barrel crude oil 5800000 Btu
1 Btu 0.252 Kcal 1.05506 kJ
1 terajoules (TJ) 10^  ^Joules 947.8 MBtu
1 M3 Natural Gas 1.1883 litre Gas Oil 1.1584 litre Fuel Oil
Sources:
Azani, M.(1993) An investigation o f the energy consumption pattern in Isfahan. MSc. thesis. University o f Isfahan, Iran.
BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, June 1994
Digest o f United Kingdom, Statistics, 1995
Oil, Statistics, Gilbert Jenkins Elsevier, Applied Science. 5-th, 1996.
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Appendix 2
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) results:
A- The case of 26 developing countries power plants: 
Output = electricity production (Q) 
Inputs = labour (L), capital (K) and energy (E)
( C )  E c o n o m e t r i c  S o f t w a r e ,  I n c .  
1 9 9 1 , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 4 , 1 9 9 5
V e r s i o n  7 . 0
S o m e  a b b r e v i a t i o n s  u s e d  i n  t h e  L I M D E P  a p p l i c a t i o n :
N v a r  =  n u m b e r  o f  v a r i a b l e s
N o b s  =  n u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s
L h s  =  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e
R h s  =  L i s t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s
L o g ( x )  =  N a t u r a l  L o g a r i t h m
s q r ( x )  =  S q u a r e  r o o t
p d s  =  T  w h e r e  T  i s  t h e  f i x e d  n u m b e r  o f  p e r i o d s  
p d s  =  T i
w h e r e  T i  i s  t h e  c o u n t  v a r i a b l e  f o r  v a r i a b l e  g r o u p  s i z e ( u n b a l a n c e d  p a n e l )
I n i t ( r , c , v ) =  t o  i n i t i a l i s e  a n  r  x  c  m a t r i x  w i t h  v a l u s  v
p h i ( O )  =  C D F  o f  s t a n d a r d  n o r m a l
p s i  ( v | / )  =  l o g - d e r i v a t i v e  o f  g a m m a  ( y )  f u n c t i o n
N O l  =  d e n s i t y  o f  s t a n d a r d  n o r m a l
G s i z ( i n d e x )  =  a  c o l u m n  v e c t o r  o f  g r o u p  s i z e s
G x b r ( l i s t , i n d e x )  =  a n  N  x  K  m a t r i x  o f  g r o u p  m e a n s
E x c u t e  =  E x c u t e  s t o r e d  p r o c e d u r e
P R O G  =  b e g i n  e n t r y  o f  c o m m a n d  i n  a  p r o c e d u r e
A m e m i y a ' s  p r e d i c t i o n  c r i t e r i o n  =  [ e ' e / ( N - K ) ] ( 1 + K / N )
A k a i k e ' s  i n f o r m a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n  =  - 2 ( l o g L - K ) / N
A m e m i y a  a n d  A k a i k e ' s  c r i t e r i a  a r e  t w o  a l t e r n a t i v e s ( f o r  a d j u s t e d  R ^ )  
t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  p r o p o s e d  f o r  c o m p a r i n g  m o d e l s .
L i n e  P r o g r a m  I n s t r u c t i o n
N v a r  = 6 ;  N a m e s  =
Q ,  K ,
5 2  o b s e r v s .
6
0
1  D I S K
2  R e a d  ;  N o b s  = 5 2  
C o u n t r y ,  N I ,
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d
3  E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .
4  o p e n ; o u t p u t = c o u 3 t r y . o u t $
5  c r e a t e ;  l Q = l o g ( Q ) ; l K = l o g ( K ) ; l L = l o g ( L ) ; l E = l o g ( E ) $
6  n a m e l i s t ; p r o d = o n e , I K , I L , 1 E $
7  f r o n t i e r ; l h s = l Q ; r h s = p r o d ; p d s = 2 $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  0 . 0 .
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r .
8  s t o p
L , E $
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L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  L Q  M e a n  =  - 2 , 0 2 9 6 7 ,  S . D .  =  2 . 6 7 6 8
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  5 2 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  4 ,  D e g . F r .  =  4 8
R e s i d u a l s  :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  0 . 8 3 7 8 6 4  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 1 3 2 1 2
F i t  : R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 9 7 7 1 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 9 7 5 6
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [  3 ,  4 8 ]  =  6 9 6 2 . 5 4 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 0 0 0 0
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  3 3 . 5 4 6 9 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( 1 Î = 0 )  L o g - L  =  - 1 2 4 . 4 8 1 2
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 1 9 ,  A k a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 1 . 1 3 6
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t  - 0 . 6 6 9 8 3 E - 0 1  0 . 2 2 8 5 1 E - 0 1  - 2 . 9 3 1  0 . 0 0 3 3 8
L K  0 . 3 0 3 6 6 E - 0 1  0 . 5 0 0 3 8 E - 0 1  0 . 6 0 7  0 . 5 4 3 9 4  - 1 . 4 2 6
L L  0 . 7 9 5 7 5 E - 0 1  0 . 3 1 6 0 0 E - 0 1  2 . 5 1 8  0 . 0 1 1 8 0  - 0 . 8 6 0 1
L E  0 . 9 7 4 7 9  0 . 3 0 8 0 7 E - 0 1  3 1 . 6 4 2  0 . 0 0 0 0 0  - 1 . 8 9 9
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 5 2
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 6
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 3 4 . 0 9 0 3 7
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v )  = 0 . 0 0 8 3 7
o ^ ( u ) = 0 . 0 2 1 3 4
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r z = b / s . e . P [ | z | ^ z ] M e a n  o f
C o n s t a n t 0 . 4 4 9 5 4 E - 0 1 0 . 5 0 7 6 7 E - 0 1 0 . 8 8 5 0 . 3 7 5 8 9
L K 0 . 1 7 4 9 2 E - 0 1 0 . 7 8 8 7 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 8 2 4 4 9 - 1 . 4 2 6
L L 0 . 8 7 9 4 4 E - 0 1 0 . 5 3 5 5 5 E - 0 1 1 . 6 4 2 0 . 1 0 0 5 6 - 0 . 8 6 0 1
L E 0 . 9 7 8 9 5 0 . 4 0 9 3 3 E - 0 1 2 3 . 9 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 . 8 9 9
a u / c r v 1 . 5 9 6 8 0 . 8 2 4 3 9 1 . 9 3 7 0 . 0 5 2 7 6
V a ^ v + a ^ u 0 . 1 7 2 3 5 0 . 3 1 4 8 1 E - 0 1 5 . 4 7 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 5 2
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 1 8
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 4 0 . 4 9 3 9 8
F r o n t i e r  m o d e l  e s t i m a t e d  w i t h P A N E L  d a t a .
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v )  = 0 . 0 0 2 1 9
o ^ ( u ) = 0 . 0 5 6 2 3
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r z = b / s . e . P [ | z l ^ z ] M e a n  o f
C o n s t a n t 0 . 1 4 8 0 9 0 . 4 7 4 4 2 E - 0 1 3 . 1 2 2 0 . 0 0 1 8 0
L K 0 . 8 4 1 5 6 E - 0 1 0 . 7 2 0 7 5 E - 0 1 1 . 1 6 8 0 . 2 4 2 9 6 - 1 . 4 2 6
L L 0 . 5 3 0 0 0 E - 0 1 0 . 5 0 8 0 9 E - 0 1 1 . 0 4 3 0 . 2 9 6 8 9 - 0 . 8 6 0 1
L E 0 . 9 5 2 4 0 0 . 4 7 0 9 7 E - 0 1 2 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 . 8 9 9
o ^ u / o ^ v 2 5 . 6 7 3 1 7 . 6 5 5 1 . 4 5 4 0 . 1 4 5 9 0
o ^  ( v ) 0 . 2 1 9 0 2 E - 0 2 0 . 9 0 9 7 2 E - 0 3 2 . 4 0 8 0 . 0 1 6 0 6
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B- The case of 26 developing countries power plants: 
Output = electricity production (Q) 
Inputs = capital (K) and energy (E)
Line Program Instruction
10
11
12
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
/  N a m e s  =
K ,
5 2  o b s e r v s .
0
E $
D I S K
R e a d  ;  N o b s  =  5 2  ;  N v a r  =  5  
C o u n t r y ,  N I ,  Q ,
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d  
E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .
o p e n ; o u t p u t = c o u 2 t r y . o u t $
c r e a t e ;  l Q = l o g ( Q ) ; l K = l o g ( K ) ; l E = l o g ( E ) $
n a m e l i s t ; p r o d = o n e , I K , 1 E $
f r o n t i e r ; l h s = l Q ; r h s = p r o d ; p d s = 2 $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  0 . 0 .
c r e a t e  ; E p s i l o n = L Q - p r o d ' B $  
m a t r i x  ;  T I = G s i z ( c o u n t r y )
; E B A R  = G x b r ( E p s i l o n , c o u n t r y )
; P a n e l u = I n i t ( 2 6 , 1 , 0 ) $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  4  i n  o u t p u t ,  
p r o c
C a l c  ;  G A M M A I = 1  /  ( 1  +  T I  ( i )  * L M D A ' " 2 )
; s 2 u  =  L M D A ' ' 2  *  s ' ^ 2  /  ( 1  +  L M D A ' ^ 2 )
; P S I  =  S q r ( s 2 u  *  G A M M A I )
; M U I =  -  E B A R ( i ) * ( 1 - G A M M A I )
; E S T D U =  M Ü I  +  P S I * N 0 1 ( M U I / P S I ) / p h i ( M U I / P S I ) $
M a t r i x  ;  P A N E L U ( i )  =  E S T D U $
E N D P R O C
E x e c u t e  ; I =  1 , 2 6  $
T h i s  b e g i n s  2 6  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .  
C A L C ; G A M M A I = 1 /  ( 1 + T I  ( I )  * L M D A ' ^ 2 )  ; S 2 U = L M D A ' ' 2 * S ' ' 2 /  ( 1 + L M D A ^ 2 )  ; P S I  
= S Q R ( S 2 U * G A M M A I ) ; M U I = - E B A R ( I ) * ( 1 - G A M M A I ) ; E S T D U = M U I + P S I * N 0 1 ( M  
U I / P S I ) / P H I ( M U I / P S I ) $
M A T R I X ; P A N E L U ( I ) = E S T D U $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  5  i n  o u t p u t .
S T O P $
R e p e t i t i o n s  r e m a i n i n g =  1  
M a t r i x  ;  l i s t ;  P a n e l u $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  3 1  i n  o u t p u t .
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r ,  
s t o p
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  L Q  M e a n  =  - 2 . 0 2 9 6 7 ,  S . D .  =  2 . 6 7 6 8
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  5 2 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  3 ,  D e g . F r .  =  4 9
R e s i d u a l s  :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  0 . 9 4 8 5 5 4  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 1 3 9 1 3
F i t :  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 9 7 4 0 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 9 7 3 0
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [  2 ,  4 9 ]  =  9 4 1 4 . 4 2 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 0 0 0 0
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  3 0 . 3 2 0 8 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( l i = 0 )  L o g - L  =  - 1 2 4 . 4 8 1 2
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 2 0 ,  A k a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 1 . 0 5 1
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t  - 0 . 6 7 2 7 3 E - 0 1  0 . 2 4 0 6 4 E - 0 1  - 2 . 7 9 6  0 . 0 0 5 1 8
L K  0 . 1 1 8 5 4  0 . 3 7 6 4 2 E - 0 1  3 . 1 4 9  0 . 0 0 1 6 4  - 1 . 4 2 6
L E  0 . 9 4 4 4 5  0 . 2 9 8 5 9 E - 0 1  3 1 . 6 3 0  0 . 0 0 0 0 0  - 1 . 8 9 9
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L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  5 2
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  4
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  3 0 . 4 1 9 9 5
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s :  o ^ ( v ) =  0 . 0 1 4 2 2
o M u ) =  0 . 0 1 0 8 6
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
L K
L E
o u / o v  
Vo^ v+a^ u
0 . 1 4 8 0 6 E - 0 1
0 . 1 1 7 9 8
0 . 9 4 4 3 6
0 . 8 7 3 9 6
0 . 1 5 8 3 7
0 . 9 0 2 4 2 E - 0 1  
0 . 4 3 9 9 3 E - 0 1  
0 . 3 4 3 9 6 E - 0 1  
1 . 0 2 0 0  
0 . 4 5 8 7 1 E - 0 1
0 . 1 6 4
2 . 6 8 2
2 7 . 4 5 5
0 . 8 5 7
3 . 4 5 3
0 . 8 6 9 6 8
0 . 0 0 7 3 2
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 3 9 1 5 6
0 . 0 0 0 5 6
- 1 . 4 2 6
- 1 . 8 9 9
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 5 2
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 2 1
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 3 9 . 6 4 4 7 3
F r o n t i e r  m o d e l  e s t i m a t e d  w i t h P A N E L  d a t a .
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v )  = 0 . 0 0 1 9 3
o ^ ( u ) = 0 . 0 7 0 3 2
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | Z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
L K
L E
o^u/o^v 
o ^  ( v )
0 . 1 8 3 5 5
0 . 1 4 5 6 4
0.93506
3 6 . 5 1 9
0 . 1 9 2 5 5 E - 0 2
0 . 4 6 5 2 6 E - 0 1  
0 . 5 6 7 9 1 E - 0 1  
0 . 5 0 8 0 5 E - 0 1  
2 7 . 4 1 5  
0 . 6 9 3 9 5 E - 0 3
3 . 9 4 5
2 . 5 6 4
1 8 . 4 0 5
1 . 3 3 2
2 . 7 7 5
0 . 0 0 0 0 8
0 . 0 1 0 3 4
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 1 8 2 8 3
0 . 0 0 5 5 2
- 1 . 4 2 6
- 1 . 8 9 9
T I = G S I Z ( C O U N T R Y )
M a t r i x  T I  h a s  2 6  r o w s  a n d  1  c o l u m n s .
E B A R = G X B R ( E P S I L O N , C O U N T R Y )
M a t r i x  E B A R  h a s  2 6  r o w s  a n d 1  c o l u m n s .
P A N E L U = I N I T ( 2 6 , 1 , 0 )
M a t r i x  P A N E L U  h a s  2 6  r o w s  a n d  1  c o l u m n s .
L I S T
P A N E L U
M a t r i x  R e s u l t  i s  2 6  r o w s  b y  1  c o l u m n s .  
L o n g  c o l u m n  v e c t o r  w i l l  b e  d i s p l a y e d  a s  a  r o w .
1 r o w s 1  - 4 0 . 3 4 2 5 0 . 3 0 4 8 0 . 1 7 1 7 0 . 1 5 2 8
1 r o w s 5  - 8 0 . 2 9 2 0 0 . 2 1 8 7 0 . 5 3 3 9 0 . 4 5 0 8
1 r o w s 9  - 1 2 0 . 4 8 9 1 E - 0 1 0 . 2 9 6 6 E - 0 1 0 . 2 7 1 6 0 . 3 9 6 8
1 r o w s 1 3  - 1 6 0 . 1 8 3 9 0 . 7 6 7 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 0 8 0 . 2 1 2 5
1 r o w s 1 7  - 2 0 0 . 3 9 5 5 E - 0 1 0 . 1 9 6 5 0 . 2 3 5 0 0 . 2 2 4 5
1 r o w s 2 1  - 2 4 0 . 1 3 8 5 0 . 3 4 2 6 0 . 2 3 0 9 0 . 1 5 6 6 E - 0 1
1 r o w s 2 5  - 2 6 0 . 3 7 4 8 0 . 2 7 4 4
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C- Effective factors in efficiency improvement of 
the developing countries power plants
Line Program Instruction
1  D I S K
2  R e a d ; n o b s = 2 6 ; n v a r = 3 ; n a m e s = e , s i z e , p u b o w n $
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  :  2 6  o b s e r v s .
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  :  3
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d  :  0
3  E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .
4  o p e n ;  o u t p u t  = c a u s e . o u t $
5  t o b i t  ;  l h s  = e ;  r h s  = o n e , s i z e , p u b o w n ; l i m i t s = 0 , 1 $  
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  G r a d i e n t  F u n c t i o n  P a r a m e t e r s  
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  0 . 0 .
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r .
6  e x i t
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  v a r i a b l e s :
E  =  p u r e  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  ( 0  <  E  ^ 1 )  c a l c u l a t e d  
f o r  t h r e e  i n p u t  v a r i a b l e s ( c a p i t a l , e n e r g y  a n d  l a b o u r ) .  
S i z e  =  m e a s u r e d  a s  i n s t a l l e d  c a p a c i t y ( s c a l e d  d o w n  b y  1 0 ^ )  
P u b o w n  =  S h a r e  o f  p u b i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  o u t  o f  
t o t a l  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n ( 1 9 8 7 / 8 ) .
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  C E N S O R E D  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  E  M e a n  =  0 . 8 2 6 4 6 ,  S . D .  =  0 . 1 4 3 4
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  2 6 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  3 ,  D e g . F r .  =  2 3
R e s i d u a l s  :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  0 . 4 0 0 7 5 4  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 1 3 2 0 0
F i t :  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 2 2 0 6 8 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 1 5 2 9 1
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [  2 ,  2 3 ]  =  3 . 2 6 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 5 6 8 5
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  1 7 . 3 5 0 1 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( 1 5 = 0 )  L o g - L  =  1 4 . 1 0 8 8
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 1 9 ,  A k a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 1 . 1 0 4
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
S I Z E
P U B O W N
0 . 8 7 5 7 9
0 . 1 4 5 1 1
- 0 . 1 2 2 4 0
0 . 8 9 3 7 5 E - 0 1
0 . 5 9 0 1 6 E - 0 1
0 . 1 0 9 2 2
9 . 7 9 9
2 . 4 5 9
- 1.121
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 1 3 9 4
0 . 2 6 2 4 1
0 . 3 3 1 4
0 . 7 9 5 9
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  C E N S O R E D  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e E
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 2 6
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 4
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 3 . 7 6 9 9 6 4
T h r e s h o l d  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  m o d e l
L o w e r =  0 . 0 0 0 0  U p p e r = 1 . 0 0 0 0
C o n s t a n t
S I Z E
P U B O W N
a
0 . 9 0 3 0 5
0 . 2 0 7 6 7
- 0 . 1 5 3 1 2
0 . 1 5 1 7 3
0 . 1 0 8 5 6
0 . 8 1 8 3 0 E - 0 1
0 . 1 3 1 9 0
0 . 2 5 2 4 6 E - 0 1
8 . 3 1 8
2 . 5 3 8
- 1 . 1 6 1
6 . 0 1 0
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 1 1 1 5
0 . 2 4 5 6 7
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | Z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
0 . 3 3 1 4
0 . 7 9 5 9
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D- Iranian power plants:
Output = electricity production (Q)
Input =capital (K),labour (L) and energy (E)
Line Program Instruction
N v a r  =  6  ;  N a m e s  =
Q,
3 0  o b s e r v s .
6 0
L ,
1  D I S K
2  R e a d  ;  N o b s  = 3 0  
P l a n t ,  N I ,
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d
3  E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .
4  o p e n ; o u t p u t = f 1 5 p 9 4 5 . o u t $
5  c r e a t e ;  l q = l o g ( q ) ; l k = l o g ( k ) ; l l = l o g ( 1 ) ; l e = l o g ( e ) $
6  n a m e l i s t ; p r o d = o n e , I k , 1 1 , l e $
7  f r o n t i e r ; l h s = l q ; r h s = p r o d ; p d s = 2 $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  0 . 0 .
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r .
8  s t o p
E $
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  L Q  M e a n  =  7 . 9 1 3 2 1 ,  S . D .  =  0 . 9 2 0 8
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  3 0 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  4 ,  D e g . F r .  =  2 6
R e s i d u a l s :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  0 . 7 6 9 7 1 6  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 1 7 2 0 6
F i t :  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 6 8 7 0 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 6 5 0 9
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [ 3 ,  2 6 ]  =  2 6 8 . 2 0 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 0 0 0 0
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  1 2 . 3 7 5 8 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( J 5 = 0 )  L o g - L  =  - 3 9 . 5 8 5 1
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 3 4 ,  A k a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 0 . 5 5 8
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
L K
L L
L E
3 . 7 2 1 5  0 . 4 8 2 7 9  
. 1 6 3 6 3 E - 0 1  0 . 1 2 6 2 9  
. 7 7 6 4 4 E - 0 1  0 . 6 3 9 2 6 E - 0 1  
1 . 1 1 7 0  0 . 1 4 1 2 7
7 . 7 0 8
- 0 . 1 3 0
1 . 2 1 5
7 . 9 0 7
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 8 9 6 9 1
0 . 2 2 4 5 2
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  - F R O N T I E R
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 3 0
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 1 5
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 1 6 . 8 0 3 6 9
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s  :  ( v )  = 0 . 0 0 0 3 9
o '  ( u )  = 0 . 0 6 8 3 0
6 . 4 9 8
6 . 0 7 1
3 . 4 2 6
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t 3 . 2 7 4 2 0 . 6 4 0 8 7 5 . 1 0 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L K 0 . 1 2 5 9 5 0 . 1 4 2 2 3 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 3 7 5 8 8 6 . 4 9 8
L L 0 . 1 1 4 4 6 0 . 1 0 4 6 1 1 . 0 9 4 0 . 2 7 3 8 6 6 . 0 7 1
L E 0 . 9 7 1 6 1 0 . 1 6 9 0 0 5 . 7 4 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 4 2 6
o u / o v 1 3 . 2 6 1 5 0 . 4 0 9 0 . 2 6 3 0 . 7 9 2 5 0
V o ^ v + o ^ u 0 . 2 6 2 0 8 0 . 4 7 7 9 3 E - 0 1 5 . 4 8 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
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L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s 3 0
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 29
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n 2 7 . 3 3 9 0 1
F r o n t i e r  m o d e l  e s t i m a t e d  w i t h P A N E L  d a t a .
V a r i a n c e  c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v )  = 0 . 0 0 1 1 5
o ^  ( u )  = 0 . 0 6 7 3 2
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r z = b / s . e . P [ | z | ^ z ] M e a n  o f
C o n s t a n t 3 . 1 4 4 1 0 . 9 3 2 6 2 3 . 3 7 1 0 . 0 0 0 7 5
L K 0 . 1 9 0 9 6 0 . 7 5 8 9 0 E - 0 1 2 . 5 1 6 0 . 0 1 1 8 6 6 . 4 9 8
L L 0 . 9 4 8 2 3 E - 0 1 0 . 1 2 9 2 4 0 . 7 3 4 0 . 4 6 3 1 2 6 . 0 7 1
L E 0 . 9 2 0 0 3 0 . 8 3 6 9 5 E - 0 1 1 0 . 9 9 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 4 2 6
O ^ u / o ^ v 5 8 . 5 7 6 2 9 . 5 5 9 1 . 9 8 2 0 . 0 4 7 5 2
o ^  ( v ) 0 . 1 1 4 9 2 E - 0 2 0 . 4 1 5 1 7 E - 0 3 2 . 7 6 8 0 . 0 0 5 6 4
E- Iranian power plants: 
Output = electricity production (Q) 
Input = capital (K) and energy (E)
L i n e  P r o g r a m  I n s t r u c t i o n
10
11
12
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
20
21
N v a r  =  5  ;  N a m e s  =  
Q ,  K ,
1 6 5  o b s e r v s .
5
0
P a r a m e t e r s
0.0.
D I S K
R e a d  ;  N o b s  = 1 6 5
P l a n t ,  N I ,  ,  ,  E $
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d  
E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n ,  
o p e n ; o u t p u t = f 3 0 p 9 0 5 . o u t $  
c r e a t e ;  l q = l o g ( q ) ; l k = l o g ( k ) ; l e = l o g ( e ) $  
c r e a t e ;  z = l k * l e $
c r e a t e ; m l = ( l k * l k ) / 2  ;  m 2 = ( l e * l e ) / 2 $
n a m e l i s t ; p r o d = o n e , I k , l e , z , m l , m 2 $  L q = l o g  o u t p u t = l h s  v a r i a b l e  
f r o n t i e r ; l h s = l q ; r h s = p r o d ; p d s = n i $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  F u n c t i o n
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  
c r e a t e  ; E p s i l o n = L q - p r o d ' B $  
m a t r i x  ;  T I = G s i z ( p l a n t )
; E B A R  = G x b r ( E p s i l o n , p l a n t )
; P a n e l u = I n i t ( 3 0 , 1 , 0 ) $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  
p r o c
C a l c  ;  G A M M A I = 1  /  ( 1  
; s 2 u  =  L M D A ^ ' 2  *  s ' ^ 2  /
; P S I  =  S q r ( s 2 u  *  G A M M A I )
; M U I =  -  E B A R ( i ) * ( 1 - G A M M A I )
; E S T D U =  M Ü I  +  P S I * N 0 1 ( M U I / P S I ) / p h i ( M U I / P S I ) $
M a t r i x  ;  P A N E L U ( i )  =  E S T D U $
E N D P R O C
E x e c u t e  ; I =  1 , 3 0  $
T h i s  b e g i n s  3 0  r e p e t i t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .  
C A L C ; G A M M A I = 1 /  ( 1 + T I  ( I )  * L M D A ' ' 2 )  ; S 2 U = L M D A ^ 2 * S ' ^ 2 /  ( l + L M D A ' ^ 2 )  ; P S I  
= S Q R ( S 2 U * G A M M A I ) ; M U I = - E B A R ( I ) * ( 1 - G A M M A I ) ; E S T D U = M U I + P S I * N 0 1 ( M  
U I / P S I ) / P H I ( M U I / P S I ) $
M A T R I X ; P A N E L U ( I ) = E S T D U $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  5  i n  o u t p u t .
S T O P $
R e p e t i t i o n s  r e m a i n i n g =  1  
M a t r i x  ;  l i s t ;  P a n e l u $
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  3 5  i n  o u t p u t .
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r ,  
s t o p
4  i n  o u t p u t .
+  T I  ( i )  * L M D A ' ' 2 )  
( 1  +  L M D A ' ^ 2 )
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L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  F R O N T I E R  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  L Q  M e a n  =  6 . 5 4 6 7 8 ,  S . D .  =  1 . 7 7 8 0
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  1 6 5 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  6 ,  D e g . F r .  =  1 5 9
R e s i d u a l s :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  6 . 8 8 8 2 9  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 2 0 8 1 4
F i t :  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 8 6 7 1 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 9 8 6 3 0
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [  5 ,  1 5 9 ]  =  2 3 6 1 . 5 2 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 0 0 0 0
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  2 7 . 9 0 5 3 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( 8 = 0 )  L o g - L  =  - 3 2 8 . 5 7 4 8
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 4 5 ,  A k a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 0 . 2 6 6
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t - 1 2 . 5 2 9 2 . 2 1 6 5  - 5 . 6 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L K 0 9 3 5 3 1 0 . 4 7 9 9 1  1 . 9 4 9 0 . 0 5 1 3 0 1 2 . 5 0
L E 0 5 0 7 6 8 0 . 3 1 9 2 5  1 . 5 9 0 0 . 1 1 1 7 8 1 5 . 9 7
Z - 0 2 5 2 5 0 0 . 1 9 0 3 1 E - 0 1  - 1 3 . 2 6 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 . 3
M l 0 2 5 7 9 0 0 . 4 9 1 1 4 E - 0 1  5 . 2 5 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 7 8 . 7 9
M 2 0 2 3 1 0 8 0 . 2 4 2 6 9 E - 0 1  9 . 5 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 . 9
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  - F R O N T I E R
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f o b s e r v a t i o n s 1 6 5
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 1 3
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  3 1 . 0 3 8 5 6
V a r i a n c e c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v ) =  0 . 0 1 4 9 1
o ^ ( u ) =  0 . 0 7 4 4 8
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e . P [ | Z | ^ Z ] M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t - 1 3 . 3 3 5 2 . 7 3 0 3  - 4 . 8 8 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L K 0 6 0 0 5 8 0 . 5 5 0 5 5  1 . 0 9 1 0 . 2 7 5 3 3 1 2 . 5 0
L E 0 9 0 5 4 2 0 . 3 3 4 9 0  2 . 7 0 4 0 . 0 0 6 8 6 1 5 . 9 7
Z - 0 2 6 2 6 4 0 . 1 6 5 7 1 E - 0 1  - 1 5 . 8 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 . 3
M l 0 3 0 1 4 7 0 . 5 0 4 6 6 E - 0 1  5 . 9 7 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 7 8 . 7 9
M 2 0 2 1 1 3 9 0 . 2 4 5 3 3 E - 0 1  8 . 6 1 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 . 9
o u / o v 2 . 2 3 4 6 0 . 5 6 1 2 4  3 . 9 8 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 7
V o ^ v + o ^ u 0 2 9 8 9 9 0 . 3 3 1 1 7 E - 0 1  9 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  - F R O N T I E R
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s
D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e L Q
N u m b e r  o f o b s e r v a t i o n s 1 6 5
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d 1 5
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  8 3 . 5 3 9 8 3
F r o n t i e r m o d e l  e s t i m a t e d  w i t h  P A N E L  d a t a .
V a r i a n c e c o m p o n e n t s  :  o ^ ( v ) =  0 . 0 1 1 2 0
o ^ ( u ) =  0 . 1 1 0 7 8
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e . P [ | Z | ^ Z ] M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t - 1 4 . 0 6 4 3 . 0 2 9 8  - 4 . 6 4 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
L K L . 0 1 2 9 0 . 5 0 0 8 4  2 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 4 3 1 3 1 2 . 5 0
L E 0 . 7 0 6 6 8 0 . 1 0 6 6 6  6 . 6 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 . 9 7
Z - 0 . 3 0 8 4 3 0 . 6 9 8 2 9 E - 0 2  - 4 4 . 1 6 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 . 3
M l 0 . 3 1 5 8 7 0 . 3 9 4 5 1 E - 0 1  8 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 7 8 . 7 9
M 2 0 . 2 6 4 9 0 0 . 8 5 6 8 7 E - 0 2  3 0 . 9 1 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 . 9
o ^ u / o ^ v 9 . 8 8 6 7 5 . 8 9 7 5  1 . 6 7 6 0 . 0 9 3 6 5
( v ) 0 . 1 1 2 0 5 E - 0 1 0 . 7 1 7 1 0 E - 0 3  1 5 . 6 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
T I = G S I Z ( P L A N T )
M a t r i x  T I  h a s  3 0  r o w s  a n d 1  c o l u m n s .
E B A R = G X B R ( E P S I L O N , P L A N T )
M a t r i x  E B A R  h a s  3 0  r o w s  a n d 1  c o l u m n s .
P A N E L U = I N I T ( 3 0 , 1 , 0 )
M a t r i x  P A N E L U  h a s  3 0  r o w s  a n d 1  c o l u m n s .
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L I S T
P A N E L U
M a t r i x  R e s u l t  i s  3 0  r o w s  b y  1  c o l u m n s .  
L o n g  c o l u m n  v e c t o r  w i l l  b e  d i s p l a y e d  a s  a  r o w .
r o w s 1  - 4 0.4672 0 . 1 0 7 0 0 . 1 8 3 8 0.3089
r o w s 5  - 8 0 . 5 3 3 8 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 2 1 0 . 3 8 7 7 E - 0 1 0 . 5 3 3 9
r o w s 9  - 1 2 0 . 2 6 8 2 0 . 5 0 9 5 E - 0 1 0 . 6 5 9 8 E - 0 1 0 . 5 9 7 7
r o w s 1 3  - 1 6 0 . 4 7 9 5 0 . 3 0 6 5 0 . 2 0 1 5 0 . 9 4 3 9 E
r o w s 1 7  - 2 0 0 . 1 6 4 1 0 . 1 4 7 5 0 . 2 9 5 8 0 . 3 4 3 5
r o w s 2 1  - 2 4 0 . 9 0 1 9 E - 0 1 0 . 6 4 0 1 0 . 5 4 8 8 0 . 4 5 3 2
r o w s 2 5  - 2 8 0 . 4 9 6 3 E - 0 1 0 . 4 2 0 2 0 . 3 5 4 4 E - 0 1 0 . 5 2 1 8
r o w s 2 9  - 3 0 0 . 2 1 1 0 0 . 2 1 6 9
F: Effective factors in efficiency improvement of the Iranian power plants
L i n e  P r o g r a m  I n s t r u c t i o n
N a m e s  =
1 5  o b s e r v s .
D I S K
R e a d  ;  N o b s = 1 5 ;  N v a r =  3  ;
E ,  S t m ,  R D $
C u r r e n t  s a m p l e  
T o t a l  v a r i a b l e s  n o w  
M i s s i n g  v a l u e s  r e a d  
E D I T
T h i s  b e g i n s  1  r e p e t i t i o n s  
o p e n ;  o u t p u t  = c a u s e p . o u t $
t o b i t  ;  I h s  = e ;  r h s  = o n e , s t m , r d ; l i m i t s = 0 , 1 $  
R e s u l t s  b e g i n  o n  p a g e  1  i n  o u t p u t .  
C o n v e r g e n c e  b y :  G r a d i e n t  F u n c t i o n  
E x i t  s t a t u s  f o r  t h i s  m o d e l  c o m m a n d  i s  
E n d  c o m m a n d  e n t r y  f r o m  e d i t o r ,  
e x i t
0
T h e  f i r s t  i s  s h o w n .
P a r a m e t e r s
0.0.
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  v a r i a b l e s  :
E  = E p  = P u r e  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  p o w e r  p l a n t s  c a l c u l a t e d  
f o r  t h r e e  i n p u t  v a r i a b l e s ( c a p i t a l , e n e r g y  a n d  l a b o u r ) i n  1 9 9 5 .  
S T M  =  S tm  = S h a r e  o f  s t e a m  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  o u t  o f  t o t a l  
e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n .
R D  =  L r d  =  S h a r e  o f  R & D  e m p l o y e e s  o u t  o f  t o t a l  e m p l o y e e s  i n  
e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  s e c t o r .
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  C E N S O R E D  R e g r e s s i o n  
O r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  W e i g h t i n g  v a r i a b l e  =  O N E
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  E  M e a n  =  0 . 9 1 2 1 3 ,  S . D .  =  0 . 1 1 2 3
M o d e l  s i z e :  O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  1 5 ,  P a r a m e t e r s  =  3 ,  D e g . F r .  =  1 2
R e s i d u a l s :  S u m  o f  s q u a r e s =  0 . 1 0 1 4 5 1  S t d . D e v .  =  0 . 0 9 1 9 5
F i t :  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 4 2 4 9 6 ,  A d j u s t e d  R - s q u a r e d  =  0 . 3 2 9 1 2
M o d e l  t e s t :  F [ 2 ,  1 2 ]  =  4 . 4 3 ,  P r o b  v a l u e  =  0 . 0 3 6 1 6
D i a g n o s t i c :  L o g - L  =  1 6 . 1 8 7 7 ,  R e s t r i c t e d ( 1 5 = 0 )  L o g - L  =  1 2 . 0 3 7 8
A m e m i y a  P r .  C r t . =  0 . 0 1 0 ,  A l c a i k e  I n f o .  C r t . =  - 1 . 7 5 8
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
S T M
R D
0 . 7 6 9 0 7
0 . 1 8 3 4 3 E - 0 2
0 . 1 6 2 0 9 E - 0 1
0 . 5 3 5 8 8 E - 0 1  
0 . 6 6 6 4 4 E - 0 3  
0 . 1 0 9 4 4 E - 0 1
1 4 . 3 5 2
2 . 7 5 2
1 . 4 8 1
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 5 9 2
0 . 1 3 8 6 0
6 2 . 7 0
1 . 7 3 1
L i m i t e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  M o d e l  -  C E N S O R E D  
M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t e s  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  E
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  1 5
I t e r a t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  5
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  0 . 6 0 0 8 9 2 8
T h r e s h o l d  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  m o d e l  :
L o w e r =  0 . 0 0 0 0  U p p e r =  1 . 0 0 0 0
V a r i a b l e  C o e f f i c i e n t  S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  z = b / s . e .  P [ | z | ^ z ]  M e a n  o f  X
C o n s t a n t
S T M
R D
a
0 . 7 2 0 6 5
0 . 2 8 7 5 0 E - 0 2
0 . 3 8 9 3 1 E - 0 1
0 . 1 2 2 9 6
0 . 8 8 0 2 1 E - 0 1  
0 . 1 0 8 2 9 E - 0 2  
0 . 2 4 0 9 6 E - 0 1  
0 . 3 4 0 7 5 E - 0 1
8 . 1 8 7
2 . 6 5 5
1 . 6 1 6
3.608
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 7 9 3
0 . 1 0 6 1 7
0 . 0 0 0 3 1
6 2 . 7 0
1 . 7 3 1
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Appendix 3
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) results
In this Appendix the efficiency scores for 26 developing countries, Iranian power 
plants and distribution organisations are presented. The efficiency scores were 
calculated using the program DEAP2 developed by Tim Coelli in 1996.
A: 26 Developing counties power plants in 1987-1988
1-Scale assumption; CRS (One output and three inputs)
Output = Electricity production (Gwh) 
Inputl = Capital (MW)
Input 2 = Labour (Total)
Input 3 = Energy (Terajoules)
Results for Argentina (1) 
Technical efïieiency = 0.900 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
27632.000 0.000 0.000 27632.000
8986.000 -897.737 -611.246 7477.017
28233.000 -2820.588 0.000 25412.412
305439.000 -30514.558 0.000 274924.442
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
25 0.359
15 0.230
Results for Bangladesh (2) 
Technical efficiency = 0.664 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
output
input
input
input
5793.000
1864.500
25000.000
70397.000
0.000
-626.436
-8399.523
-23652.048
0.000 5793.000
-86.836 1151.227
-2788.847 13811.630
0.000 46744.952
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.207
Results for Central African republic (3)
Technical efficiency = 0.570 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input 
input ; 
input :
original radial 
value movement
slack projected
18.000
21.000
557.000
255.000
0.000
-9.039
-239.738
-109.754
movement
0.000
-8.384
-274.347
0.000
value
18.000
3.577
42.915
145.246
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
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Results for Costa Rica (4)
Teehnical efficiency = 0.702
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 88.000 0.000 0.000 88.000
input 1 142.000 -42.363 -82.149 17.488
input 2 5757.000 -1717.482 -3829.709 209.809
input 3 1012.000 -301.909 0.000 710.091
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.003
Results for Dominican Republic (5) 
Technical efficiency = 0.879 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
1 4374.000
1070.000
5817.000 
56178.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
16 0.529
24 0.011
0.000
-129.768
-705.476
-6813.230
0.000
0.000
0.000
-478.911
4374.000
940.232
5111.524
48886.359
Results for Egypt (6) 
Technical efficiency = 0.926 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
1 29870.000 
7200.500
33000.000 
300427.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.031
15 0.349
0.000
-533.606
-2445.526
-22263.735
0.000
-95.490
0.000
0.000
29870.000
6571.404
30554.474
278163.765
Results for El Salvador (7) 
Technical efficiency = 0.449 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
output 1 338.500 0.000
input 1 203.000 -111.908
input 2 2795.000 -1540.795
input 3 6087.000 -3355.571
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.012
movement 
0.000 
-23.823 
447.155 
0.000
value
338.500
67.269
807.049
2731.429
Results for Ghana (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.505 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.002
57.000
113.000
5244.000 
910.500
0.000
-55.917
-2594.958
-450.555
slack projected 
movement value
0.000 57.000
-45.755 11.327
-2513.143 135.899
0.000 459.945
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Results for Guatemala (9)
Technical efficiency = 0.831
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input ; 
input :
original radial 
value movement
288.500
333.000
8194.000
2803.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.010
0.000
-56.434
-1388.659
-475.032
slack projected 
movement value
0.000 288.500
-219.233 57.333
-6117.501 687.840
0.000 2327.968
Results for Haiti (10) 
Technical efficiency = 0.691 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.010
267.500
79.500
1674.000
3124.000
slack projected
0.000
-24.570
-517.357
-965.485
movement
0.000
-1.771
-518.872
0.000
value
267.500
53.160
637.772
2158.515
Results for Indonesia (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.866 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial
output 1 
input I 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 0.233
24 0.379
slack projected 
value movement movement value
29970.500 0.000 0.000 29970.500
9000.000 -1206.739 -1413.761 6379.500
51220.000 -6867.685 0.000 44352.315
307872.000 -41280.122 0.000 266591.878
Results for Iran (12)
Technical efficiency = 0.807 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
35314.000 0.000 0.000 35314.000
9391.000 -1811.694
57824.500 -11155.392
417897.500 -80619.986
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
15 0.228
24 0.284
16 1.093
0.000 7579.306
0.000 46669.108
0.000 337277.514
Results for Malaysia (13) 
Technical efficiency = 0.835 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.290
15 0.059
slack projected 
value movement movement value
13063.500 0.000 0.000 13063.500
-569.212 -166.642 2704.147
0.000 24230.206
0.000 111728.333
3440.000
29034.500 -4804.294
133881.500 -22153.167
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Results for Mali (14) 
Technical efficiency = 0.643 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
42.000
1000.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.002
value movement movement value 
66.000 0.000 0.000 66.000
-15.002 -13.882 13.116
-357.190 -485.453 157.357
828.500 -295.932 0.000 532.568
Results for M c x i c O  ( 1 5 )  
Technical efficiency =  1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 83125.000 0.000 0.000 83125.000
input 1 18340.000 0.000 0.000 18340.000
input 2 81671.000 0.000 0.000 81671.000
input 3 777167.500 0.000 0.000 777167.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 1.000
Results for M o r O C C O  ( 1 6 )  
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
16 1.000
value movement movement value 
7683.000 0.000 0.000 7683.000
1661.000
8269.500
87682.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1661.000
8269.500
0.000 87682.000
Results for Nepal (17) 
Technical efficiency = 0.720 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 26.500 0.000 0.000 26.500
input 1 42.000 -11.761 -24.973 5.266
input 2 5132.500 -1437.201 -3632.118 63.181
input 3 297.000 -83.166 0.000 213.834
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
Results for Nicaragua (18)
Technical efficiency = 0.637 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
635.000 0.000 0.000 635.000
248.500 -90.316 -31.992 126.192
4044.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.023
■1469.771 -1060.266 1513.963
8049.500 -2925.550 0.000 5123.950
181
Results for Niger (19)
Technical efficiency = 0.543
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 158.500 0.000 0.000 158.500
input 1 63.000 -28.815 -2.687 31.498
input 2 1000.000 -457.374 -164.732 377.895
input 3 2357.000 -1078.030 0.000 1278.970
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.006
Results for Nigeria (20) 
Technical efficiency = 0.726 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
output 1 
input I 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.275
7705.000
2140.000
32906.000 
85677.500
0.000
-587.074
-9027.220
-23504.212
0.000 
-21.732 
-5508.573 
0.000
7705.000
1531.194
18370.208
62173.288
Results for Pakistan (21) 
Technical efficiency = 0.850 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.702
19698.500
4948.000
150300.000
187077.000
0.000
-743.894
-22596.461
-28125.603
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 19698.500
-289.476 3914.630
-80738.511 46965.027
0.000 158951.397
Results for Peru (22) 
Technical efficiency = 0.657 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.112
3128.500 0.000 0.000 3128.500
1726.000 -591.828 -512.454 621.718
14349.500 -4920.296 -1970.256 7458.948
38417.500 -13172.966 0.000 25244.534
Results for Sri Lanka (23)
Technical efficiency = 0.642 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 366.000 0.000 0.000 366.000
input 1 270.000 -96.615 -100.651 72.734
input 2 15136.000 -5416.141 -8847.245 872.615
input 3 4599.000 -1645.668 0.000 2953.332
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.013
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Results for Thailand (24)
Technical efficiency =  1.000
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 28051.000 0.000 0.000 28051.000
input 1 5574.500 0.000 0.000 5574.500
input 2 66879.000 0.000 0.000 66879.000
input 3 226349.500 0.000 0.000 226349.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.000
Results for Venezuela (25) 
Teehnieal efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 23665.500 0.000 0.000 23665.500
input 1 9063.000 0.000 0.000 9063.000
input 2 18420.000 0.000 0.000 18420.000
input 3 267402.000 0.000 0.000 267402.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
25 1.000
Results for Zambia (26) 
Technical efficiency = 0.680 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 39.000 0.000 0.000 39.000
input 1 191.000 -61.038 -122.212 7.750
input 2 5100.000 -1629.802 -3377.214 92.984
input 3 462.500 -147.801 0.000 314.699
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
2- Scale assumption: VRS (One output and three inputs)
Output = Electricity production (Gwh) 
Inputl = Capital (MW)
Input 2 = Labour (Total)
Input 3 = Energy (Terajoules)
Results for Argentina (1) 
Technical efficiency = 0.904 
Scale efficiency =0.996 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input : 
input :
original radial 
value movement
27632.000
8986.000
28233.000
305439.000
0.000
-865.480
-2719.239
-29418.118
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 27632.000
-548.355 7572.166
0.000 25513.761
0.000 276020.882
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
25
15
3
0.382
0.223
0.394
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Results for Bangladesh (2) 
Teehnieal efficiency = 0.665 
Scale efficiency =0.998 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
5793.000
1864.500
25000.000
70397.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.528
24 0.206
3 0.266
0.000
-624.500
-8373.557
-23578.933
movement 
0.000 
-64.734 
0.000 
0.000
value
5793.000
1175.266
16626.443
46818.067
Results for Central African Republic (3)
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.570 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 18.000 0.000 0.000 18.000
input 1 21.000 0.000 0.000 21.000
input 2 557.000 0.000 0.000 557.000
input 3 255.000 0.000 0.000 255.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 1.000
Results for Costa Rica (4) 
Technical efficiency = 0.788 
Scale efficiency =0.891 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
output
input
input
input
88.000
142.000
5757.000
1012.000
0.000
-30.120
-1221.133
-214.658
slack 
movement 
0.000 
-60.843 
0.000 
0.000
projected 
value 
88.000 
51.037 
4535.867 
797.342
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.837
24 0.002
3 0.161
Results for Dominican Republic (5)
Technical efficiency = 0.888 
Scale efficiency =0.989 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
output 1 4374.000 0.000 0.000 4374.000
input 1 1070.000 -119.635 0.000 950.365
input 2 5817.000 -650.387 0.000 5166.613
input 3 56178.500 -6281.206 -514.558 49382.735
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
24 0.006
16 0.547
3 0.448
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Results for Egypt (6) 
Technical efficiency = 0.927 
Scale efficiency -0.999 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input ] 
input :
original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
29870.000
7200.500
33000.000
300427.500
0.000
-525.713
-2409.353
-21934.418
0.000
-88.024
0.000
0.000
29870.000
6586.763
30590.647
278493.082
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.023
15 0.351
3 0.626
Results for El Salvador (7) 
Technical efficiency = 0.468 
Scale efficiency = 0.959 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 338.500 0.000 0.000 338.500
input 1 203.000 -108.046 -10.334 84.620
input 2 2795.000 -1487.632 0.000 1307.368
input 3 6087.000 -3239.790 0.000 2847.210
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 0.989
24 0.011
15 0.000
Results for Ghana (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.609 
Scale efficiency =0.829 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement imovement value
output 1 57.000 0.000 0.000 57.000
input 1 113.000 -44.157 -29.323 39.520
input 2 5244.000 -2049.176 0.000 3194.824
input 3 910.500 -355.792 0.000 554.708
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.559
24 0.001
3 0.440
Results for Guatemala (9)
Technical efficiency = 0.860 
Scale efficiency =0.966 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial
value movement movement
288.500 0.000 0.000
333.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.991
24 0.009
slack projected 
value 
288.500 
-46.647 -192.630 93.723
8194.000 -1147.814 -1336.420 5709.766
2803.000 -392.644 0.000 2410.356
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Results for Haiti (10) 
Technical efficiency = 0.886 
Scale efficiency =0.780 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 267.500 0.000 0.000 267.500
input 1 79.500 -9.073 0.000 70.427
input 2 1674.000 -191.038 -335.681 1147.281
input 3 3124.000 -356.513 -500.195 2267.292
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.009
3 0.991
Results for Indonesia (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.867 
Scale efficiency = 0.999 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
29970.500
9000.000
51220.000
307872.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 0.234
24 0.375
3 0.391
0.000
-1200.986
-6834.943
-41083.318
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 29970.500
-1410.063 6388.952
0.000 
0.000
44385.057
266788.682
Results for Iran (12) 
Technical efficiency = 0.809 
Scale efficiency =0.998 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 35314.000
9391.000
57824.500
417897.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
15 0.286
24 0.299
16 0.415
0.000
-1797.567
-11068.405
-79991.329
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 35314.000
0.000 7593.433
0.000 46756.095
-11898.578 326007.593
Results for Malaysia (13) 
Technical efficiency = 0.837 
Scale efficiency = 0.997 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input : 
input :
original radial 
value movement
13063.500 
3440.000
29034.500
133881.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
24
15
3
0.283
0.062
0.656
0.000
-561.065
-4735.532
-21836.098
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 13063.500
-159.170 2719.766
0.000 24298.968
0.000 112045.402
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Results for Mali (14) 
Teehnieal efficiency = 0.774 
Scale efficiency =0.830 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 66.000 0.000 0.000 66.000
input 1 42.000 -9.478 -1.573 30.949
input 2 1000.000 -225.674 0.000 774.326
input 3 828.500 -186.971 0.000 641.529
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 0.976
17 0.023
24 0.002
Results for M c x i c O  ( 1 5 )  
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 83125.000 0.000 0.000 83125.000
input 1 18340.000 0.000 0.000 18340.000
input 2 81671.000 0.000 0.000 81671.000
input 3 777167.500 0.000 0.000 777167.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 1.000
Results for M o r O C C O  ( 1 6 )  
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
16 1.000
7683.000
1661.000 
8269.500 
87682.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
movement
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
value
7683.000
1661.000 
8269.500 
87682.000
Results for Nepal (17) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.720 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 26.500 0.000 0.000 26.500
input 1 42.000 0.000 0.000 42.000
input 2 5132.500 0.000 0.000 5132.500
input 3 297.000 0.000 0.000 297.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 1.000
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Results for Nicaragua (18) 
Technical efficiency = 0.649 
Scale efficiency =0.980 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
output 1 635.000
input 1 248.500
input 2 4044.000
input 3 8049.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 0.844
17 0.134
24 0.022
0.000
-87.112
-1417.631
-2821.765
movement 
0.000 
-15.572 
0.000 
0.000
value
635.000
145.816
2626.369
5227.735
Results for Niger (19) 
Technical efficiency = 0.793 
Scale efficiency =0.684 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input : 
input :
original radial 
value movement
slack projected
158.500
63.000
1000.000
2357.000
0.000
-13.042
-207.014
-487.933
movement
0.000 
0.000
0.000
-243.995
value
158.500
49.958
792.986
1625.072
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 0.988
24 0.002
16 0.009
Results for Nigeria (20) 
Technical efficiency = 0.726 
Scale efficiency =0.999 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slaek projected 
movement value
output
input
input
input
7705.000
2140.000
32906.000 
85677.500
0.000 0.000 7705.000
-585.452 0.000 1554.548
-9002.280 -2634.890 21268.830
-23439.276 0.000 62238.224
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.274
17 0.554
3 0.172
Results for Pakistan (21) 
Technical efficiency = 0.850 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable
output 
input ] 
input : 
input :
original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
19698.500
4948.000
150300.000
187077.000
0.000 0.000 19698.500
-743.239 -279.183 3925.578
-22576.547 -79247.552 48475.901
-28100.816 0.000 158976.184
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
17
24
0.298
0.702
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Results for PeiU (22)
Technical efficiency = 0.659 
Scale efficiency =0.997 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 3128.500 0.000 0.000 3128.500
input 1 1726.000 -587.849 -494.386 643.765
input 2 14349.500 -4887.217 0.000 9462.283
input 3 38417.500 -13084.404 0.000 25333.096
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.111
17 0.339
3 0.550
Results for Sri Lanka (23) 
Technical efficiency = 0.660 
Scale efficiency = 0.973 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.988
24 0.012
slack projected 
value movement movement value
366.000 0.000 0.000 366.000
270.000 -91.791 -69.186 109.023
15136.000 -5145.745 -4109.733 5880.522
4599.000 -1563.510 0.000 3035.490
Results for Thailand (24) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 28051.000 0.000 0.000 28051.000
input 1 5574.500 0.000 0.000 5574.500
input 2 66879.000 0.000 0.000 66879.000
input 3 226349.500 0.000 0.000 226349.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.000
Results for Venezuela (25)
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale effieiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 23665.500 0.000 0.000 23665.500
input 1 9063.000 0.000 0.000 9063.000
input 2 18420.000 0.000 0.000 18420.000
input 3 267402.000 0.000 0.000 267402.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
25 1.000
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Results for Zambia (26) 
Technical efficiency = 0.869 
Scale efficiency =0.783 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 39.000 0.000 0.000 39.000
input 1 191.000 -24.959 -124.654 41.387
input 2 5100.000 -666.440 0.000 4433.560
input 3 462.500 -60.437 0.000 402.063
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.000
17 0.840
3 0.159
3- Scale assumption: CRS (One output and two inputs)
Output = Electricity production (Gwh)
Inputl = Capital (MW) 
input 2 = Energy (Terajoules)
Results for Argentina (1)
Technical efficiency = 0.730 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 27632.000 0.000 0.000 27632.000
input 1 8986.000 -2426.278 -1068.489 5491.233
input 2 305439.000 -82470.500 0.000 222968.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.985
Results for Bangladesh (2)
Technical efficiency = 0.664 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 5793.000 0.000 0.000 5793.000
input 1 1864.500 -626.436 -86.836 1151.227
input 2 70397.000 -23652.048 0.000 46744.952
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.207
Results for Central African Republic (3)
Technical efficiency = 0.570 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
1 18.000 0.000 0.000 18.000
1 21.000 -9.039 -8.384 3.577
2 255.000 -109.754 0.000 145.246
output 
input 
input
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
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Results for Costa Rica (4) 
Technical efficiency = 0.702 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
output 1 88.000
input 1 142.000
input 2 1012.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.003
0.000
-42.363
-301.909
movement
0.000
-82.149
0.000
value
88.000
17.488
710.091
Results for Dominican Republic (5)
Technical efficiency = 0.812 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
4374.000 0.000 0.000 4374.000
1070.000 -200.767 0.000 869.233
56178.500 -10540.909 -10342.852 35294.739
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.156
Results for Egypt (6) 
Technical efficiency = 0.824 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.065
original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
29870.000 0.000 0.000 29870.000
7200.500 -1264.515 0.000 5935.985
300427.500 -52759.542 -6640.559 241027.399
Results for El Salvador (7) 
Technical efficiency = 0.449 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
338.500 0.000
203.000 -111.908
6087.000 -3355.571
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.012
slack projected 
movement value
0.000 338.500
-23.823 67.269
0.000 2731.429
Results for Gbaua (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.505 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 57.000
113.000
910.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.002
slack projected 
movement value
0.000
-55.917
-450.555
0.000
-45.755
0.000
57.000
11.327
459.945
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Results for Guatemala (9) 
Technical efficiency = 0.831 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
288.500 0.000output 1 
input 1 333.000
input 2 2803.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.010
-56.434
-475.032
slack projected 
movement value
0.000 288.500
-219.233 57.333
0.000 2327.968
Results for Haiti (10)
Technical efficiency = 0.691 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
267.500 0.000
79.500 -24.570
3124.000 -965.485
slack projected
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.010
movement
0.000
-1.771
0.000
value
267.500
53.160
2158.515
Results for Indonesia (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.786 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
29970.500 0.000 0.000 29970.500
9000.000 -1930.357 -1113.686 5955.957
307872.000 -66033.645 0.000 241838.355
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.068
Results for Iran (12)
Technical efficiency = 0.747 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
35314.000 0.000 0.000 35314.000
9391.000 -2373.143 0.000 7017.857
417897.500 -105604.380 -27336.925 284956.196
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.259
Results for Malaysia (13) 
Technical efficiency = 0.787 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement 
13063.500 
3440.000 
133881.500
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.466
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 0.000 13063.500
•731.501 -112.424 2596.074
28469.333 0.000 105412.167
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Results for Mali (14)
Technical efficiency =  0.643
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
output 1 66.000
input 1 42.000
input 2 828.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.002
0.000
-15.002
-295.932
0.000
-13.882
0.000
66.000
13.116
532.568
Results for McxicO (15) 
Technical efficiency = 0.901 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 2.963
original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
83125.000 0.000 0.000 83125.000
18340.000 -1820.792 0.000 16519.208
777167.500 -77157.040 -29257.111 670753.349
Results for M o r O C C O  ( 1 6 )  
Technical efficiency = 0.919 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.274
original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
7683.000 0.000 0.000 7683.000
1661.000 -134.178 0.000 1526.822
87682.000 -7083.081 -18603.154 61995.765
Results for Nepal (17) 
Technical efficiency = 0.720 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
output 1 
input 1 
input 2
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
26.500 0.000 0.000 26.500
42.000 -11.761 -24.973 5.266
297.000 -83.166 0.000 213.834
Results for Nicaragua (18) 
Technical efficiency = 0.637 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
output 1 635.000
input 1 248.500
input 2 8049.500
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.023
slack projected
0.000
-90.316
-2925.550
movement 
0.000 
-31.992 
0.000
value
635.000
126.192
5123.950
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Results for Niger (19)
Technical efficiency = 0.543 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 158.500 0.000 0.000 158.500
input 1 63.000 -28.815 -2.687 31.498
input 2 2357.000 -1078.030 0.000 1278.970
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.006
Results for Nigeria (20)
Technical efficiency = 0.726 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 7705.000 0.000 0.000 7705.000
input 1 2140.000 -587.074 -21.732 1531.194
input 2 85677.500 -23504.212 0.000 62173.288
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.275
Results for Pakistan (21)
Technical efficiency = 0.850 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 19698.500 0.000 0.000 19698.500
input 1 4948.000 -743.894 -289.476 3914.630
input 2 187077.000 -28125.603 0.000 158951.397
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.702
Results for Peril (22)
Technical efficiency = 0.657 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 3128.500 0.000 0.000 3128.500
input 1 1726.000 -591.828 -512.454 621.718
input 2 38417.500 -13172.966 0.000 25244.534
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.112
Results for Sri Lanka (23)
Technical efficiency = 0.642 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 366.000 0.000 0.000 366.000
input 1 270.000 -96.615 -100.651 72.734
input 2 4599.000 -1645.668 0.000 2953.332
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.013
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Results for Thailand (24)
Technical efficiency = 1.000
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 28051.000
5574.500
226349.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 28051.000
0.000 5574.500
0.000 226349.500
Results for Venezuela (25)
Technical efficiency = 0.714 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
1output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.844
original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value
23665.500 0.000 0.000 23665.500
9063.000 -2590.766 -1769.253 4702.981
267402.000 -76440.035 0.000 190961.965
Results for Zambia (26) 
Technical efficiency = 0.680 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
output 1 
input 1 
input 2
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
39.000 0.000 0.000 39.000
191.000 -61.038 -122.212 7.750
462.500 -147.801 0.000 314.699
4- Scale assumption: VRS (One output and two inputs)
Output = Electricity production (Gwh) 
Inputl = Capital (MW)
Input 2 = Energy (Terajoules)
Results for Argentina (1) 
Technical efficiency = 0.730 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.985
17 0.015
slack projected 
value movement movement value
27632.000 0.000 0.000 27632.000
8986.000 -2426.241 -1067.976 5491.782
305439.000 -82469.257 0.000 222969.743
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Results for Bangladesh (2) 
Technical efficiency = 0.665 
Scale efficiency =0.999 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
5793.000
1864.500
70397.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.206
17 0.794
0.000
-624.687
-23585.995
0.000 5793.000
-59.411 1180.403
0.000 46811.005
Results for Central African Republic (3)
Teehnieal efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.570 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
1 18.000 0.000 0.000 18.000
1 21.000 0.000 0.000 21.000
2 255.000 0.000 0.000 255.000
output 
input 
input
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 1.000
Results for Costa Rica (4) 
Technical efficiency = 0.784 
Scale efficiency = 0.895 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
output 1 88.000
input 1 142.000
input 2 1012.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.002
17 0.998
slack projected
0.000
-30.719
-218.926
movement
0.000
-57.140
0.000
value
88.000
54.141
793.074
Results for Dominican Republic (5)
Technical efficiency = 0.826 
Scale efficiency = 0.983 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 4374.000 0.000 0.000 4374.000
input 1 1070.000 -186.051 0.000 883.949
input 2 56178.500 -9768.292 -11022.769 35387.438
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
3 0.845
24 0.155
Results for Egypt (6) 
Technical efficiency = 0.833 
Scale efficiency = 0.990 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
29870.000
7200.500
300427.500
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.967
15 0.033
0.000
-1204.377
-50250.411
0.000 29870.000
0.000 5996.123
-5635.013 244542.076
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Results for El Salvador (7)
Technical efficiency = 0.464 
Scale efficiency =0.966 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 338.500 0.000 0.000 338.500
input 1 203.000 -108.737 0.000 94.263
input 2 6087.000 -3260.504 0.000 2826.496
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.506
3 0.483
24 0.011
Results for Ghana (8)
Technical efficiency = 0.596 
Scale efficiency = 0.847 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 57.000 0.000 0.000 57.000
input 1 113.000 -45.607 -19.372 48.021
input 2 910.500 -367.480 0.000 543.020
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.001
17 0.999
Results for Guatemala (9)
Technical efficiency = 0.860 
Scale efficiency = 0.966 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 288.500 0.000 0.000 288.500
input 1 333.000 -46.647 -192.630 93.723
input 2 2803.000 -392.644 0.000 2410.356
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.009
17 0.991
Results for Haiti (10)
Technical efficiency = 0.886 
Scale efficiency =0.780 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 267.500 0.000 0.000 267.500
input 1 79.500 -9.073 0.000 70.427
input 2 3124.000 -356.513 -500.195 2267.292
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.009
3 0.991
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Results for Indonesia (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.798 
Scale efficiency =0.985 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
1 29970.500
9000.000
307872.000
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 0.035
24 0.965
0.000
-1821.936
-62324.781
0.000 29970.500
-1158.647 6019.417
0.000 245547.219
Results for Iran (12) 
Technical efficiency = 0.773 
Scale efficiency =0.967 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
35314.000
9391.000 
417897.500
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 0.132
24 0.868
0.000 0.000 35314.000
-2133.023 0.000 7257.977
-94919.058 -23988.656 298989.786
Results for Malaysia (13) 
Technical efficiency = 0.788 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected 
movement value
1 13063.500
3440.000
133881.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.465
17 0.535
0.000
-730.359
-28424.856
0.000 13063.500
-93.922 2615.720
0.000 105456.644
Results for Mali (14) 
Technical efficiency = 0.772 
Scale efficiency =0.833 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
movement value
output 1 66.000 0.000 0.000 66.000
input 1 42.000 -9.581 0.000 32.419
input 2 828.500 -188.992 0.000 639.508
LISTINGOFPEERS:
peer lambda weight
17 0.099
3 0.899
24 0.002
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Results for McxicO (15) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 0.901 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
83125.000
18340.000 
777167.500
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 83125.000
0.000 18340.000
0.000 777167.500
Results for M o r O C C O  ( 1 6 )  
Technical efficiency = 0.927 
Scale efficiency = 0.992 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 7683.000
1661.000 
87682.000
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.273
3 0.727
0.000
-121.519
-6414.828
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 7683.000
0.000 1539.481
19191.662 62075.509
Results for Nepal (17) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.720 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable
output 1 
input 1 
input 2
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 1.000
original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
26.500 0.000 0.000 26.500
42.000 0.000 0.000 42.000
297.000 0.000 0.000 297.000
Results for Nicaragua (18) 
Technical efficiency = 0.647 
Scale efficiency = 0.984 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
output 1 
input 1 
input 2
635.000
248.500
8049.500
slack projected
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.907
3 0.071
24 0.022
0.000
-87.746
-2842.301
movement 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
value
635.000
160.754
5207.199
Results for Niger (19) 
Technical efficiency = 0.775 
Scale efficiency =0.700 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
output 1 158.500
input 1 63.000
input 2 2357.000
LISTINGOFPEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.005
3 0.995
0.000
-14.166
-529.993
movement
0.000
0.000
-438.832
value
158.500
48.834
1388.174
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Results for Nigeria (20)
Technical efficiency = 0.726 
Scale efficiency = 0.999 (1rs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 7705.000 0.000 0.000 7705.000
input 1 2140.000 -585.452 0.000 1554.548
input 2 85677.500 -23439.276 0.000 62238.224
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.274
3 0.172
17 0.554
Results for Pakistan (21)
Technical efficiency = 0.850 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output I 19698.500 0.000 0.000 19698.500
input 1 4948.000 -743.239 -279.183 3925.578
input 2 187077.000 -28100.816 0.000 158976.184
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.702
17 0.298
Results for PcrU (22)
Technical efficiency = 0.659 
Scale efficiency =0.997 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output I 3128.500 0.000 0.000 3128.500
input 1 1726.000 -588.505 -483.109 654.386
input 2 38417.500 -13099.006 0.000 25318.494
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 O .Ill 
17 0.889
Results for Sri Lanka (23)
Technical efficiency = 0.660 
Scale efficiency =0.973 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 366.000 0.000 0.000 366.000
input 1 270.000 -91.791 -69.186 109.023
input 2 4599.000 -1563.510 0.000 3035.490
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 0.988
24 0.012
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Results for Thailand (24) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 28051.000
5574.500
226349.500
output 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 28051.000
0.000 5574.500
0.000 226349.500
Results for Venezuela (25) 
Technical efficiency = 0.714 
Scale efficiency =1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
23665.500
9063.000
267402.000
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.844
17 0.156
0.000
-2590.325
-76427.020
slack projected 
movement value 
0.000 23665.500
1763.945 4708.730
0.000 190974.980
Results for Zambia (26) 
Technical efficiency =  0.860 
Scale efficiency = 0.791 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial
value movement
output 1 39.000 0.000
input 1 191.000 -26.708
input 2 462.500 -64.672
slack projected
movement
0.000
-119.825
0.000
value
39.000
44.468
397.828
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
24 0.000
17 1.000
B: Iranian power plants
1 Scale assumption: CRS (One output and three inputs) in 1995
Output = Electricity production (Mwh) 
Inputl = Capital (MW)
Input 2 = Labour (generating sectors) 
Input 3 = Energy (Btu)
Results for Shahid Firozi, Tarasht (1) 
Technical efficiency = 0.532 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
Ioutput 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.043
186.906
70.000
144.000 
2.962
0.000
-32.754
-67.379
-1.386
movement
0.000
- 1.002
-47.930
0.000
value
186.906
36.244
28.691
1.576
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Results for Montazcr Ghaem (2)
Technical efficiency = 0.901 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output I 5233.720 0.000 0.000 5233.720
input I 1204.000 -119.183 0.000 1084.817
input 2 586.000 -58.008 0.000 527.992
input 3 53.680 -5.314 0.000 48.367
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.179
5 0.404
7 0.354
Results for Loshan, Shahid Beheshti (3)
Technical efficiency = 0.813 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1488.387 0.000 0.000 1488.387
input 1 344.760 -64.309 0.000 280.451
input 2 396.000 -73.867 -107.748 214.385
input 3 15.819 -2.951 0.000 12.868
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.251
7 0.090
Results for Neka, Salimi (4) 
Technical efficiency = 0.880 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
output
input
input
input
8759.371
1942.000
1007.000 
95.495
0.000
-233.117
-120.880
-11.463
movement
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
value
8759.371
1708.883
886.120
84.032
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 0.285
7 1.247
13 0.622
Results for Shahid Raj aie (5) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
slack projected
Ioutput 
input I 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 1.000
7064.862
1622.500
540.000
66.954
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
movement
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
value
7064.862
1622.500
540.000
66.954
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Results for Bcsat (6)
Technical efficiency =  0.814
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1562.609 0.000 0.000 1562.609
input 1 366.500 -68.328 0.000 298.172
input 2 334.000 -62.269 -40.212 231.520
input 3 16.427 -3.063 0.000 13.364
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.307
7 0.053
Results for Tabriz (7) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4536.145 0.000 0.000 4536.145
input 1 789.000 0.000 0.000 789.000
input 2 540.000 0.000 0.000 540.000
input 3 41.784 0.000 0.000 41.784
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
7 • 1.000
Results for Mashad (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.685 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial 
value movement
1 1304.450
319.740
374.000
20.815
output 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS; 
peer lambda weight 
7 0.031
9 0.324
0.000
-100.861
-117.977
-6.566
slack projected
movement
0.000
0.000
-81.187
0.000
value
1304.450
218.879
174.837
14.249
Results for Tous Steam (9) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 3591.871 0.000 0.000 3591.871
input 1 600.000 0.000 0.000 600.000
input 2 488.000 0.000 0.000 488.000
input 3 39.987 0.000 0.000 39.987
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
9 1.000
Results for Isfahan, Islam Abad (10) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4306.004 0.000 0.000 4306.004
input 1 835.000 0.000 0.000 835.000
input 2 661.000 0.000 0.000 661.000
input 3 36.307 0.000 0.000 36.307
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
10' 1.000
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Results for Ramin, Ahwaz (11)
Technical efficiency =  0.916
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4379.797 0.000 0.000 4379.797
input 1 1260.000 -105.642 -305.048 849.310
input 2 848.000 -71.099 -104.573 672.328
input 3 40.309 -3.380 0.000 36.929
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
10 1.017
Results for R c y  ( 1 2 )
Technical efficiency = 0.543
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1497.471 0.000 0.000 1497.471
input 1 1028.500 -469.613 -268.505 290.383
input 2 448.000 -204.557 -13.572 229.872
input 3 23.235 •-10.609 0.000 12.626
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.348
Results for Qum (13) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1755.488 0.000 0.000 1755.488
input 1 423.000 0.000 0.000 423.000
input 2 95.000 0.000 0.000 95.000
input 3 20.692 0.000 0.000 20.692
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
13 1.000
Results for Gilan (14) 
Technical efficiency = 0.784 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 2471.831 0.000 0.000 2471.831
input 1 814.500 -175.966 -64.111 574.423
input 2 224.000 -48.393 0.000 175.607
input 3 31.641 -6.836 0.000 24.805
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
5 0.265
13 0.340
Results for Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan (15)
Technical efficiency = 0.845 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
5899.279 0.000 0.000 5899.279
1320.000 -204.950 0.000 1115.050
-115.517 0.000 628.483
-10.241 0.000 55.717
744.000
65.957
output 1 
input 1 
input 2 
input 3 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 0.154
13 0.240
7 0.967
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2- Scale assumption: VRS (One output and three inputs) in 1995
Output = Electricity production (Mwh)
Inputl = Capital (MW)
Input 2 = Labour (generating sectors)
Input 3 = Energy (Btu)
Results for Shahid Firozi, Tarasht (1) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 0.532 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 186.906 0.000 0.000 186.906
input 1 70.000 0.000 0.000 70.000
input 2 144.000 0.000 0.000 144.000
input 3 2.962 0.000 0.000 2.962
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
1 1.000
Results for Montazer Ghaem (2)
Technical efficiency = 0.905
Scale efficiency =0.996 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 5233.720 0.000 0.000 5233.720
input 1 1204.000 -114.865 0.000 1089.135
input 2 586.000 -55.906 0.000 530.094
input 3 53.680 -5.121 0.000 48.559
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.154
5 0.414
7 0.360
1 0.072
Results for Loshan, Shahid Beheshti (3) 
Technical efficiency = 0.877 
Scale efficiency = 0.927 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 1488.387 0.000 0.000 1488.387
input 1 344.760 -42.345 0.000 302.415
input 2 396.000 -48.639 -55.711 291.650
input 3 15.819 -1.943 0.000 13.876
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.205
7 0.105
1 0.690
Results for Neka, Salimi (4)
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.880 (drs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 8759.371 0.000 0.000 8759.371
input 1 1942.000 0.000 0.000 1942.000
input 2 1007.000 0.000 0.000 1007.000
input 3 95.495 0.000 0.000 95.495
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
4 1.000
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Results for Shahid Raj aie (5) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 7064.862 0.000 0.000 7064.862
input 1 1622.500 0.000 0.000 1622.500
input 2 540.000 0.000 0.000 540.000
input 3 66.954 0.000 0.000 66.954
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
5 1.000
Results for Bcsat (6)
Technical efficiency = 0.885
Scale efficiency =0.919 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1562.609 0.000 0.000 1562.609
input 1 366.500 -42.029 0.000 324.471
input 2 334.000 -38.302 0.000 295.698
input 3 16.427 -1.884 0.000 14.543
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
10 0.220
5 0.021
7 0.076
1 0.684
Results for Tabriz (7)
Technical efficiency = 1.000
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4536.145 0.000 0.000 4536.145
input 1 789.000 0.000 0.000 789.000
input 2 540.000 0.000 0.000 540.000
input 3 41.784 0.000 0.000 41.784
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
7 1.000
Results for Mashad (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.763 
Scale efficiency = 0.897 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack p
value movement movement
output 1 1304.450 0.000 0.000
input 1 319.740 -75.789 0.000
input 2 374.000 -88.650 -28.446
input 3 20.815 -4.934 -0.767
rojected 
value 
1304.450 
243.951 
256.904 
15.114
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
1 0.672
9 0.328
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Results for Tous Steam (9) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 3591.871 0.000 0.000 3591.871
input 1 600.000 0.000 0.000 600.000
input 2 488.000 0.000 0.000 488.000
input 3 39.987 0.000 0.000 39.987
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
9 1.000
Results for Isfahan, Islam Abad (10) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =1.000 (crs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4306.004 0.000 0.000 4306.004
input 1 835.000 0.000 0.000 835.000
input 2 661.000 0.000 0.000 661.000
input 3 36.307 0.000 0.000 36.307
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 1.000
Results for Ramin, Ahwaz (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.921 
Scale efficiency = 0.995 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 4379.797 0.000 0.000 4379.797
input 1 1260.000 -99.467 -304.469 856.064
input 2 848.000 -66.943 -123.293 657.764
input 3 40.309 -3.182 0.000 37.127
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 0.027
10 0.973
Results for Rcy (12)
Technical efficiency = 0.611 
Scale efficiency =0.890 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 1497.471 0.000 0.000 1497.471
input 1 1028.500 -400.327 -294.244 333.929
input 2 448.000 -174.377 0.000 273.623
input 3 23.235 -9.044 0.000 14.191
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.194
5 0.075
1 0.732
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Results for Qum (13) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1755.488 0.000 0.000 1755.488
input 1 423.000 0.000 0.000 423.000
input 2 95.000 0.000 0.000 95.000
input 3 20.692 0.000 0.000 20.692
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
13 1.000
Results for Gilan (14) 
Technical efficiency = 0.829 
Scale efficiency = 0.945 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 2471.831 0.000 0.000 2471.831
input 1 814.500 -138.980 -90.449 585.071
input 2 224.000 -38.222 0.000 185.778
input 3 31.641 -5.399 0.000 26.242
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 0.185
13 0.644
1 0.170
Results for Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan (15)
Technical efficiency = 0.891 
Scale efficiency = 0.949 (drs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 5899.279 0.000 0.000 5899.279
input 1 1320.000 -144.439 0.000 1175.561
input 2 744.000 -81.411 0.000 662.589
input 3 65.957 -7.217 -0.323 58.417
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
7 0.637
4 0.263
5 0.101
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C: Iranian distribution organisations for electricity
1- Scale assumption: CRS ( Four outputs and three inputs) in 1995
Output 1 = Electricity sales to residential customers (measured in Gwh)
Output2 = Electricity sales to industrial customers (measured in Gwh)
Outputs = Number of residential customers 
Output 4= Number o f industrial customers 
Input 1 = Network size (measured in KM)
Input 2 = Transformer capacity (measured in MVA)
Input 3 = Labour (numbers o f employees in distribution sectors)
Results for Azarbaij an Sharghi (1)
Technical efficiency = 0.694 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 1071.938 0.000 0.000 1071.938
output 2 510.796 0.000 174.618 685.414
output 3 387370.000 0.000 51907.532 439277.532
output 4 2799.000 0.000 0.000 2799.000
input 1 7842.000 -2399.451 0.000 5442.549
input 2 1547.000 -473.342 0.000 1073.658
input 3 1363.000 -417.043 0.000 945.957
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
27 0.066
14 0.088
21 0.600 
22 0.160
Results for Azarbaij an Garbi (2)
Technical efficiency = 0.631
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 723.899 0.000 0.000 723.899
output 2 240.978 0.000 0.000 240.978
output 3 228114.000 0.000 16025.086 244139.086
output 4 1394.000 0.000 0.000 1394.000
input 1 5998.000 -2212.606 0.000 3785.394
input 2 1245.000 -459.269 -26.893 758.838
input 3 939.000 -346.388 0.000 592.612
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight 
9 0.001
21 0.253
22 0.703
6 0.029
Results for Ardcbil (3) 
Technical efficiency = 0.693 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 267.792 0.000 0.000 267.792
output 2 44.300 0.000 72.152 116.452
output 3 98973.000 0.000 41527.192 140500.192
output 4 473.000 0.000 502.949 975.949
input 1 3601.000 -1106.606 -891.081 1603.313
input 2 303.000 -93.113 0.000 209.887
input 3 425.000 -130.605 -69.812 224.583
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.230
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Results for Isfahan (4)
Technical efficiency =  1.000
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1530.024 0.000 0.000 1530.024
output 2 3526.940 0.000 0.000 3526.940
output 3 817619.000 0.000 0.000 817619.000
output 4 8233.000 0.000 0.000 8233.000
input 1 12998.000 0.000 0.000 12998.000
input 2 2589.000 0.000 0.000 2589.000
input 3 1914.000 0.000 0.000 1914.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
4 1.000
Results for Char Mahal Bakhtiari (5) 
Technical efficiency = 0.658 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 188.781 0.000 32.453 221.234
output 2 50.494 0.000 45.712 96.206
output 3 116073.000 0.000 0.000 116073.000
output 4 556.000 0.000 250.272 806.272
input 1 2503.000 -856.191 -322.246 1324.563
input 2 283.000 -96.805 -12.799 173.396
input 3 282.000 -96.463 0.000 185.537
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.190
Results for Markazi (6) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 466.308 0.000 0.000 466.308
output 2 2665.688 0.000 0.000 2665.688
output 3 270520.000 0.000 0.000 270520.000
output 4 1654.000 0.000 0.000 1654.000
input 1 4724.000 0.000 0.000 4724.000
input 2 1055.000 0.000 0.000 1055.000
input 3 577.000 0.000 0.000 577.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
6 1.000
Results for Hamadan (7) 
Technical efficiency = 0.747 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement imovement value
output 1 497.582 0.000 0.000 497.582
output 2 117.336 0.000 175.078 292.414
output 3 255782.000 0.000 5675.409 261457.409
output 4 1884.000 0.000 0.000 1884.000
input 1 4127.000 -1045.933 0.000 3081.067
input 2 794.000 -201.229 -165.854 426.917
input 3 596.000 -151.048 -10.894 434.058
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.392
4 0.027
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Results for Lorcstaii (8)
Technical efficiency =  0.637
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 345.590 0.000 37.326 382.916
output 2 654.952 0.000 0.000 654.952
output 3 178522.000 0.000 0.000 178522.000
output 4 1042.000 0.000 107.164 1149.164
input 1 3644.000 -1322.994 0.000 2321.006
input 2 749.000 -271.933 0.000 477.067
input 3 609.000 -221.104 -25.142 362.754
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
6 0.157
21 0.195
14 0.033
Results for Tehran (9) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY: 
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value 
output 1 5125.654 0.000 0.000 5125.654
output 2 3068.754 0.000
output 3 1910161.000 0.000
output 4 4765.000 0.000
input 1 29657.000 0.000
input 2 6306.000 0.000
input 3 4216.000 0.000
0.000 3068.754
0.000 1910161.000 
0.000 4765.000
0.000 29657.000
6306.000
4216.000
0.000
0.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
9 1.000
Results for Gharb Tehran (10)
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
762.303 0.000 0.000 762.303output 1
output
output
output
input
input
input
792.547
324070.000
1306.000
3810.000
1064.000
702.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 792.547
0.000 324070.000 
0.000 1306.000
0.000 3810.000
0.000 1064.000
0.000 702.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 1.000
Results for Qum (11) 
Technical efficiency = 0.869 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 357.723 0.000 0.000 357.723
output 2 190.889 0.000 0.000 190.889
output 3 160378.000 0.000 11518.9231 171896.923
output 4 1018.000 0.000 0.000 1018.000
input 1 2660.000 -349.453 -175.744 2134.803
input 2 656.000 -86.181 -237.443 332.376
input 3 345.000 -45.324 0.000 299.676
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.214
6 0.007
9 0.021
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Results for Khorasan (12)
Technical efficiency =  0.717
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 921.540 0.000 194.917 1116.457
output 2 270.084 0.000 215.419 485.503
output 3 585762.000 0.000 0.000 585762.000
output 4 1828.000 0.000 2240.849 4068.849
input 1 9318.000 -2633.600 0.000 6684.400
input 2 1398.000 -395.125 -127.833 875.042
input 3 1422.000 -401.908 -83.778 936.314
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.957
Results for Mashad (13) 
Technical efficiency = 0.962 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 890.961 0.000 0.000 890.961
output 2 519.052 0.000 0.000 519.052
output 3 444860.000 0.000 7008.809 451868.1
output 4 3168.000 0.000 0.000 3168.000
input 1 5473.000 -210.307 0.000 5262.693
input 2 1572.000 -60.406 -737.733 773.861
input 3 985.000 -37.850 -176.960 770.190
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
4 0.025
21 0.689
14 0.020
Results for Khozcstan (14) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 2492.586 0.000 0.000 2492.586
output 2 4149.409 0.000 0.000 4149.409
output 3 510586.000 0.000 0.000 510586.000
output 4 1872.000 0.000 0.000 1872.000
input 1 6633.000 0.000 0.000 6633.000
input 2 4024.000 0.000 0.000 4024.000
input 3 2465.000 0.000 0.000 2465.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
14 1.000
Results for Kokeeloeh & Booyer Ahmad (15) 
Technical efficiency = 0.582 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 115.153 0.000 0.000
output 2 15.719 0.000 56.492
output 3 54660.000 0.000
output 4 98.000 0.000
input 1 1081.000 -451.426
input 2 283.000 -118.181
input 3 322.000 -134.467
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.083
14 0.007
115.153 
72.211 
0.000 54660.000
367.589 
629.574 
105.203 
99.278
269.589
0.000
-59.616
-88.255
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Results for Zanjaii (16)
Technical efficiency =  0.822
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 204.576 0.000 75.272 279.848
output 2 169.720 0.000 0.000 169.720
output 3 147330.000 0.000 0.000 147330.000
output 4 812.000 0.000 207.002 1019.002
input 1 3314.000 -590.582 -1010.248 1713.170
input 2 478.000 -85.183 -160.035 232.781
input 3 290.000 -51.680 0.000 238.320
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.232
6 0.019
Results for Ghazvceii (17) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 300.292 0.000 0.000 300.292
output 2 603.186 0.000 0.000 603.186
output 3 169616.000 0.000 0.000 169616.000
output 4 1447.000 0.000 0.000 1447.000
input 1 2598.000 0.000 0.000 2598.000
input 2 627.000 0.000 0.000 627.000
input 3 342.000 0.000 0.000 342.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 1.000
Results for Kemianshah (18) 
Technical efficiency = 0.852 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 273.577 0.000 224.554 498.131
output 2 96.925 0.000 119.692 216.617
output 3 261350.000 0.000 0.000 261350.000
output 4 869.000 0.000 946.402 1815.402
input 1 3499.000 -516.615 0.000 2982.385
input 2 828.000 -122.251 -315.331 390.418
input 3 629.000 -92.870 -118.374 417.756
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.427
Results for Kordestan (19) 
Technical efficiency = 0.793 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 327.126 0.000 46.162 373.288
output 2 55.366 0.000 106.962 162.328
output 3 195850.000 0.000 0.000 195850.000
output 4 712.000 0.000 648.423 1360.423
input 1 2818.000 -583.065 0.000 2234.935
input 2 501.000 -103.661 -104.768 292.571
input 3 433.000 -89.591 -30.352 313.057
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.320
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Results for Ham (20)
Technical efficiency = 0.629
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 105.684 0.000 30.043 135.727
output 2 15.019 0.000 44.003 59.022
output 3 71211.000 0.000 0.000 71211.000
output 4 462.000 0.000 32.649 494.649
input 1 1291.000 -478.378 0.000 812.622
input 2 288.000 -106.718 -74.903 106.379
input 3 282.000 -104.495 -63.678 113.828
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.116
Results for Fars (21) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1166.163 0.000 0.000 1166.163
output 2 507.118 0.000 0.000 507.118
output 3 611841.000 0.000 0.000 611841.000
output 4 4250.000 0.000 0.000 4250.000
input 1 6982.000 0.000 0.000 6982.000
input 2 914.000 0.000 0.000 914.000
input 3 978.000 0.000 0.000 978.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 1.000
Results forBushehr (22) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 582.065 0.000 0.000 582.065
output 2 44.716 0.000 0.000 44.716
output 3 112668.000 0.000 0.000 112668.000
output 4 378.000 0.000 0.000 378.000
input 1 2626.000 0.000 0.000 2626.000
input 2 696.000 0.000 0.000 696.000
input 3 460.000 0.000 0.000 460.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
22 1.000
Results for Shiraz (23) 
Technical efficiency = 0.897 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 544.423 0.000 0.000 544.423
output 2 385.574 0.000 0.000 385.574
output 3 243599.000 0.000 34947.209 278546.209
output 4 2025.000 0.000 0.000 2025.000
input 1 3721.000 -381.832 0.000 3339.168
input 2 1211.000 -124.267 -582.125 504.608
input 3 745.000 -76.448 -182.077 486.475
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
14 0.010
4 0.042
21 0.392
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Results for Kerman (24)
Technical efficiency =  0.507
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 713.440 0.000 35.554 748.994
output 2 983.364 0.000 0.000 983.364
output 3 359647.000 0.000 0.000 359647.000
output 4 589.000 0.000 1399.117 1988.117
input 1 8764.000 -4319.745 0.000 4444.255
input 2 1873.000 -923.195 -10.480 939.325
input 3 1364.000 -672.311 0.000 691.689
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.247
6 0.174
10 0.498
Results for Gilan (25)
Technical efficiency = 0.800 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 760.488 0.000 46.741 807.229
output 2 560.094 0.000 0.000 560.094
output 3 415226.000 0.000 9382.745 424608.745
output 4 3136.000 0.000 0.000 3136.000
input 1 11255.000 -2252.627 -3889.006 5113.366
input 2 1170.000 -234.169 -201.614 734.217
input 3 904.000 -180.931 0.000 723.069
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.596
4 0.073
Results for Mazandaran (26) 
Technical efficiency = 0.690 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1385.912 0.000 0.000 1385.912
output 2 653.798 0.000 0.000 653.798
output 3 694512.000 0.000 0.000 694512.000
output 4 4438.000 0.000 26.930 4464.930
input 1 14308.000 -4440.365 -1600.984 8266.652
input 2 2096.000 -650.476 -258.553 1186.971
input 3 1682.000 -521.994 0.000 1160.006
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 1.001 
6 0.006 
9 0.042
Results for Hormozgan (27)
Technical efficiency =  1.000 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 912.873 0.000 0.000 912.873
output 2 135.428 0.000 0.000 135.428
output 3 142902.000 0.000 0.000 142902.000
output 4 382.000 0.000 0.000 382.000
input 1 3823.000 0.000 0.000 3823.000
input 2 912.000 0.000 0.000 912.000
input 3 1046.000 0.000 0.000 1046.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
27 1.000
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Results for Yazd (28)
Technical efficiency = 0.633
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 298.810 0.000 49.024 347.834
output 2 373.297 0.000 0.000 373.297
output 3 181250.000 0.000 0.000 181250.000
output 4 970.000 0.000 262.270 1232.270
input 1 3490.000 -1279.446 0.000 2210.554
input 2 537.000 -196.866 0.000 340.134
input 3 488.000 -178.903 0.000 309.097
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
10
14
21
6
0.001
0.004
0.255
0.085
Results for Semnan (29) 
Technical efficiency = 0.909 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 158.913 0.000 49.465 208.378
output 2 294.085 0.000 47.026 341.111
output 3 110630.000 0.000 0.000 110630.000
output 4 992.000 0.000 0.000 992.000
input 1 1742.000 -158.483 0.000 1583.517
input 2 528.000 -48.036 -194.983 284.981
input 3 664.000 
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.064 
4 0.088
-60.409 -373.612 229.979
Results for Sistan & Baloochestan (30) 
Technical efficiency = 0.561 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 396.676 0.000 0.000 396.676
output 2 79.851 0.000 287.744 367.595
output 3 157386.000 0.000 0.000 157386.000
output 4 252.000 0.000 734.662 986.662
input I 3295.000 -1447.670 0.000 1847.330
input 2 1124.000 -493.833 -187.499 442.667
input 3 1837.000 -807.092 -673.396 356.512
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
14 0.064
21 0.204
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2- Scale assumption: VRS ( Four outputs and three inputs) in 1995
Outputl = Electricity sales to residential customers (measured in Gwh)
Output! = Electricity sales to industrial customers (measured in Gwh)
Outputs = Number of residential customers 
Output 4= Number o f industrial customers 
Input 1 = Network size (measured in KM)
Input 2 = Transformer capacity (measured in MVA)
Input 3 = Labour (numbers o f employees in distribution sectors)
Results for Azarbaij an Sharghi (1) 
Technical efficiency = 0.702 
Scale efficiency =0.989 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output I 1071.938 0.000 0.000 1071.938
output 2 510.796 0.000 144.362 655.158
output 3 387370.000 0.000 53524.888 440894.1
output 4 2799.000 0.000 0.000 2799.000
input I 7842.000 -2340.283 0.000 5501.717
input 2 1547.000 -461.670 0.000 1085.330
input 3 1363.000 -406.759 -27.814 928.427
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
21
22
14
15
0.596
0.291
0.082
0.031
Results for Azarbaijan Gharbi (2) 
Technical efficiency = 0.631 
Scale efficiency =  0.999 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 723.899 0.000 0.000 723.899
output 2 240.978 0.000 0.000 240.978
output 3 228114.000 0.000 14908.599 243022.599
output 4 1394.000 0.000 0.000 1394.000
input 1 5998.000 -2210.447 -5.622 3781.931
input 2 1245.000 -458.821 -25.217 760.963
input 3 939.000 -346.050 0.000 592.950
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
21
6
22
17
0.251
0.029
0.714
0.005
Results for Ardebil (3) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.693 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 267.792 0.000 0.000 267.792
output 2 44.300 0.000 0.000 44.300
output 3 98973.000 0.000 0.000 98973.000
output 4 473.000 0.000 0.000 473.000
input 1 3601.000 0.000 0.000 3601.000
input 2 303.000 0.000 0.000 303.000
input 3 425.000 0.000 0.000 425.000
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
3 1.000
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Results for Isfahan (4) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1530.024 0.000 0.000 1530.024
output 2 3526.940 0.000 0.000 3526.940
output 3 817619.000 0.000 0.000 817619.000
output 4 8233.000 0.000 0.000 8233.000
input 1 12998.000 0.000 0.000 12998.000
input 2 2589.000 0.000 0.000 2589.000
input 3 1914.000 0.000 0.000 1914.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
4 1.000
Results for Char Mahal Bakhtiari (5) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.658 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 188.781 0.000 0.000 188.781
output 2 50.494 0.000 0.000 50.494
output 3 116073.000 0.000 0.000 116073.000
output 4 556.000 0.000 0.000 556.000
input 1 2503.000 0.000 0.000 2503.000
input 2 283.000 0.000 0.000 283.000
input 3 282.000 0.000 0.000 282.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
5 I.OOO
Results for Markazi (6) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 466.308 0.000 0.000 466.308
output 2 2665.688 0.000 0.000 2665.688
output 3 270520.000 0.000 0.000 270520.000
output 4 1654.000 0.000 0.000 1654.000
input 1 4724.000 0.000 0.000 4724.000
input 2 1055.000 0.000 0.000 1055.000
input 3 577.000 0.000 0.000 577.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
6 I.OOO
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Results for Hamadan (7) 
Technical efficiency = 0.833 
Scale efficiency =0.897 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 497.582 0.000 0.000 497.582
output 2 117.336 0.000 357.070 474.406
output 3 255782.000 0.000 0.000 255782.000
output 4 1884.000 0.000 0.000 1884.000
input I 4127.000 -690.985 0.000 3436.015
input 2 794.000 -132.940 0.000 661.060
input 3 596.000 -99.789 0.000 496.211
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
10 0.008
17 0.551
20 0.150
21 0.230
14 0.003
22 0.057
Results for Lorcstan (8) 
Technical efficiency = 0.748 
Scale efficiency =0.851 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 345.590 0.000 0.000 345.590
output 2 654.952 0.000 0.000 654.952
output 3 178522.000 0.000 0.000 178522.000
output 4 1042.000 0.000 26.166 1068.166
input 1 3644.000 -917.788 0.000 2726.212
input 2 749.000 -188.645 0.000 560.355
input 3 609.000 -153.384 0.000 455.616
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
20 0.060 
6 0.197
15 0.487
22 0.037
21 0.120 
17 0.099
Results for Tehran (9) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 5125.654 0.000 0.000 5125.654
output 2 3068.754 0.000 0.000 3068.754
output 3 1910161.000 0.000 0.000 1910161.000
output 4 4765.000 0.000 0.000 4765.000
input 1 29657.000 0.000 0.000 29657.000
input 2 6306.000 0.000 0.000 6306.000
input 3 4216.000 0.000 0.000 4216.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
9 I.OOO
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Results for Gharb Tehran (10)
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected 
value movement movement value 
output 1 762.303 0.000 0.000 762.303
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
output
output
output
input
input
input
792.547
324070.000 
1306.000
3810.000
1064.000
702.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 792.547
0.000 324070.000 
0.000 1306.000
0.000 3810.000
0.000 1064.000
0.000 702.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 I.OOO
Results for Qum (11) 
Technical efficiency = I.OOO 
Scale efficiency =0.869 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 357.723 0.000 0.000 357.723
output 2 190.889 0.000 0.000 190.889
output 3 160378.000 0.000 0.000 160378.000
output 4 1018.000 0.000 0.000 1018.000
input I 2660.000 0.000 0.000 2660.000
input 2 656.000 0.000 0.000 656.000
input 3 345.000 0.000 0.000 345.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
I I  I.OOO
Results for Khorasan (12) 
Technical efficiency = 0.718 
Scale efficiency =0.998 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 921.540 0.000 208.024 1129.564
output 2 270.084 0.000 262.901 532.985
output 3 585762.000 0.000 0.000 585762.000
output 4 1828.000 0.000 2155.203 3983.203
input I 9318.000 -2623.460 0.000 6694.540
input 2 1398.000 -393.603 -76.803 927.594
input 3 1422.000 -400.361 -68.652 952.988
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.909
10 0.091
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Results for Mashad ( 1 3 )  
Technical efficiency = 0.976 
Scale efficiency =0.985 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 890.961 0.000 0.000 890.961
output 2 519.052 0.000 26.577 545.629
output 3 444860.000 0.000 8137.748 452997.7
output 4 3168.000 0.000 0.000 3168.000
input 1 5473.000 -131.241 0.000 5341.759
input 2 1572.000 -37.696 -650.918 883.386
input 3 985.000 -23.620 -38.287 923.093
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.660 
14 0.029
29 0.311
Results for K h o Z C S ta i l  ( 1 4 )  
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 2492.586 0.000 0.000 2492.586
output 2 4149.409 0.000 0.000 4149.409
output 3 510586.000 0.000 0.000 510586.000
output 4 1872.000 0.000 0.000 1872.000
input 1 6633.000 0.000 0.000 6633.000
input 2 4024.000 0.000 0.000 4024.000
input 3 2465.000 0.000 0.000 2465.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
14 1.000
Results for Kokeeloeh & Booyer Ahmad (15) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.582 (irs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 115.153 0.000 0.000 115.153
output 2 15.719 0.000 0.000 15.719
output 3 54660.000 0.000 0.000 54660.000
output 4 98.000 0.000 0.000 98.000
input 1 1081.000 0.000 0.000 1081.000
input 2 283.000 0.000 0.000 283.000
input 3 322.000 0.000 0.000 322.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
15 1.000
221
Results for Zanjan (16) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.822 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 204.576 0.000 0.000 204.576
output 2 169.720 0.000 0.000 169.720
output 3 147330.000 0.000 0.000 147330.000
output 4 812.000 0.000 0.000 812.000
input 1 3314.000 0.000 0.000 3314.000
input 2 478.000 0.000 0.000 478.000
input 3 290.000 0.000 0.000 290.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
16 I.OOO
Results for Ghazvceii (17) 
Technical efficiency =  I.OOO 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 300.292 0.000 0.000 300.292
output 2 603.186 0.000 0.000 603.186
output 3 169616.000 0.000 0.000 169616.000
output 4 1447.000 0.000 0.000 1447.000
input 1 2598.000 0.000 0.000 2598.000
input 2 627.000 0.000 0.000 627.000
input 3 342.000 0.000 0.000 342.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
17 1.000
Results for Kermanshah (18) 
Technical efficiency = 0.919 
Scale efficiency = 0.927 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 273.577 0.000 290.455 564.032
output 2 96.925 0.000 377.781 474.706
output 3 261350.000 0.000 0.000 261350.000
output 4 869.000 0.000 431.917 1300.917
input 1 3499.000 -282.308 0.000 3216.692
input 2 828.000 -66.805 0.000 761.195
input 3 629.000 -50.749 0.000 578.251
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
10 0.523
20 0.335
21 0.108 
15 0.034
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Results for Kordestan (19) 
Technical efficiency = 0.971 
Scale efficiency =0.817 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 327.126 0.000 23.050 350.176
output 2 55.366 0.000 202.668 258.034
output 3 195850.000 0.000 0.000 195850.000
output 4 712.000 0.000 682.054 1394.054
input 1 2818.000 -82.829 0.000 2735.171
input 2 501.000 -14.726 0.000 486.274
input 3 433.000 -12.727 0.000 420.273
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 0.176
20 0.480
5 0.083
17 0.261
Results for Ham (20) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.629 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 105.684 0.000 0.000 105.684
output 2 15.019 0.000 0.000 15.019
output 3 71211.000 0.000 0.000 71211.000
output 4 462.000 0.000 0.000 462.000
input 1 1291.000 0.000 0.000 1291.000
input 2 288.000 0.000 0.000 288.000
input 3 282.000 0.000 0.000 282.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
20 1.000
Results for Pars (21) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1166.163 0.000 0.000 1166.163
output 2 507.118 0.000 0.000 507.118
output 3 611841.000 0.000 0.000 611841.0C
output 4 4250.000 0.000 0.000 4250.000
input 1 6982.000 0.000 0.000 6982.000
input 2 914.000 0.000 0.000 914.000
input 3 978.000 0.000 0.000 978.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
21 1.000
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Results for Bushchr (22) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 582.065 0.000 0.000 582.065
output 2 44.716 0.000 0.000 44.716
output 3 112668.000 0.000 0.000 112668.000
output 4 378.000 0.000 0.000 378.000
input 1 2626.000 0.000 0.000 2626.000
input 2 696.000 0.000 0.000 696.000
input 3 460.000 0.000 0.000 460.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
22 1.000
Results for Shiroz (23) 
Technical efficiency = 0.954 
Scale efficiency =0.940 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 544.423 0.000 0.000 544.423
output 2 385.574 0.000 179.582 565.156
output 3 243599.000 0.000 31175.242 274774.:
output 4 2025.000 0.000 0.000 2025.000
input 1 3721.000 -169.929 0.000 3551.071
input 2 1211.000 -55.303 -383.584 772.112
input 3 745.000 -34.022 0.000 710.978
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
14
21
29
17
0.032
0.267
0.407
0.294
Results for Kerman (24) 
Technical efficiency = 0.513 
Scale efficiency = 0.988 (irs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 713.440 0.000 30.951 744.391
output 2 983.364 0.000 0.000 983.364
output 3 359647.000 0.000 0.000 359647.000
output 4 589.000 0.000 1435.946 2024.946
input 1 8764.000 -4267.285 0.000 4496.715
input 2 1873.000 -911.984 0.000 961.016
input 3 1364.000 -664.146 0.000 699.854
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
17
20
21
10
6
0.081
0.040
0.233
0.484
0.162
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Results for Gilaii (25) 
Technical efficiency = 0.802 
Seale efficiency =0.997 (1rs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 760.488 0.000 57.489 817.977
output 2 560.094 0.000 0.000 560.094
output 3 415226.000 0.000 18879.896 434105.896
output 4 3136.000 0.000 0.000 3136.000
input 1 11255.000 -2223.798 -3792.542 5238.660
input 2 1170.000 -231.172 -132.951 805.877
input 3 904.000 -178.615 0.000 725.385
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.591
4 0.005
17 0.404
Results forMazandaran (26) 
Technical efficiency = 0.714 
Scale efficiency =0.966 (drs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 1385.912 0.000 21.882 1407.794
output 2 653.798 0.000 120.418 774.216
output 3 694512.000 0.000 0.000 694512.000
output 4 4438.000 0.000 0.000 4438.000
input 1 14308.000 -4091.641 -1694.162 8522.197
input 2 2096.000 -599.390 -206.635 1289.975
input 3 1682.000 -480.999 0.000 1201.001
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
21 0.903
4 0.040
9 0.057
Results for Hormozgan (27) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency = 1.000 (crs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 912.873 0.000 0.000 912.873
output 2 135.428 0.000 0.000 135.428
output 3 142902.000 0.000 0.000 142902.000
output 4 382.000 0.000 0.000 382.000
input 1 3823.000 0.000 0.000 3823.000
input 2 912.000 0.000 0.000 912.000
input 3 1046.000 0.000 0.000 1046.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
27 1.000
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Results for Yazd (28) 
Technical efficiency = 0.833 
Scale efficiency =0.760 (1rs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 298.810 0.000 17.415 316.225
output 2 373.297 0.000 0.000 373.297
output 3 181250.000 0.000 0.000 181250.000
output 4 970.000 0.000 146.698 1116.698
input 1 3490.000 -581.786 0.000 2908.214
input 2 537.000 -89.518 0.000 447.482
input 3 488.000 -81.350 -3.770 402.880
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight
5 0.430
21 0.129
6 0.105
20 0.336
Results for Semnan (29) 
Technical efficiency = 1.000 
Scale efficiency =0.909 (1rs) 
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 158.913 0.000 0.000 158.913
output 2 294.085 0.000 0.000 294.085
output 3 110630.000 0.000 0.000 110630.0
output 4 992.000 0.000 0.000 992.000
input 1 1742.000 0.000 0.000 1742.000
input 2 528.000 0.000 0.000 528.000
input 3 664.000 0.000 0.000 664.000
LISTING OF PEERS: 
peer lambda weight 
29 1.000
Results for Sistan & Baloochestan (30)
Technical efficiency = 0.652 
Scale efficiency =0.860 (1rs)
PROJECTION SUMMARY:
variable original radial slack projected
value movement movement value
output 1 396.676 0.000 0.000 396.676
output 2 79.851 0.000 308.503 388.354
output 3 157386.000 0.000 0.000 157386.000
output 4 252.000 0.000 299.281 551.281
input 1 3295.000 -1148.118 0.000 2146.882
input 2 1124.000 -391.650 -85.962 646.388
input 3 1837.000 -640.089 -689.351 507.560
LISTING OF PEERS:
peer lambda weight
10 0.335
14 0.027
15 0.637
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Appendix 4
Developing countries electricity data and correlation results:
Table A4.1 Electricity supply industry of 26 developing countries in 1987
“Thermal”
Countries Electricity production Net installed capacity Employees Energy input
Q (Gwh) K(MW) L (Total) E(TJ)
1 Argentina 23791 8984 34480 259518
2 Bangladesh 5395 1645 25000 66528
3 Central African Republic 18 21 557 255
4 Costa Rica 81 142 5792 935
5 Dominican Republic 4346 900 5700 57772
6 Egypt 30400 6834 33000 288090
7 El Salvador 382 203 2804 6656
8 Ghana 59 113 3978 931
9 Guatemala 266 333 8198 2616
10 Haiti 255 76 1681 3017
11 Indonesia 28725 9000 51203 310099
12 Iran 34164 9862 56638 405827
13 Malaysia 12477 3400 34177 128400
14 Mali 58 42 1000 722
15 Mexico 82024 18062 85750 766229
16 Morocco 7337 1617 8077 84089
17 Nepal 27 42 3200 297
18 Nicaragua 662 247 4437 8255
19 Niger 157 63 1000 2336
20 Nigeria 7695 2140 32912 85232
21 Pakistan 17723 4863 150300 166174
22 Peru 3139 1721 13699 37388
23 Sri Lanka 530 270 16972 6757
24 Thailand 25917 5545 66372 179853
25 Venezuela 23289 9451 18051 266662
26 Zambia 38 191 5100 438
Sources:
Statistics Centre o f Iran, Statistical Yearbook, 1369 (1990).
UN, Energy balances and electricity profiles (1992), New York, 1994
Escay, J.R (1990), Summary Data Sheets o f 1987 power and commercial energy statistics
for 100 developing countries. World Bank
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Table A4.2 Electricity supply industry of 26 developing countries in 1988
“Thermal”
Countries Electricity production Net installed capacity Employees Energy input
Q (Gwh) K(MW) L (Total) E(TJ)
1 Argentina 31473 8988 21986 351360
2 Bangladesh 6191 2084 25000 74266
3 Central African Republic 18 21 557 255
4 Costa Rica 95 142 5722 1089
5 Dominican Republic 4402 1240 5934 54585
6 Egypt 29340 7567 33000 312765
7 El Salvador 295 203 2786 5518
8 Ghana 55 113 6510 890
9 Guatemala 311 333 8190 2990
10 Haiti 280 83 1667 3231
11 Indonesia 31216 9000 51237 305645
12 Iran 36464 8920 59011 429968
13 Malaysia 13650 3480 23892 139363
14 Mali 74 42 1000 935
15 Mexico 84226 18618 77592 788106
16 Morocco 8029 1705 8462 91275
17 Nepal 26 42 7065 297
18 Nicaragua 608 250 3651 7844
19 Niger 160 63 1000 2378
20 Nigeria 7715 2140 32900 86123
21 Pakistan 21674 5033 150300 207980
22 Peru 3118 1731 15000 39447
23 Seri Lanka 202 270 13300 2441
24 Thailand 30185 5604 67386 272846
25 Venezuela 24042 8675 18789 268142
26 Zambia 40 191 5100 487
Sources:
Statistics Centre o f Iran, Statistical Yearbook, 1369 (1990).
UN, Energy balances and electricity profiles (1992), New York, 1994
Escay, J, Summary 1988 power data sheets for 100 developing countries. World Bank, August 1991
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Table A4.3 Comparison of the DBA efficiency scores of 3 with 2 input variables
(Pearson method)
Countries DEA3 (VRS) DEA2 (VRS)
X y xy x= y:
1 Argentina 0.904 0.73 0.65992 0.817216 0.5329
2 Bangladesh 0.665 0.665 0.442225 0.442225 0.442225
3 Central African Republic 1 1 1 1 1
4 Costa Rica 0.788 0.784 0.617792 0.620944 0.614656
5 Dominican Republic 0.888 0.826 0.733488 0.788544 0.682276
6 Egypt 0.927 0.833 0.772191 0.859329 0.693889
7 El Salvador 0.468 0.464 0.217152 0.219024 0.215296
8 Ghana 0.609 0.596 0.362964 0.370881 0.355216
9 Guatemala 0.86 0.86 0.7396 0.7396 0.7396
10 Haiti 0.886 0.886 0.784996 0.784996 0.784996
11 Indonesia 0.867 0.798 0.691866 0.751689 0.636804
12 Iran 0.809 0.773 0.625357 0.654481 0.597529
13 Malaysia 0.837 0.788 0.659556 0.700569 0.620944
14 Mali 0.774 0.772 0.597528 0.599076 0.595984
15 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1
16 Morocco 1 0.927 0.927 1 0.859329
17 Nepal 1 1 1 1 1
18 Nicaragua 0.649 0.647 0.419903 0.421201 0.418609
19 Niger 0.793 0.775 0.614575 0.628849 0.600625
20 Nigeria 0.726 0.726 0.527076 0.527076 0.527076
21 Pakistan 0.85 0.85 0.7225 0.7225 0.7225
22 Peru 0.659 0.659 0.434281 0.434281 0.434281
23 Sri Lanka 0.66 0.66 0.4356 0.4356 0.4356
24 Thailand 1 1 1 1 1
25 Venezuela 1 0.714 0.714 1 0.509796
26 Zambia 0.869 0.86 0.74734 0.755161 0.7396
Sum 21.488 20.593 17.44691 18.273242 16.759731
The formula for Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient is:
r = y r = 0.889577
X = DBA efficiency scores calculated for three inputs (capital, fuel and labour) 
y = DBA efficiency scores calculated for two inputs (capital and fuel) 
n = Number of countries (26)
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Table A4.4 Comparison of the DBA efficiency scores of three with two variables
(Spearman method)
Countries DEA3 (VRS) 
Ranking
DEA2 (VRS) 
Ranking
d d^
1 Argentina 8 18 -10 100
2 Bangladesh 21 21 0 0
3 Central African Republic 3.5 2.5 1 1
4 Costa Rica 18 14 4 16
5 Dominican Republic 9 11 -2 4
6 Egypt 7 10 -3 9
7 El Salvador 26 26 0 0
8 Ghana 25 25 0 0
9 Guatemala 13 7.5 5.5 30.25
10 Haiti 10 6 4 16
11 Indonesia 12 12 0 0
12 Iran 16 16 0 0
13 Malaysia 15 13 2 4
14 Mali 19 17 2 4
15 Mexico 3.5 2.5 1 1
16 Morocco 3.5 5 -1.5 2.25
17 Nepal 3.5 2.5 1 1
18 Nicaragua 24 24 0 0
19 Niger 17 15 2 4
20 Nigeria 20 19 1 1
21 Pakistan 14 9 5 25
22 Peru 23 23 0 0
23 Sri Lanka 22 22 0 0
24 Thailand 3.5 2.5 1 1
25 Venezuela 3.5 20 -16.5 272.25
26 Zambia 11 7.5 3.5 12.25
Spearman’s Rank correlation statistic can be calculated by the following formula:
R =  1 -
6
n{n^  - 1)
R = 0.82769
d = differences between rankings by two DBA calculations
Interpretation: The result indicates that null hypothesis (no difference in ranks 
as evidenced by two DBA calculations) can not be rejected at the significant 
level of 0.01 (0.828 > 0.515).
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Table A4.5 Comparison of the DBA efficiency scores with the SFA results
(Pearson method)
Countries
Stochastic
frontier
DEA2 (VRS) 
scores
X y xy x= f-
1 Argentina 0.6575 0.73 0.479975 0.43230625 0.5329
2 Bangladesh 0.6952 0.665 0.462308 0.48330304 0.442225
3 Central African Republic 0.8283 1 0.8283 0.68608089 1
4 Costa Rica 0.8472 0.784 0.6642048 0.71774784 0.614656
5 Dominican Republic 0.708 0.826 0.584808 0.501264 0.682276
6 Egypt 0.7813 0.833 0.6508229 0.61042969 0.693889
7 El Salvador 0.4661 0.464 0.2162704 0.21724921 0.215296
8 Ghana 0.5492 0.596 0.3273232 0.30162064 0.355216
9 Guatemala 0.9511 0.86 0.817946 0.90459121 0.7396
10 Haiti 0.9703 0.886 0.8596858 0.94148209 0.784996
11 Indonesia 0.7284 0.798 0.5812632 0.53056656 0.636804
12 Iran 0.6032 0.773 0.4662736 0.36385024 0.597529
13 Malaysia 0.8161 0.788 0.6430868 0.66601921 0.620944
14 Mali 0.9232 0.772 0.7127104 0.85229824 0.595984
15 Mexico 0.7792 1 0.7792 0.60715264 1
16 Morocco 0.7875 0.927 0.7300125 0.62015625 0.859329
17 Nepal 0.9604 1 0.9604 0.92236816 1
18 Nicaragua 0.8035 0.647 0.5198645 0.64561225 0.418609
19 Niger 0.765 0.775 0.592875 0.585225 0.600625
20 Nigeria 0.7755 0.726 0.563013 0.60140025 0.527076
21 Pakistan 0.8615 0.85 0.732275 0.74218225 0.7225
22 Peru 0.6574 0.659 0.4332266 0.43217476 0.434281
23 Sri Lanka 0.7691 0.66 0.507606 0.59151481 0.4356
24 Thailand 0.9843 1 0.9843 0.96884649 1
25 Venezuela 0.6252 0.714 0.4463928 0.39087504 0.509796
26 Zambia 0.7256 0.86 0.624016 0.52649536 0.7396
sum 20.0193 20.593 16.1681595 15.8428124 16.759731
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient is calculated as follows:
r = y r = 0.71
X  =  Stochastic frontier results of technical efficiency for two inputs (capital and fuel) 
y = DBA efficiency scores calculated for two inputs (capital and fuel) 
n = Number of countries (26)
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Table A4.6 Comparison of the DBA efficiency scores with SFA results
(Spearman method)
Country
Stochastic
frontier
Ranking
DEA2 (VRS) 
Ranking
d d^
1 Argentina 21 18 3 9
2 Bangladesh 20 21 -1 1
3 Central African Republic 8 2.5 5.5 30.25
4 Costa Rica 7 14 -7 49
5 Dominican Republic 19 11 8 64
6 Egypt 12 10 2 4
7 El Salvador 26 26 0 0
8 Ghana 25 25 0 0
9 Guatemala 4 7.5 -3.5 12.25
10 Haiti 2 6 -4 16
11 Indonesia 17 12 5 25
12 Iran 24 16 8 64
13 Malaysia 9 13 -4 16
14 Mali 5 17 -12 144
15 Mexico 13 2.5 10.5 110.25
16 Morocco 11 5 6 36
17 Nepal 3 2.5 0.5 0.25
18 Nicaragua 10 24 -14 196
19 Niger 16 15 1 1
20 Nigeria 14 19 -5 25
21 Pakistan 6 9 -3 9
22 Peru 22 23 -1 1
23 Sri Lanka 15 22 -7 49
24 Thailand 1 2.5 -1.5 2.25
25 Venezuela 23 20 3 9
26 Zambia 18 7.5 10.5 110.25
Spearman’s Rank correlation statistic can be calculated by the following formula:
R =1
6
n{n^  - 1)
R = 0.664
d = differences between rankings by two approaches (DBA and SFA).
Interpretation: The result indicates that null hypothesis (no difference in ranks 
as evidenced by two approaches; SFA, DBA) can not be rejected 
at the significant level of 0.01 (0.664 > 0.515).
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